THE ‘TOONERVILLE TROLLEY’: THE POLITICIZATION OF THE SCARBOROUGH RAPID TRANSIT LINE IN POST-SUBURBAN TORONTO

Peter Voltsinis
“The world is watching.”¹ A spokesperson for the Province of Ontario’s (the Province) Urban Transportation Development Corporation (UTDC) uttered those poignant words on March 21, 1985, one day before the Toronto Transit Commission’s (TTC) inaugural opening of the Scarborough Rapid Transit (SRT) line.² One day later, Ontario Deputy Premier Robert Welch gave the signal to the TTC dispatchers to send the line’s first trains into the Scarborough Town Centre Station, proclaiming that it was “a great day for Scarborough and a great day for public transit.”³ For him, the SRT was proof that Ontario can challenge the world.⁴

This research essay outlines the development of the SRT to carve out an accurate place for the infrastructure project in Toronto’s planning history. I focus on the SRT’s development chronology, from the moment of the Spadina Expressway’s cancellation in 1971 to the opening of the line in 1985. Correctly classifying what the SRT represents in Toronto’s planning history requires a clear vision of how the project emerged. To create that image, I first situate my research within Toronto’s dominant historiographical planning narratives. I then synthesize the processes and phenomena, specifically postmodern planning and post-suburbanization, that generated public transit alternatives to expressway development in Toronto in the 1970s. Building on my synthesis, I present how the SRT fits into that context and analyze the changing landscape of Toronto land-use politics in the 1970s and early-1980s. This analysis is integral to understanding the SRT as a representation of Toronto’s broader sociopolitical realities—namely, the politics of density that surrounded the Province’s involvement in the SRT’s development.

² Ibid.
⁴ Ibid.
By analyzing its emergence through those lenses, I argue that provincial placemaking agendas and the politicization of public transit in post-suburban Toronto, rather than planning’s postmodern shift, shaped the SRT. Indeed, the transit line’s development started in postmodernity’s emerging participatory planning context. However, the SRT was not a postmodern creation; it was a highly political endeavour, guided by provincial placemaking dreams and motivated by post-suburban politics. As such, the project reveals continuity across planning’s modern-postmodern narrative and is a unique window into the relationship between planning reform, elite agency, and the politicization of public transit in post-suburban Toronto.

**Historiography: The Narrative Structure of Toronto’s Planning History after the Second World War**

Five areas of inquiry constitute the study of planning history: i) studies of planning movements and organizations; ii) biographical studies of individual planners; iii) studies of the planning of cities, towns, and suburbs; iv) explorations of the national and global experiences of planning; and v) research on specific types of planning intervention. This research essay builds on the history of the planning of post-Second World War Toronto. The writings of Frances Frisken, John Sewell, and Richard White form this period’s dominant historical narratives. These historians focus on critical junctures—phases in Toronto’s history where planning

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discourses shifted. More specifically, they represent what urban scholar and historian Pierre Filion describes as medium time-scale views of planning’s shift from modernism to postmodernism. These lenses focus on ideational cycles (i.e., sequences that prompted planning’s shift from modernism to postmodernism) rather than short-term micro-histories of events or longer-term histories of society’s regularities.

**Post-Second World War Toronto’s Planning History: Modernism to Postmodernism**

Chronologically, there are three historical narratives that describe how Toronto’s planning context changed since the Second World War: i) the predominance of technocratic planning for the expedition of large-scale infrastructure and redevelopment projects (1945 to the late-1960s); ii) planning’s adaptation to citizen movements and advocacy (the 1970s to the late-1980s); and iii) and planning’s reposition in the face of waning neoliberalism (the 1990s to the present). This paper is an extension of the literature that focuses on the shift from planning’s technocratic to participatory epochs, applied to Toronto’s transit infrastructures. Although limited, several works contend with these shifts and reflect a modern-postmodern understanding of the emergence of rapid transit systems as alternatives to expressway developments in Toronto.

Defining planning’s modern-postmodern transition explains how these works fit into planning history more generally. Urban scholar David Harvey argues that an expert-driven program of reconstruction after the Second World War, when planning regimes supported large-scale metropolitan plans and projects, propelled planning’s modernist moment. This

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8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., 2.
10 Ibid., 6.
technocratic approach, defined as the rational-comprehensive model of planning, generated transformative planning visions for cities and produced auto-centric suburbs, accessible urban cores of various expressways, and planned metropolitan regions.\textsuperscript{12}

Planning’s ideational transition to postmodernism started in the late-1960s and early-1970s, triggered by the consequences of, and disillusionment with, modernism’s grand narratives.\textsuperscript{13} Postmodernism in planning is a cultural paradigm and symbolizes a post-Second World War shift from modernism’s ideological doctrines.\textsuperscript{14} Agitations with these visions for cities and the projects they produced (i.e., urban expressways and renewal) ushered in participatory planning, which adapted planning to postmodernity’s multitude of views and fragmented values.\textsuperscript{15} Disruptions to neighbourhoods, caused by large redevelopment and expressway projects, interrupted the placid acceptance of expert visions; citizens confronted politicians and advocated for participation in the planning process to dismantle those narratives and create locally-driven plans.\textsuperscript{16} The emergence of suburban rapid transit systems, including the SRT, in the 1970s and 1980s can be seen as a product of shifting planning discourses that instigated the replacement of expressway developments in Toronto with investments in alternative forms of public transit. Although limited, several published works on Toronto’s planning history disseminate and conform to that narrative.

Frances Frisken’s text, entitled *The Public Metropolis: The Political Dynamics of Urban Expansion in the Toronto Region, 1924-2003*, answers the question of how provincial-municipal government politics, individual agency, and demographic changes altered Toronto’s metropolitan landscape after World War One.\(^{17}\) In terms of the role of centralized planning bodies in the development of post-Second World War public transit infrastructures, Frisken contends that persistent anti-highway social sentiments generated the rationale for the development of suburban rapid transit lines in the 1970s.\(^{18}\) Frisken focuses on these social turbulences, namely citizen movements such as the Stop Spadina movement, to account for these transit investments.\(^{19}\) I build on her work by discussing the role of longer-term political processes (the politics of post-suburbanization) in the SRT’s development.

John Sewell adopts a similar modern-postmodern framework in his published works on Toronto’s planning history.\(^{20}\) Recognizing Sewell’s political history and role as City of Toronto Mayor between 1978 and 1980, his works nonetheless constitute a significant portion of the history of Toronto’s planning regimes after the Second World War.\(^{21}\) Sewell traces the origins of Toronto’s modernist vision and details how planning for Metropolitan Toronto (Metro Toronto) materialized and, eventually, demised in the wake of waning support for centralized planning bodies.\(^{22}\) Anti-expressway advocacy, built heritage protectionism, resident opposition to urban renewal projects, and resident opposition to new apartment developments created a new pluralistic vision that incrementally replaced Metro Toronto’s expert-driven planning approaches.\(^{23}\) For Sewell, the shift towards metropolitan de-concentration (the creation of

\(^{17}\) Frances Frisken, *The Public Metropolis*.
\(^{18}\) Ibid., 176.
\(^{19}\) Ibid., 177.
\(^{20}\) John Sewell, *The Shape of the Suburbs*; John Sewell, *The Shape of the City*.
\(^{22}\) John Sewell, *The Shape of the Suburbs*; John Sewell, *The Shape of the City*.
\(^{23}\) John Sewell, *The Shape of the City*, 181.
subcentres and transit systems in Toronto’s suburban communities) to curb urban sprawl constituted part of this activist-motivated, postmodern dream. Sewell concentrates on ideational changes in Toronto’s planning discourses after the Second World War, focusing on local movements and ideas and how they changed Toronto’s urban and suburban forms. My analysis of the SRT recognizes the modern-postmodern shift in planning to which Sewell refers and enhances it with a view of the underlying political processes that prolong that transition.

Richard White in *Planning Toronto: The Planners, the Plans, their Legacies, 1940-80*, although attentive to the social, political, and economic trends that characterize post-Second World War Toronto, also focuses on changes in planning ideas after the Second World War. He argues that by, the late-1960s, Metropolitan Toronto’s expressway network became the object of anti-planning mobilization, a reaction to institutional expert authority that was too focused on public planning goals rather than local interests. Similar to Frisken and Sewell, White also contends that anti-automobile environmentalism in Toronto was one cause of the lack of new major roadway investments in the 1970s and 1980s. However, White deviates from the scholarly tendency to view modern planners as disconnected technocrats; he argues that Toronto’s planners clearly saw and reasonably addressed the city’s modern problems, including the ascendance of the automobile. His work reveals that planning was never “the sole, or even the prime, creator of the city’s physical form”; these landscapes, in his estimation, are better defined as products of economic cycles, demographic patterns, and the pursuits of private property owners, channeled through the established planning regime. White addresses the

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27 Ibid., 370.
29 Ibid., 5-6.
durable “background” factors, such as the institutional structure of the Province’s political economy, that propel planning decisions. I apply this approach to the SRT to clarify its position during Toronto’s modern-postmodern shift.

Although limited in quantity, several of Toronto’s planning historians generally (but not unanimously) focus on the ideational forces in Ontario’s planning regime that motivated the demise of expressways and the emergence of rapid transit alternatives to those projects. A complete outline of the SRT’s position on Toronto’s historical mantle hinges on these explanations and a broader view of Toronto’s socio-political realities in the 1970s and 1980s. In line with Richard White’s arguments, I contend that the implementation of postmodern planning values and discourses did not facilitate the SRT’s development. Rather, an emergent politics of post-suburban densification, which surrounded the commercialization of the Scarborough Town Centre (STC), catalyzed the project and dictated its final form.

**Post-suburbanization, the Politics of Density, and the SRT’s Development**

The point at which citizen groups and local political actors seriously challenged metropolitan expressways in Toronto is an essential part of the context in which the SRT developed. Citizen advocacy and the awakening of postmodern planning motivated, in part, the demise of the Crosstown, Spadina, and Scarborough Expressways. Nonetheless, the discourses that propelled the demise of these expressways and those which brought the SRT into existence are separate. Although the SRT emerged during Toronto’s postmodern transition, the discourses that halted metropolitan expressway projects did not perpetuate nor shape its development. The SRT is a political creation, birthed by the morphological changes that Metro Toronto experienced in the 1970s and 1980s and shaped by the Province through the UTDC. The

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31 Ian Milligan, “‘This Board Has a Duty to Intervene,’” 28.
disconnect between new planning discourses and the implementation of those ideals, in the case of the SRT, highlights the power of political placemaking dreams on transit planning decisions in post-suburban Toronto.

**An Emergent Polycentricity: Metro Toronto’s Post-suburbanization**

The transition from modernity to postmodernity in Toronto’s planning history is gradual and prolonged by sociopolitical processes that reduce the effects that new planning discourses have on the built form of cities. These processes, namely profit motives and the influence of existing built forms on development patterns, create continuity across planning’s modern and postmodern epochs. The influence of politics and space economics are also durable in their capacity to shape Toronto’s metropolitan region. In terms of the SRT’s development, the process of Scarborough’s post-suburbanization, morphologically and politically, reveals that planning modernity did not demise with the Province’s disapproval of the Spadina Expressway.

Post-suburbanization is a historical change in the direction of suburbs where the process of de-densification (suburbanization) is converted or inverted into a process of densification. It involves the reshaping of metropolitan regions through the decentralization of urban features and functions—including corporate headquarters, municipal administrations, and industrial parks—to the suburbs. The development of the STC in 1973 marks the beginning of this transformation in Scarborough. The $400-million project on the 170-acre site north of Ellesmere Road between Brimley and McCowan Roads, with its wide tracts of surface parking and connections to the adjacent provincial highway, epitomized Toronto’s culture of suburban living and private

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32 Pierre Filion, “Rupture or Continuity?”, 431
33 Ibid., 439.
automobility.\textsuperscript{36} Despite its suburban composition, shifts in Toronto’s urban form in the late-1960s reshaped how this subcentre was discussed, marketed, and planned, provincially and municipally.

The SRT emerged during the rapid commercialization of Toronto’s subcentre in the late-1960s, after Eatons/Trizec announced their intention to build a regional shopping mall (i.e., the STC) in Scarborough.\textsuperscript{37} Soon thereafter, Scarborough Council decided to build a new city hall adjacent to the shopping centre.\textsuperscript{38} These investments perpetuated Toronto’s longer-term decentralization of downtown office space, which began in the early 1950s. Further, they amplified the STC’s role as a metropolitan subcentre, making it the focus of new rapid transit infrastructure investments. Indeed, until the 1960s, office decentralization only occurred across Metro Toronto’s urban core (Table One).\textsuperscript{39} In 1951, Metro Toronto’s central area contained 83 per cent of office building space in the Toronto Census Metropolitan Area (CMA), with 17 per cent dispersed in the municipality’s suburban periphery.\textsuperscript{40} By 1986, however, Toronto’s core contained only 50.5 per cent of the CMA’s office building space, with 41.6 per cent situated in the city’s surrounding suburbs.\textsuperscript{41} Growing downtown traffic problems and the location of inexpensive land close to highway corridors in Toronto’s periphery prompted this dispersal of office jobs across Metro Toronto.\textsuperscript{42} These phenomena also instigated and coincided with changes

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid.
in municipal policy frameworks, which attempted to expedite this process of deconcentration to reduce downtown infrastructure strain.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table One. Growth in Office Building Space in the Toronto CMA: 1951-1986</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1951</td>
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<tr>
<td>1961</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1971</td>
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<td>1981</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
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</tbody>
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Notes:
1) * estimated
2) Absolute data are square metres of floorspace
Source: Malcolm R. Matthew’s data. Derived from Metro Toronto, 1987, Tables 2, 8; and from Metro’s inventory of office buildings

Aware of new apprehensions about downtown infrastructure capacity, the City of Toronto in its 1976 Official Plan prescribed a downzoning in the Central Business District (CBD) to encourage an increase in employment growth across the city. These policy changes accelerated the proliferation of office buildings around the STC from the late-1960s to the mid-1980s (Table Two). In fact, between 1979 and 1985, developers constructed five office buildings on the lands surrounding the STC, including: the six-storey Bell Telephone building in 1979; the six-storey Canada Life Centre in 1983; the two 16-storey office buildings at Consilium Place (to the immediate east of McCowan Road) in 1984 and 1985, and the 12-storey federal government

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building in 1985, when the SRT line opened. Office space around the town centre expanded from 6,900 square metres (sq. m) in 1966 to 187,900 sq. m by the end of 1986, constituting an increase of approximately 2,700 per cent. The STC’s commercialization across this timeframe reveals Metro Toronto’s rapid decentralization of typical urban uses and, thus, Scarborough’s post-suburbanization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Year Occ.</th>
<th>No. of Stys.</th>
<th>Office space (sq. m)</th>
<th>Project space (sq. m)</th>
<th>Off. % of proj</th>
<th>Floor area ratio of prj</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1801 Brimley Road</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6,900</td>
<td>6,900</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Sub-total: pre-1971</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>150 Borough</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>27,900</td>
<td>27,900</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Sub-total: 1972-1976</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>100 Borough</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>23,400</td>
<td>23,400</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0.9</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Sub-total: 1977-1981</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>55 Town Centre</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20,700</td>
<td>20,700</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>200 Consil.</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>34,500</td>
<td>34,500</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>100 Consil.</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>34,500</td>
<td>34,500</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>200 Town C.</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Sub-total: 1982-1986</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>187,900</td>
<td>187,900</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Malcolm R. Matthew’s data.

Increases in the residential density (persons per square kilometre or square mile) of Toronto’s suburban CMAs between 1971 and 1996 also demonstrate the gradual ‘urbanizing’ of its suburbs (Table Three). Across those 15 years, Toronto exhibited above-average suburban density increases, reaching approximately 3,000 persons per square kilometre by 1996. These

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46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
trends illustrate that, even prior to the development of the STC, trends of suburban densification shaped Toronto’s regional morphology. Toronto’s downtown population densities incrementally decreased since 1941 from 94,000 persons per square mile to 32,000 persons per square mile by 1976.\textsuperscript{50} Deconcentration and decentralization in Toronto materialized in decreases in the city’s downtown population, a flattening of density gradients, and the dispersal of the population over a larger urban envelope.\textsuperscript{51} As a result, Scarborough emerged as one of Metro Toronto’s growing centres of commerce and population in the region’s new polycentric urban fabric, a landscape shaped by a process of urban transformation from single to multiple centres in a metropolitan region.\textsuperscript{52} However, as Urban Geographer Daniel Griffith argues in the first study of this phenomenon in Toronto, the region’s polycentric transformation was not completely a natural phenomenon; it was more gradual than desired by Toronto’s and Ontario’s planning regimes, which instigated focused efforts to expedite the process.\textsuperscript{53}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CMA</th>
<th>Suburban population*</th>
<th>Suburban density</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Toronto</td>
<td>1,433,181</td>
<td>2,634,466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montréal</td>
<td>1,630,875</td>
<td>2,061,663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vancouver</td>
<td>609,295</td>
<td>1,157,824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ottawa-Hull</td>
<td>390,955</td>
<td>637,099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calgary</td>
<td>312,740</td>
<td>604,739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton</td>
<td>278,099</td>
<td>408,861</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1) * Continuously built territory lying outside the inner city.
Source: Bunting, Filion, and Priston’s data.\textsuperscript{54} Derived from Statistics Canada Census, 1971 and 1996

\textsuperscript{51} Bunting, Filion, and Priston, “Density Gradients,” 2532.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{54} Bunting, Filion, and Priston, “Density Gradients,” 2544.
The SRT as an Expeditor of Post-suburban Densification

Post-suburbia is characterized by an emergent polycentricity. However, these physical changes derive from and are reshaped by a framework of investment in infrastructure networks funded by non-local tiers of government intervention.\(^{55}\) Political concerns with the longer-term use value of land (and its amenity for business)—and a disconnect between local and regional political views of how to satisfy mobility demands—also propel these changes.\(^{56}\) The Province’s technological agenda for the use of ICTSs shaped the dreams of density around the STC that the Province, Metro Toronto, and Scarborough shared. These dreams constitute the politics of density that accelerated Toronto’s post-suburbanization and motivated the SRT’s development.\(^{57}\)

The SRT emerged during Toronto’s transition through modernity into postmodernity, characterized by the demise of metropolitan planning capacity—a period beginning in the 1969 when Toronto elected a reform bloc of ‘new guard’ city councillors in response to resident resentment over downtown expressway and redevelopment schemes.\(^{58}\) Under its influence, the City launched a secondary plan process in which residents played a dominant role in emphasizing the preservation of their respective neighbourhoods.\(^{59}\) Similar philosophical changes arrived on the provincial stage when, in 1971, mounting citizen group and City of Toronto opposition motivated the Province to abandon the proposed Spadina Expressway.\(^{60}\) 1971 also marks the beginning of the SRT’s development, when Premier Davis built on his decision to

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\(^{57}\) Ibid.


\(^{60}\) Filion, “Balancing Concentration and Dispersion?”, 173.
reject the Spadina Expressway by creating the Urban Transportation Development Corporation (UTDC).\textsuperscript{61}

These decisions initiated the Province’s more direct involvement in the manufacture of public transit infrastructures and technologies.\textsuperscript{62} One year later, on Wednesday, November 22, 1972, Premier Davis announced at the Ontario Science Centre the release of an urban transportation policy for Ontario entitled “A New Way to Go/Ontario.”\textsuperscript{63} The policy document outlined new problems that Toronto’s downtown core was facing, including overcrowding and congestion.\textsuperscript{64} It also projected a new planning message that coincided with Toronto’s anti-expressway citizen protests: that it would be folly to continue to rely on the automobile and other existing public transportation systems in the coming decades to satisfy Ontario’s mobility needs.\textsuperscript{65} The stage was set, in the Province’s view, for the use of advancing transit technologies that could function in an intermediate capacity between subways and bus lines.\textsuperscript{66} In its new GO-Urban framework, Davis’s government identified five routes in Metro Toronto for the use of these “Intermediate Capacity Transit Systems” (ICTSs) that could carry 20,000 persons per hour in each direction.\textsuperscript{67} The Province linked its dream of creating a new transportation system to a broader planning vision that emerged across the region’s political institutions: the need to densify Metro Toronto’s sprawling suburbs.\textsuperscript{68}

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{63} Ontario Ministry of Transportation and Communications, \textit{A New Way to Go/Ontario}, Record ID: 1703736, Call Number: 388.40971 N266, Toronto Public Library, Stacks Request Reference S-BST, 1972, 1.
\textsuperscript{64} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{65} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., 15-16.
\textsuperscript{68} Ibid., 20.
Premier Davis’s report marks the beginning of his government’s fascination with exploring new alternatives to expressways across Ontario and to forging a connected, polycentric Toronto. In 1973, the Government of Ontario announced its plan to create an ICTS using magnetic levitation and linear induction motors, a project undertaken by Krauss-Maffei and the West German government and that eventually became the SRT.69 The Province also began constructing a “Demonstration Track” at Exhibition Place to market, test, and unveil this technology, which the German government personally introduced to Premier Davis after a trip to Munich.70 In Davis’s government’s view, encouraging densified growth in appropriate areas in Metro Toronto required new, economical systems that balanced high-rise, high-density living with suburban sprawl.71 The government’s planning goal for the use of these systems was clear: to drive densified development to Toronto’s suburbs.

The Province grounded its new visions in a recognition of the need for expanded and improved public transit service in Scarborough. In September of the same year, Toronto Transit Commissioner D. Crawford Smith concluded that the need for rapid transit beyond Kennedy Station had been studied to an unnecessary extreme; to him, a full subway capable of carrying 40,000 persons one way per hour was the most obvious solution to Scarborough’s public transit deficiencies.72 After the Commissioner issued his call to action, Acres Consulting Services Limited on behalf of the City of Toronto Planning Board released a “Study of Public Transit Alternatives in the Scarborough Area.” The study revealed that traffic trends increased in the morning peak period of subway ridership at Victoria Park Station from 5,131 persons in 1969 to

71 Ontario Ministry of Transportation and Communications, A New Way to Go/Ontario, 20.
16,045 persons in 1973; over those four years, vehicular trips remained constant, indicating growing strains on the system’s existing public transit infrastructures.\textsuperscript{73} In fact, subway ridership increased from 162,200,000 in 1971 to 169,200,000 in 1972 and from 330,495,450 in 1971 to 345,994,178 in 1972 over the entire transit system.\textsuperscript{74} Demand for public transit across Toronto rose to a new apex in the region’s developing polycentric landscape. The Province responded to these demands and reacted to the anti-expressway activism that characterized Toronto’s postmodernity. However, debates about Scarborough’s transportation future, coupled with the Province’s technology-driven agenda, reveal that this post-suburban planning arena was highly politicized, expert-driven, and attached to Toronto’s modern planning epoch.

Technocratic debates about transportation decisions persisted after the collapse of the Spadina Expressway. Providentially, the Davis government was committed to testing its GO-Urban transit system as an alternative to expressways, subways, and buses, despite brewing public skepticism about the system’s utility. By 1973, the German Government invested more than $12.5-million into the system.\textsuperscript{75} On September 11th of the same year, the Province and the TTC held the first public meeting at the newly-built STC to gauge public reactions to the implementation of ICTS routes in Scarborough.\textsuperscript{76} The 150-person audience criticized the technology’s untested safety features, comparing the vehicles to “flying coffins.”\textsuperscript{77} These sentiments pierced Toronto’s local planning veil three months later when the TTC rejected the


\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., 27.


\textsuperscript{77} Ibid.
Province’s request to study the viability of these systems in Scarborough. The TTC agreed with the “Street Cars for Toronto” citizen group, who contended that the Commission should not commit itself to a study of routes that could only be implemented with untested GO-Urban vehicles.78 Despite the TTC’s resistance, the Province remained committed to the project, recommending again that consultants undertake a study of a Scarborough rapid transit route from Warden Station to the Pickering border.79

The Province’s technology-driven dream was unwavering despite these public shortfalls and growing political skepticism about the technology’s functionality. The failure of the automated Bay Area Rapid Transit system (BART) in San Francisco in April of 1974 heightened the criticism directed at the GO-Urban project. Transportation Minister Rhodes faced such disapproval in the Legislature when his Liberal counterparts questioned whether the minister had any basis for believing that Ontario’s experiment at the CNE will succeed.80 The BART’s failure generated more political skepticism about the utility of automated ICTS systems when the government announced an eight-week delay in the technology’s development and that the costs for the CNE’s system had increased to $25-million.81 Such turbulence climaxed when Liberal Transportation critic Philip Givens called on the government to abandon its GO-Urban plan entirely.82 Despite these tribulations, Minister Rhodes insisted that GO-Urban will succeed, entrenching the durability of the Province’s new transit dream for post-suburban Toronto.83

79 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 “GO-Urban Will Succeed: Rhodes.”
The infusion of local politics into this technocratic visioning exercise manifested in April of 1974 when Scarborough Mayor Paul Cosgrove called a joint meeting of Toronto’s four planning boards (Metro, East York, Toronto, and Scarborough) in the Scarborough Civic Centre. Cosgrove established the congregation to grapple with the question of whether Scarborough’s expressway corridor should be retained for public transit use, including the use of ICTSs. Moreover, the working group was Scarborough’s response to a report by the Metro Transportation Plan Review that recommended against the expressway’s construction. One week earlier, two motions passed at Scarborough’s Board of Control, one opposing and one supporting the expressway. Despite this political choreography, Scarborough Council eventually approved the expressway’s immediate construction, pitting itself against Metro Toronto’s and the Province’s new planning agendas.

These regional-local political dialectics display the different power modalities that materialize in post-suburbia. Such conversations are part of a broader form of territorial politics that emerged in Metro Toronto’s increasingly regional landscape, where state-driven technologies are deployed to relieve these tensions. For the Province, an automated ICTS was the best means of expediting suburban densification and relieving regional debates about how to resolve new mobility demands across Toronto’s changing suburbs. However, after magnet malfunctions in Munich delayed the CNE exhibit’s opening by eight weeks, the West German Government abruptly withdrew funding from Krauss-Maffei and divested entirely from the

85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
This unforeseen decision prompted Minister Rhodes to travel to Bonn on November 1st to address the situation, resulting in Ontario negotiating exclusive world rights to the technology.\textsuperscript{90} After he made this announcement in the Legislature, Ontario Liberal Leader Robert Nixon urged the government to abandon the project and spare taxpayers by focusing on proven forms of rapid transit.\textsuperscript{91} Stephen Lewis, the New Democratic Party Leader, duplicated these sentiments during a Queen’s Park press conference.\textsuperscript{92} Lewis then filed a non-confidence motion, which ultimately failed in lieu of the Progressive Conservative majority in the Legislature, over the government’s handling of the magnetic levitation transit system.\textsuperscript{93} Such political turbulence encouraged the Province to respond, not only to its critics but to the demand for public transit alternatives in Scarborough. The response, however, ensured the UTDC’s sustained involvement in the development of ICTS technologies.

Recognizing the project’s uncertainty, the Province in 1975 revived a previous transit plan from 1966 for Scarborough that called for a 3.5-mile streetcar or light rail transit (LRT) system, developed by the UTDC, from Kennedy Station to the STC.\textsuperscript{94} Speaking before the Broadview Progressive Conservative Association, Transportation Minister Rhodes argued that Ontario needed swift actions such as these, which included increasing transit subsidies from 50 to 75 per cent, to address Metro Toronto’s urgent transportation problems.\textsuperscript{95} Rhodes based his comments on a 164-page report by Dr. Richard Soberman, chairman of the Metropolitan Toronto

\textsuperscript{89} Thomas Coleman. “Germans Back Out: Ontario Cancels Plan for Magnetic Trains.”
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{91} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{92} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{95} Ibid.
Transportation Plan Review, who contended that complementing decentralizing growth, rather than stimulating downtown concentration, needed to be Toronto’s primary transportation goal.\footnote{Thomas Coleman, “Scrap Queen Subway Plan for Better Suburban Transit, Study Urges,” \textit{The Globe and Mail (1936-Current)}, Jan 28, 1975, http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.uwaterloo.ca/docview/1239448299?accountid=14906.} Visions of a polycentric urban fabric for Ontario’s largest city continued despite GO-Urban’s temporary failure, and a high-speed LRT (i.e., the SRT line) to the STC, created by the UTDC, was a major component of that regional, technology-driven dream for the Province.

Political discussions about the revived line’s usefulness are products of an in-between-ness of political relations between the Province, Metro Toronto, and Scarborough in post-suburbia.\footnote{Douglas Young and Roger Keil. “Reconnecting the Disconnected,” 91.} Similar to the physical decentralization that the Province promoted, political dispersions also emerged when residual tensions over the Spadina Expressway controversy seeped into debates over the Province’s role in transit planning. In Metro Chairman Paul Godfrey’s view, Soberman’s study showed that the provincial government erred in stopping the Spadina Expressway without providing Toronto with reasonable transportation alternatives.\footnote{Raymond Aboud, “Reactions to Transport Study among Metro Politicians Mixed,” \textit{The Globe and Mail (1936-Current)}, Jan 30, 1975, http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.uwaterloo.ca/docview/1239444480?accountid=14906.} By contrast, Scarborough Mayor Paul Cosgrove supported the report’s recommendations in principle, contending that he was involved for an extensive period of time in attempting to bring job opportunities to Scarborough through extensions to rapid transit infrastructures.\footnote{Ibid.} Ironically, the original 1956 proposal by the TTC for a streetcar line in the same area produced one of the largest public uproars in the history of the borough over expropriation and neighbourhood compatibility concerns.\footnote{Ibid.} However, as the STC’s morphology shifted, economic development objectives for Scarborough gradually came into greater balance with those centering on the
protection of residential amenity.\textsuperscript{101} These new, post-suburban visions tamed Scarborough’s previous fears of community rupture.

The Province’s, Metro Toronto’s, and Scarborough’s economic dreams also unified Toronto’s post-suburban political context. This arena produced discursive placemaking attempts to reimagine the region, including Scarborough, as a landscape of global urban competitiveness.\textsuperscript{102} Commonly-held economic visions of the STC as a metropolitan subcentre generated consensus among Scarborough’s planners about the need to develop a quasi-downtown around the STC through the use of a LRT line. Supported by Planners C. A. Tripp (Development Commissioner), D. F. Easton (Planning Commissioner), and R. K. Brown (Works Commissioner), Scarborough asked Metro Toronto on August 25, 1975, to implement the new transportation plan, emphasizing the importance of bringing 25,000 jobs to the STC.\textsuperscript{103} Two years later, Metro Toronto approved the $108.7-million project by a 23-8 margin.

The line’s approval was not completely uncontroversial. The decision, like the report that prompted it, also opened regional-local rifts in Metro Toronto’s political fabric. Indeed, City of Toronto Mayor John Sewell argued that the transit line was a “costly lemon” and that Metro’s intent to test the functionality of this type of ICTS was inappropriate.\textsuperscript{104} Despite these concerns, Sewell received no political support from Metro to reduce by half the City’s $4.4-million

\textsuperscript{102} Jean-Paul D. Addie and Roger Keil, “Real Existing Regionalism,” 413.
allocation for the transit line. The TTC eventually released the first of five progress reports on the SRT’s development in October of 1980, overlooking these debates and emphasizing that the seven-kilometre line will bring direct transit service to the STC, shape land use, and facilitate economic development. Toronto’s post-suburban political discourses converged on economic development goals but diverged on the best means to realize those visions. Nonetheless, the politicized dream of a polycentric urban fabric was durable throughout the SRT’s contemplation.

Metro Toronto eventually formalized this economic dream on a local level in 1980. To accommodate office development being diverted from the CBD, Metro Toronto Council adopted in its 1980 Official Plan a “Centres” policy intended to direct the growth of peripheral office and industrial uses to Scarborough and North York—two major suburban centres that were planned to be located at the end of rapid transit routes. The placemaking associated with the LRT line built on these policies and continued late into 1981 in the UTDC’S “Welcome Aboard: Tomorrow’s Transit Today” pamphlet. Reported as “the most advanced urban transit technology in the world,” the SRT kept the TTC “at the forefront of urban transit service and innovation, and is helping to stimulate further development of the booming core of Scarborough one of this country’s fastest growing cities.” These marketing materials reveal the UTDC’s global placemaking project for the SRT line. However, the UTDC was not referring to the LRT plans

that were on the books since 1975 but, rather, a renewed automated guideway system that the Province began developing in 1976, after the collapse of GO-Urban.\footnote{Urban Transportation Development Corporation. ICTS Development Program , 1976, Record ID: 259655. Call Number: 388.42097 U67 V. 2-3, Toronto Public Library, Stacks Request Reference S-BST.}

The abrupt change in the SRT’s development chronology, when it transitioned to an elevated guideway transit system, reveals the techno-material bias of regional transit decision-making processes in Toronto’s post-suburban political arena in the 1980s.\footnote{Jean-Paul D. Addie and Roger Keil, “Real Existing Regionalism,” 414.} Indeed, on June 16, 1981, the TTC discarded the streetcar plans in favour of the UTDC’s revised automated ICTS system, intended to run northeast from the Bloor-Danforth subway terminal at Kennedy Station and Eglinton Avenue for four miles to the STC.\footnote{Alden Baker, “Scarborough Mayor Calls Automated Line ‘Toonerville Trolley’,” \textit{The Globe and Mail (1936-Current)}, Jun 17, 1981, http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.uwaterloo.ca/docview/1151392882?accountid=14906.} The decision came after the president of the UTDC invited a group of Scarborough politicians, including Controller Joyce Trimmer, to the Kingston facility where the UTDC manufactured the ICTS vehicles.\footnote{“Page A28,” \textit{Toronto Star (1971-2009)}, Jun 17, 1981, http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.uwaterloo.ca/docview/1399540229?accountid=14906.} Up to that point, Kirk Foley, the UTDC’s president, had prospective customers in Vancouver and Detroit but none in Ontario for the Ontario-based technology.\footnote{Thomas Claridge, “TTC’s New Scarborough Line a Test of High-Tech Transit,” \textit{The Globe and Mail (1936-Current)}, Mar 22, 1985, http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.uwaterloo.ca/docview/1222798757?accountid=14906.} Afterwards, at its meeting on May 5, 1981, the TTC received a Scarborough delegation consisting of Controllers Brian Harrison and Joyce Trimmer who requested that the Commission investigate the possibility of using this alternative ICTS on the Scarborough line.\footnote{Background material - change from LRT (Light Rail Transit) to ICTS (Intermediate Capacity Transit System) Scarborough Transit Line: vol. 8, 1981, Fonds 16, Series 1603, File 8, City of Toronto Archives, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.} The Commission recommended the immediate preparation of a comparison of the two systems, which encompassed an analysis of timelines, capital and operating costs, the systems’ local impacts, and the systems’ land-use implications.\footnote{Background material - change from LRT: vol. 8, 1981.} Despite
increased capital and operating costs, amounting to a 30 per cent increase in expenditures, TTC officials did not predict that the new ICTS would shape land use beyond the degree to which the initial LRT system was capable. Nonetheless, one month after the delegation requested the study, the Province also agreed to pay for the additional $20-million costs associated with implementing the new technology; so, after a six-hour meeting, Scarborough Council endorsed the transit line in a 11-5 vote (which passed without public debate or presentations). The decision showcases that the long-term economic goals for the STC were equally grounded in the Province’s technocratic endeavours to globalize Metro Toronto’s economic identity, specifically through the use of a “modern” transit technology.

The Province’s long-term commitment to developing made-in-Ontario transit infrastructures, marketing them globally, and implementing them locally to shape Metro Toronto’s regional urban fabric catalyzed the transit investment. Specifically, in 1976 (after the collapse of GO-Urban), the Ontario government started investing in an Advanced Light Guideway transit system that was similar to the German-designed system in its use of linear induction motors but which operated on steel wheels. On Tuesday, June 9, 1981, five days before the Province announced the change, the TTC held an informal, confidential meeting during which Commissioner Rowlands asked staff why the Province considered the revised ICTS to be superior to the LRT; yet, “No direct answer was forthcoming on this question.”

116 Background material - change from LRT: vol. 8, 1981.
120 Background material - change from LRT (Light Rail Transit) to ICTS (Intermediate Capacity Transit System) Scarborough Transit Line: vol. 6, 1981, Fonds 16, Series 1603, File 6, City of Toronto Archives, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.
TTC staff questioned the final decision again when, one month prior to its approval, the TTC’s Manager of Equipment L. G. Berney concluded that “If one takes the position that the SLRT is really not a vital transit link…then it does provide a unique ‘test bed’ for providing ICTS.”121 Agreeing with such cynicism, Scarborough Mayor Gus Harris condemned Metro Chairman Paul Godfrey for spontaneously switching to “‘the Mickey Mouse Toonerville Trolley.’”122 Ward 5 Alderman Frank Faubert also scolded the lack of public participation after not being permitted to address the Metro committee that approved the $134-million line on June 23, 1981, calling the project “‘the biggest railroad job at Metro.’”123 Barbara Jackson, the president of the Brimley Area Association, reaffirmed these sentiments, urging Council to recognize that its decision must transcend party politics and address the thousands of affected individuals.124 Such backlash reveals that the SRT’s transition from a LRT to an automated ICTS was not a product of participatory planning whereby the transit investment’s decision-making process included local actors. Provincial placemaking and technological ventures, rooted in providing post-suburban Scarborough “‘one of the most modern systems in Canada and the world,’” drove the decision.125

The power of the Province’s placemaking visions also influenced Metro Toronto’s planning processes and reinforced the technocratic basis for the SRT’s change. Supporting the Province, Metro Council rejected two proposals for public meetings with ratepayer groups and ignored Mayor Gus Harris’s view that the two-year delay that accompanied the proposal will cause Scarborough to miss the current development boom.126 Even comments from business owners proposing office towers and hotels in the town centre, who guaranteed that buildings will

121 Background material - change from LRT: vol. 6, 1981.
123 Background material - change from LRT: vol. 3, 1981.
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid.
be left empty without the previously-approved LRT line, were not enough to influence the decision. The Province’s previous investment in alternative ICTS technologies, coupled with the view that the use of these infrastructures would contribute to the reimagination of Scarborough (regionally and globally), propelled the decision. Expert-driven views dislodged citizens and some local politicians from this post-suburban process of regional marketing.

The SRT represented a repackaged modernist view of planning, wrapped in the longer process of post-suburbanization during which the regional politics of density and placemaking drove public transit decisions. The greatest degree of public consultation that the change prompted culminated in January of 1982 when the TTC requested public submissions to help name the new line. The campaign generated 5,600 entries, with Alvin Frost’s “Here comes Artie” or “Take the Artie” (in reference to the ‘RT’) being named the winning submission; for his efforts, Mr. Frost received a Metropass for free transit for a year. The superficiality of these efforts reflect the expert-driven rationale for the pursuit of the transit line. Stanley Lawrence, the general manager of engineering and construction at the TTC, defended the lack of public scrutiny by suggesting that most taxpayers and politicians do not really understand the technology involved in the system; in his view, the project was self-evidently meritorious and, thus, opponents could only be “‘professional opposers.’” Regard for public participation had, once again, been supplanted, this time by political placemaking and technological agendas.

Since its inception, the SRT was a politically-charged venture grounded in visions of global recognition. Harkening back to Premier Davis’s speech at the Ontario Science Centre on

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127 Background material - change from LRT: vol. 3, 1981.
129 Ibid.
October 23, 1973, Canadians needed to jump on the competition in the world of rapid transit technologies. The choice to pay $500,000 to secure the world rights to the ICTS system developed by West Germany’s Krauss-Maffet set in motion the Province’s fascination with marketing Scarborough as a pioneering municipality of transit innovation. Even Mayor Gus Harris, an avid opponent of the new ICTS, embraced the economic arguments for bringing development to the STC through rapid transit investments. After his 1982 election victory, he fully endorsed the polycentric vision on which these economic development goals rested; in Harris’s view, “‘We’ll never get a bug hotel here until we get rapid transit.’”

Even the fifth and final progress report on the SRT’s development advertised that the line already sparked growth around the town centre by attracting major tenants such as Bell Canada, the Government of Canada, and Prudential Insurance. The STC’s urbanization through the congregation of urban uses, such as corporate offices, was a major component of the politics of density that surrounded the SRT. Local and provincial politicians connected these economic development goals to the need for new transit technologies, hence the SRT’s transition to the automated ICTS.

This politics of density did not persist in a vacuum around the STC. As the SRT headed towards completion in 1982, increasing in cost to $196-million, Metro also approved two new rapid transit lines (including the downtown relief line and a waterfront transit line). Most municipal councils in Toronto rejected the projects, which Metro Council ultimately approved notwithstanding that the ventures did not conform to Metro Toronto’s Official Plan (which

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132 Ibid.
134 Scarborough Light Rail Transit construction. Fonds 16, Series 836, Subseries 1, File 33.
prioritized suburban centres over downtown development). Indeed, Toronto Alderman John Sewell stated without restraint that “This is just fulfilling the Metro chairman’s dream of raping downtown Toronto and I will do everything in my power to stop him.” Likewise, Scarborough Controller Joyce Trimmer contended that these approvals undermined Metro’s earlier commitment to promote the decentralization of future development to the region’s suburban centres. Regional political disagreements about where development should be sent reveal that even local politicians, some of whom rejected the planning rationale for the SRT’s automated ICTS system, also embraced the economic vision on which it was based.

Representative of the development’s entire chronology, controversy obscured the SRT’s opening. By April 18, 1984, the TTC officially accepted the first two cars for the finalized SRT in a ceremony at the Scarborough Civic Centre. Mr. Foley praised Metro and Scarborough Councils for their acts of faith as he lifted a veil over one of the $1.5-million vehicles. Despite delays with the delivery of the vehicles, the line successfully passed its trial run on February 22, 1985. On March 23, 1985, the SRT officially opened, welcomed by protesters in wheelchairs who held placards pointing out the service’s inaccessibility. Indeed, the discourses surrounding the SRT’s opening (and its development overall) mirror the narratives that dismantled Metro Toronto’s expressway visions; post-suburbia reframed these narratives,

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138 Ibid.
140 Ibid.
creating a politics of density that also disenfranchised those advocating for greater participation in the planning process.

**Conclusion**

The SRT, and its transition to an elevated guideway system, emerged during Scarborough’s gradual post-suburbanization. The STC’s expedited development, coupled with provincial and local agendas of polycentricity and the Province’s commitment to marketing new transit technologies, motivated the SRT line’s switch from a LRT line to an ICTS. The decision-making processes that underpinned the line’s approval and transformation are unindicative of the postmodern planning ethos brewing in Toronto in the early-1970s after the Spadina Expressway’s refusal. Indeed, the line emerged after the demise of expressway projects in Toronto during which advocacy groups demanded a powerful voice in Metro Toronto’s planning arena. However, the line’s creation did not symbolize the values that prompted those shifts in planning thought.

The SRT was a highly political endeavour, guided by provincial placemaking visions and motivated by post-suburban politics. Indeed, it more accurately symbolizes continuity across Toronto’s modern and postmodern planning epochs. The relics of Toronto’s modern planning moment, including expert-driven infrastructure investments, persisted at the beginning of Toronto’s post-suburbanization. The politics surrounding the need to create a polycentric metropolitan region were grounded in economic development and placemaking visions. These state-crafted, technology-driven dreams represent a politics of density that shaped the SRT’s development and, thus, extended modern planning’s reach. As such, the SRT reveals that political processes are powerful determinants of planning decisions in post-suburban Toronto.
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