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Acknowledgements

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By the mid-1950s, the United Nations (UN) was in trouble. The polarized politics of the Cold War, the increasing resort to extra-mural diplomacy, and the UN's institutional rigidities had greatly diminished its reputation and prospects. One of the most serious challenges facing the organization as it entered its second decade was the deadlock among the Great Powers over the admission of new members. With its important stake in the UN, where it could maximize its influence by building and leading coalitions of like-minded states, Canada had long been interested in finding a solution to this problem. As international pressure for action grew in the early and mid-1950s, Lester B. Pearson, the secretary of state for external affairs, added his voice to the calls for change but hesitated to act decisively as long as the Great Powers remained at loggerheads.

Paul Martin, the minister of national health and welfare and chairman of the Canadian delegation to the 10th session of the UN General Assembly, did not share these hesitations. Then approaching the height of his political power, Martin was a successful minister with 10 years experience, who enjoyed a growing domestic and international reputation as a progressive and effective policy-maker. Ambitious and anxious to enhance his standing both at home and abroad, he arrived in New York in the fall of 1955 ready to embrace the new members question as his own. Already a tenacious and determined diplomat, he was by temperament more willing than Pearson to challenge the Great Powers on the floor of the General Assembly. Cajoling support from reluctant officials in the Department of External Affairs and defying the United States, Martin successfully mobilized a broadly-based coalition of smaller powers that eventually forced the Security Council to admit 16 new members to the United Nations. It was, as John Holmes has justly remarked, “one of the most remarkable feats in the history of the General Assembly.”
Under the terms of the charter adopted by the United Nations at its founding conference at San Francisco in 1945, membership in the new international organization was not universal. Instead, it was limited to sovereign “peace-loving” states that were judged ready to accept and carry out the charter’s obligations. On the recommendation of the Security Council, qualified applicants were admitted to the world body by a two-thirds majority vote in the General Assembly. Unfortunately, as the Cold War intensified in the late 1940s, it became increasingly difficult to secure the admission of new members, and no country was admitted after 1950 when Indonesia became the 60th member. The main reason for the impasse lay in the Security Council, where the Soviet Union consistently vetoed West European applicants and those former colonial states who were suspected of having a Western orientation. Although the United States promised not to veto new members, it could always muster sufficient support to retaliate by blocking those Soviet satellites who wished to join the UN. Efforts to negotiate a solution to the stalemate foundered on Washington’s repeated refusal to accept a “package deal,” which the United States, Britain and France denounced as a form of “blackmail.” By the mid-1950s, there were no less than 14 states excluded by the Soviet veto: Austria, Ceylon, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Libya, Nepal, Portugal, Cambodia, Laos, South Korea, and South Vietnam. Seven others were excluded by the Western majority: Albania, Outer Mongolia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, North Korea and North Vietnam.

By the spring and early summer of 1955, the new members question was at last coming to a head. In April, the Bandung Conference of Asian and African states passed a resolution in favour of universality and called on the Security Council to approve the admission of all qualified states. Canada too was growing exasperated at the illogical situation in New York. In a sudden and surprising statement that qualified Canada’s support for the Western position, Pearson told the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs in late May that “the time has come when we should accept all these applications for membership which are now before the UN. Some of them may not subscribe to our ideals of what constitutes a peace-loving state, but I think it would probably be a good thing if they are all in, even Outer Mongolia.”

There was more evidence of movement at the UN’s 10th anniversary conference in June 1955. Several states announced that they were ready to accept the principal of universality. In an encouraging sign of flexibility, the Soviet foreign minister, V.M. Molotov, agreed to accept either a small package of six states or a larger one that would admit all outstanding applicants, except the four divided states, and Japan, with whom the USSR remained technically at war. Pearson responded with a suggestion of his own: the UN should stop trying to negotiate an acceptable package deal and admit all outstanding applicants except those states that were “temporarily divided.” Although the United States, Britain and France restated their opposition to any “package deal” admitting the Soviet satellites, Pearson’s speech captured the UN’s mood and, in the words of UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld, “crystalized...what was very much in the air....[S]omething could be done if some governments or some men had the wisdom to find the right formulas and the courage and guts to carry them out.”

Despite Pearson’s apparent interest in resolving the new members question, neither he nor his officials in the Department of External Affairs were anxious to sponsor an initiative at the UN’s forthcoming 10th General Assembly. The department reviewed the situation in early August 1955 after learning that India and the Soviet Union had agreed on the desirability of admitting all undivided and qualified applicants, including Japan. Even at the cost of admitting Outer Mongolia, about whose claim to sovereignty there was considerable doubt, Canadian officials acknowledged that a deal admitting all 17 applicants would carry enormous benefits. Reform would build on the spirit of detente that accompanied US president Dwight Eisenhower’s July 1955 summit with Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev, and signal a further easing of Cold War tensions. It would also greatly enhance the UN’s prestige and validate its claim to be a genuine world forum. Moreover, it might even
help resolve the vexing question of Beijing's exclusion from the UN by establishing a precedent for admitting states regardless of their ideology and past behaviour, and by emphasizing the anomaly of excluding the world's most populous state.³

These benefits, however, did not outweigh the risk that a Canadian initiative might alienate Canada's traditional Western allies. Officials recommended that Canada limit itself to simply asking the “Western Big Three” if they had any plans to solve this problem themselves, gently urging them to seek an agreement with the Soviet Union on the admission of all outstanding applicants. Although Pearson initially indicated that he was ready to confront Washington on this issue, in the end, he agreed that for the time being Canada would merely consult – “emphasizing the inquiry aspect” – with the United States, Britain, and France.

The lukewarm reaction that the Canadian demarche received seemed to justify Ottawa's caution. Foreign Office officials in Whitehall merely promised to give the idea careful attention.⁴ French officials naturally favoured the principle of universality, but warned their Canadian interlocutors that there was unlikely to be any progress on new members until mid-November, when the foreign ministers of the Four Great Powers were to meet in Geneva to discuss East-West relations.⁵

Washington's response was even more discouraging. The Americans sympathized with the Canadian cause, but warned that there were serious obstacles to be overcome. The United States remained strongly opposed to the admission of Soviet satellites and insisted that whatever “decision is taken on the whole issue, the US will not agree to the admission of Outer Mongolia on the grounds that it lacks the attributes of a Sovereign State, and therefore, does not qualify under the most basic requirement of the UN Charter.”⁶ In addition, the Administration was faced with the difficult public relations problem created by its earlier statements emphatically rejecting “package deals”. More important, added the US under-secretary of state, Herbert Hoover Jr., the United States was worried about the implications of UN action for the position of Communist China, whose claim to membership in the UN would be strengthened by action on new members.⁷

The strong US reaction worried officials in the Department of External Affairs, at one point even prompting them to reassure Washington that “there was no Canadian proposal.”⁸ Indeed, after considering the results of the department's preliminary canvass, Pearson recommended to Cabinet in mid-September that the delegation to the 10th session of the United Nations General Assembly “should let our views be known privately to friendly delegations but should not engage in an active campaign to solicit support for our views if the US and UK oppose the scheme.”⁹

By this time, however, Pearson was no longer the only minister with a substantial interest in shaping Canadian policy on the new members question. Even before Cabinet approved Pearson's recommendation on September 16, Paul Martin, the minister of national health and welfare, had left for New York to take up his duties as Chairman of the Canadian delegation to the 10th session of United Nations General Assembly. Pearson's decision to ask Martin to lead the delegation while he was absent on a visit to the Soviet Union was hardly surprising. Since his election to Parliament in 1935, Martin had displayed an active interest in Canadian foreign policy and international affairs. His education included courses in international law at Harvard and at the Graduate Institute for International Studies in Geneva. Like Pearson, Martin was strongly attached to the internationalist principles on which postwar Canadian foreign policy was based. As younger members of the Cabinet, Pearson and Martin had been political allies on Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent’s left wing since Pearson joined the government in 1948. Following Brooke Claxton's retirement as Minister of National Defence in early 1954, the political relationship had grown closer and Martin regularly served as acting secretary of state for external affairs whenever Pearson was away from Ottawa. The experience deepened Martin’s interest in and knowledge of international affairs.

Indeed, by 1955, Martin was already something of an old hand at the United Nations. During the 1930s, he had attended meetings of the defunct League of Nations in Geneva; since then he had been a frequent member of Canadian delegations to UN General Assemblies, serving as
acting head of delegation when Pearson was elected to the presidency of the 7th General Assembly in 1952. More important, Martin's confidence in his abilities as a diplomat had been reinforced substantially by his success in securing a unanimous General Assembly resolution on disarmament during the 9th General Assembly, where he served for the first time as head of the Canadian delegation while Pearson travelled in Europe. In pursuing this objective, Martin had acted alone, defying the experts in the Department of External Affairs and, to some extent, even Pearson himself. He had also managed to withstand repeated American demands for a Western disarmament resolution that would isolate the Soviet Union and had forged a good working relationship with Krishna Menon, India's unpredictable but influential representative at the United Nations. Anxious to build on this initial diplomatic success, Martin arrived in New York in the fall of 1955 and immediately demonstrated an interest in resolving the stalemate over new members.

Martin's interest was reinforced by a visit from Leonid Zamyatin, a first secretary with the Soviet permanent mission to the United Nations. Zamyatin had heard rumours of Canada's earlier attempt to spur the Great Powers into action, and indicated that Moscow was "very interested" in Ottawa's initiative, and even ready to support the admission of Japan. Martin and the delegation urged Ottawa to follow up this opening gambit by renewing its approaches to the United States and Britain. Martin thought that Canada might use the threat of unilateral action in the General Assembly to force the members of the Security Council to act:

If the results were favourable...we should give serious consideration to taking a Canadian initiative at the Assembly along the lines of the Minister's remarks in the External Affairs Committee...[W]e sensed that the Australian and New Zealand Delegations were hoping that we would find it possible to take the initiative. Clearly, moreover, it would be greatly to our advantage if the initiative in this matter came from the Western Powers rather than from the Soviet Union or the neutralist bloc...I realize that in terms of the United Nations Charter it is rather difficult for a country not on the Security Council to take a serious initiative on the membership question but the question is of course on the agenda...[S]ome indication now of the possibility of an initiative in the Assembly might have a salutary effect on any prior Security Council consideration of new members.

Alas, in the fall of 1955, the Department of External Affairs was not feeling its most heroic. It reacted cautiously to the news that Martin and the delegation were interested in reviving the idea of a Canadian initiative. Marcel Cadieux, head of the UN Division, worried that any move without the express consent of the major Western powers "would create embarrassment and, in any event, was unlikely to succeed...[A]n initiative on our part might even elicit strong reactions from Washington." Reluctantly, the department decided to meet the delegation halfway. Ottawa agreed to inform Washington, London and Paris about the Soviet approach, pointing out that if the Western powers did not act "there was a strong possibility of the USSR and the Asians gaining an important propaganda advantage." In addition, Pearson agreed to raise the subject directly with John Foster Dulles, the American secretary of state. Dulles, however, had strong reservations about including the communist satellites and reinforced the view transmitted earlier by the Department of State that a UN initiative would not be welcome. As far as Pearson and the Department of External Affairs were concerned, a new members initiative was not in the works.

Meanwhile, Martin had decided to take his own soundings in New York. On balance, the results were promising. Following an exchange between members of the Canadian and Soviet delegations, Martin concluded that Moscow would welcome an initiative in the General Assembly. Similarly, a talk with the British foreign secretary, Harold Macmillan, suggested that London was not yet firmly opposed to an initiative, though Britain was reluctant to fall out of step with the US and shared French concerns about any development that would increase the strength of anti-colonial forces at the UN. Martin was also encouraged by the warm response given his opening speech to the General Assembly. In his remarks, he hinted broadly that the majority of members might have to defy the Great Powers to achieve "as quick and as broad an advance towards universality as may be possible."
When Spain applied to join the UN an hour or so after this speech, persuading the large bloc of Latin American republics to support some kind of initiative, Martin decided to act. He asked Geoffrey Murray, the most junior member of the delegation, to draft a resolution for the General Assembly. "The more I pondered it," he later wrote, "the more I grew convinced that passage of the resolution [on new members] by a huge majority would impress on the Security Council the determination of the Assembly's will. If any permanent member of the Council vetoed the wishes of an overwhelming majority of the UN membership, it would look very bad in the eyes of the world."18

On October 3, soon after Pearson left for the Soviet Union, Martin sent the department a copy of his draft resolution. It asked the Security Council to reconsider the applications from those undivided states whose previous requests for membership had been rejected and report back to the 10th General Assembly. The qualified states, which numbered 18 now that Spain had applied, were listed alphabetically. Martin hastened to reassure the nervous under-secretary of state for external affairs, Jules Léger, that he was not inclined "to precipitate action." In any event, there were still major stumbling blocks to overcome: "The Australian delegation...believes that any initiative should have at least the unofficial blessing of one of the Western Great Powers. At the present time, as far as we are aware, none of them is in favour of an early move."19

With Léger's reluctant support, Martin continued to discuss the new members question with a small group of sympathetic delegations without revealing that a Canadian draft resolution existed. As long as the possibility remained that France might veto the resolution in retaliation for General Assembly action on Algeria, he hesitated to bring these discussions into the open.20 However, Martin's hand was forced in late October when Menon approached him with a draft resolution of his own.21 Determined to retain the initiative, Martin confidently rejected Ottawa's suggestion that he explore the possibility of cooperating with New Delhi. "[T]he inclusion of India in the initial stages," he warned, "might decrease the chances of success."22 He tackled Léger directly by phone. Responsible, sensitive and scholarly, the under-secretary was a self-described homme d'équipe, who normally only dealt with his minister accompanied by his assistants. His reservations were swept aside by the determined Martin, who quickly began discussing the Canadian draft with the Australian, New Zealand, Indian, British and American delegations.23

In Martin's view these discussions suggested two general conclusions. First, Canada could probably count on the reluctant support of both Britain and the United States. Although the British were unhappy with Martin's proposed tactic of using the General Assembly to embarrass the Security Council into acting, they would ultimately support the Canadian resolution as they were already committed to seating Ceylon in the UN as soon as possible.24 The US reaction was also surprisingly warm. The delegation reported that James Wadsworth, the American deputy permanent representative at the UN with whom Martin had worked closely on disarmament in 1954, "was much less disturbed than the British about our initiative and, indeed, said that he was glad that we were taking some initiative since obviously they could not do so." Although Wadsworth reiterated the view that Outer Mongolia was a "serious obstacle," he took "no exception" to the plan for Assembly action.25

Second, Martin's conversations in New York had reinforced his conviction that if Canada did not act, no one else would. Though the Great Powers were ready to see the new members problem resolved, none was ready to press the issue forward, making it doubtful that their foreign ministers would be able to come to grips with the subject in Geneva. Martin's analysis "suggested that an initiative might have to be taken in the Assembly, designed primarily to have the Assembly express with the largest possible vote its views in favour of the admission of the largest possible group of new members." From now on, Martin announced bluntly to Ottawa, this "aim was foremost in our minds."26

Martin's conclusions were greeted with dismay in the corridors of the East Block. The department quickly but tactfully reminded the enthusiastic minister that its thinking had never envisaged actually introducing the draft resolution. As the exercise was designed merely to
“bully” the Great Powers into finding a solution to the new members problem, the Canadian delegation needed only to keep the draft resolution in the background, maintaining UN interest and increasing the pressure on the Great Powers by gradually widening the circle of representatives consulted. Martin was reminded that Canada would not consider introducing its resolution until the Great Powers had failed to take action. For the time being, the delegation was to sit tight and do nothing.27

Martin was clearly disappointed with these instructions. To overcome the department’s reluctance to put the Canadian resolution into play, he quietly leaked it to Peter Stursberg, a prominent reporter with the Montreal Star and a stringer for the London-based Observer.28 The story, which broke on November 2, proudly revealed that Canada was heading UN efforts to “open the doors...to all those clamouring to get in.”29 Unaware of Martin’s role in engineering the Stursberg article, officials in the Department of External Affairs fretted that it exposed the minister to stepped-up pressure for action at the UN. As Martin hoped, Léger responded by agreeing to increase the pressure on the Great Powers.30 Canadian representatives in London, Washington and Paris were instructed to urge the Great Powers to resolve the impasse over new members before public opinion forced Canada to formally introduce its draft resolution. Canada was not anxious to take this step but recognized that if it did not act, others, whose actions would be more difficult to control, would do so:

If we or some other group introduce a resolution on new members the Great Powers will, it seems to us, be faced with a regrettable choice of either bluntly rejecting the admission of new members or else appearing to be giving reluctant acquiescence to a move which was forced on them by world opinion. We are anxious to avoid confronting the Big Three with a dilemma which action on their part could now avoid.31

The Canadian demarche produced no useful results. The discussions in Washington, London and Paris during the first week of November again suggested that the four Great Powers would not be able to resolve their differences at Geneva. On November 10, Martin called Léger to persuade him that the time for decisive action had finally arrived. The minister marshalled several arguments in support of immediate action. He pointed out that France, Britain and the United States were not prepared to act “until the demand became articulate” and that they “must be persuaded that we mean business.” In addition, Martin insisted that it was necessary to move soon if Canada was to maintain its control over the situation in New York:

Responsible delegations like the Scandinavians, the Australians and New Zealanders...have agreed with us that the opportunity should not be lost. They and others welcome our initiative but if we are not prepared to pursue the matter some of them, and possibly others less desirable, will take steps of their own.

And finally, Martin worried that if he delayed much longer, the General Assembly might well adjourn before anything was accomplished. For these reasons, he insisted that the moment had come to increase the stakes substantially and begin to search for co-sponsors. Without much enthusiasm, Léger agreed.32

Martin’s decision to seek co-sponsors immediately generated a strong response from Washington. For several weeks, the US permanent representative at the UN, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., had warned the State Department that the US position was slipping as word of the draft Canadian resolution circulated in New York. In late October, he suggested that the United States regain the initiative by issuing a statement supporting all the outstanding applicants except Outer Mongolia.33 Dulles, reluctant to beat too quick a retreat, hesitated. However, when he failed to convince Molotov to accept a package without Outer Mongolia, the American secretary of state instructed Lodge to “quickly get out our own 17 power proposal and try to rally enough support for it to nullify the Canadian proposal.”34 Lodge released the US statement on November 13, before moving aggressively, and without consulting Martin, to forestall General Assembly consideration of the new members item by asking the next day for an early meeting of the Security Council on the same subject. This, he explained to the State
Department, might “head off the introduction by Martin (Canada) of a resolution in favour of “universality”...[and] assist in the defeat of a possible Canadian-Indian motion in the ad hoc committee to take up the membership item immediately.”35 As one contemporary observer put it, “Lodge and Dulles, in effect, had declared war on Paul Martin.”36

While Lodge and the American delegation in New York tried to reinforce the weak American position and dissuade potential co-sponsors, Martin had not been idle. He revelled in political campaigning, and now that his initiative was out in the open, he happily urged his delegation to gather co-sponsors. “Better get moving, boys,” he is quoted by one Canadian delegate, “I'll give you a cigar for every co-sponsor you get.” By November 16, the delegation had lined up 27 supporters, drawing support from Asia, the Middle East, Latin America and Europe. For tactical reasons, Martin refused to permit the co-sponsors to offer substantive amendments. However, with one eye firmly on the two major Western powers, he convinced the co-sponsors to modify the resolution in order to make it more palatable to the United States and the United Kingdom. The principal change involved replacing references to “universality” with the phrase “widest possible membership.” Shortly after, Martin responded to Lodge’s opening salvo by tabling the Canadian resolution in the ad hoc committee struck by the General Assembly to address the issue.

With the Canadian resolution tabled, American objectives shifted. More or less resigned to Martin’s package of 18 new members, Washington was now becoming increasingly concerned with what would happen if Nationalist China made good on its threat to veto Outer Mongolia. The State Department’s worries were twofold. First, observers would accuse Washington of engineering the veto, and blocking the admission of friendly states like Ceylon, Japan, Italy, Austria and Spain. Second, a veto might result in such a backlash against the Nationalist government that the General Assembly might very well try to assign the Chinese seat to Beijing, a blow which would cripple US policy in Asia. As the General Assembly’s ad hoc committee prepared to take up the

Canadian resolution, American efforts at the highest levels in New York and Washington to persuade China not to use its veto proved futile. Anxiously, Lodge asked Martin on November 21 to delay his resolution for a week until the US could convince China to forego its veto. Still suspicious of American intentions, “Martin professed great sympathy but did not commit himself.”37

Martin’s skepticism, which appeared unreasonable in American eyes, enraged the Administration. In Washington, Dulles called in George Glazebrook, minister at the Canadian embassy and the senior officer in the absence of the ambassador, Arnold Heeney. Obviously frustrated and angry at his inability to shape the course of events in New York and determined to convince Ottawa of the gravity of the situation, Dulles lashed out savagely at the hapless Glazebrook. He unfairly accused Canada of failing to consult with the United States on what he called “the Canadian proposal”, adding that “in view of the relations between the two countries, he would have expected a more cooperative attitude.” He pointedly reminded Glazebrook that the Administration had recently excluded Canada from new restrictions on imported oil. More offensively, he implied that Pearson had cut a deal with Molotov “behind the backs of the United States.” In short, he concluded, “by a lack of adequate consultation, we had put the administration into an extremely difficult position.” There was a point to this calculated outburst: the United States needed more time to deal with China before the Canadian resolution was debated in the ad hoc committee.

That same afternoon, in New York, armed with instructions from the State Department, Lodge met Martin. When he repeated the American plea for a delay in the UN’s proceedings, Martin indicated that the matter was “out of his hands” and rested with the ad hoc committee.38 Lodge reacted to Martin’s unsympathetic attitude with anger. He accused Ottawa of harbouring a bias against the Republican Administration and declared that Washington would consider retaliatory action, including sanctions against Canadian oil exports if the resolution was not withdrawn.39 When this tack failed, Lodge implied that Martin’s
initiative did not have Pearson’s support. But the Canadian was not easily intimidated. On one occasion, when the US permanent representative reminded Martin that “when I speak, I speak for the Government of the United States,” the Canadian minister replied, “Cabot...when I speak, I AM the government of Canada.” This time, too, Lodge’s bully-boy tactics proved counter-productive. Far from changing Martin’s mind, Lodge’s behaviour convinced the Canadian minister that the US was “anxious to avoid favourable consideration of this matter at this Assembly, and that [Lodge] is prepared to resort and continue to resort to diverting tactics that will have the result of avoiding Assembly consideration.”

The testy confrontations with Dulles and Lodge set alarm bells ringing in Ottawa. On November 28, Pearson flew to New York to refute the suggestion that Martin’s initiative did not have his full support. At the same time, however, Pearson softened Martin’s opposition to delay and agreed to give the United States the time it required to convince China not to veto Outer Mongolia’s application. Debate on the new members issue was delayed until December 1, when Canada and 27 co-sponsors moved Martin’s resolution in the ad hoc committee. Less than a week later, the committee adopted the resolution by a vote of 52 in favour, two against (China and Cuba) and five abstentions (including France and the US). The resolution was approved by an identical vote in the General Assembly on December 8, 1955.

Despite the impressive display of support for the resolution in the Assembly, Security Council approval was not assured. The fears of the resolution’s supporters were confirmed on December 10, when the Council considered the applicants listed in the General Assembly resolution one-by-one. With Martin and the other members of the Canadian delegation watching helplessly, Nationalist China, despite several direct appeals from Eisenhower, vetoed the admission of Outer Mongolia. The Soviet Union, worried that this presaged a Western effort to deny entry to all the Communist applicants, retaliated by vetoing all 13 non-communist applicants. The resolution of the new members question was a personal triumph for Martin. Against the advice of the professional diplomats and the inclination of Pearson himself, he made this issue his own. He shaped the tactics and he paid the price for acting alone. Justifiably, the successful conclusion of his new members initiative greatly increased his standing as an international figure in his own right, and made him a leading candidate to succeed St. Laurent as prime minister. Canada too enjoyed the fruits of his labour. In forging a broadly-based coalition of middle and smaller states, the Canadian delegation demonstrated its capacity to engage in effective multilateral diplomacy. The delegation pursued objectives, tactics and temporary alliances that put Ottawa at odds with Washington, London and Paris, daring its closest allies to defy the strongly-expressed will of the General Assembly. The effort broadened Canada’s contacts in New York, reinforced its standing with the UN’s smaller members, and gave it valuable experience in UN diplomacy.

Martin’s work remained unfinished. With the tenacious determination that was the hallmark of his diplomacy, he set about trying to find some way to reassure the USSR that there was no trickery afoot. Against his better judgement, he first agreed to an Indian plan for a meeting at which the resolution’s 52 supporters would indicate in advance their support for the Soviet candidates. As a matter of principle, several delegates refused to declare their voting intentions in this manner and the meeting adjourned in disarray. More successfully, Martin and the British permanent representative, Sir Pierson Dixon, later met privately for a lengthy conversation with Vasili V. Kuznetsov, chairman of the Soviet delegation, to convince him “of the sincerity of purpose of the long and difficult effort to reach a settlement at the tenth session.”

The following day, the Soviet Union agreed to support a resolution calling for the admission of all those applicants on the previous list with the exception of Japan and Outer Mongolia. After an American amendment to add Japan was vetoed by Moscow, the resolution as a whole was passed, and the 16 new members were welcomed into the United Nations later that day. As these new members took their seats, the General Assembly rose and gave Paul Martin a rare – and much deserved – standing ovation. The resolution of the new members question was a personal triumph for Martin. Against the advice of the professional diplomats and the inclination of Pearson himself, he made this issue his own. He shaped the tactics and he paid the price for acting alone. Justifiably, the successful conclusion of his new members initiative greatly increased his standing as an international figure in his own right, and made him a leading candidate to succeed St. Laurent as prime minister. Canada too enjoyed the fruits of his labour. In forging a broadly-based coalition of middle and smaller states, the Canadian delegation demonstrated its capacity to engage in effective multilateral diplomacy. The delegation pursued objectives, tactics and temporary alliances that put Ottawa at odds with Washington, London and Paris, daring its closest allies to defy the strongly-expressed will of the General Assembly. The effort broadened Canada’s contacts in New York, reinforced its standing with the UN’s smaller members, and gave it valuable experience in UN diplomacy.
Finally, and most important, Martin’s efforts helped revitalize the UN itself. The admission of new members set the UN on the road to universality, and resulted in a dramatic shift in power as the newly independent states of Africa and Asia joined the organization in ever-increasing numbers. This would soon make the General Assembly less tractable, more unpredictable. Though some lamented this development, Martin knew that the UN could not be an effective forum for global issues unless its membership - as wide and as broad as possible – reflected international political realities. And for a middle power like Canada, whose diplomacy depended heavily on its ability to engage other countries on a multilateral basis, this was of paramount importance.

ENDNOTES

The authors would like to thank Mary Halloran, John Hilliker and Michael Stevenson for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.

2 Ibid., 339.
5 Paris to Ottawa, Telegrams 388 and 396, 15 August 1955, DEA File 5475-CR-40, NAC.
6 Washington to Ottawa, Telegram WA-1376, 12 August 1955 and Washington to Ottawa, Telegram WA-1502, 1 September 1955. The State Department official added, as his personal view, that "if a settlement on the general problem of admission of new members were in sight, the USSR would not likely make its agreement contingent upon admission of Outer Mongolia."
7 Washington to Ottawa, Telegram WA-1551, 12 September 1955, DEA File 5475-CR-40, NAC.
8 Ottawa to Washington, Telegram 1516, 30 August 1955, DEA File 5475-CR-40, NAC.
11 Geoffrey Murray, unpublished memoirs. In his memoirs, Martin recalled that he first raised the possibility of a resolution in Ottawa before his departure for New York. See Paul Martin, A Very Public Life, Volume II: So Many Worlds (Markham: Deneau Publishers, 1965), 183-64.
12 Marcel Cadieux, Memorandum for the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, DEA File 5474-CR-40, NAC.
14 Draft Memorandum from Canadian Embassy to State Department, [December 1955] and Washington to Ottawa, Telegram 1605, 20 September 1955, DEA File 5475-CR-40, NAC.
20 New York to Ottawa, Letter No. 22, 12 October 1955, DEA File 5475-CR-40, NAC. The French were upset at the General Assembly’s decision to discuss the civil war in Algeria, which Paris considered a domestic issue beyond the UN’s competence.
23 Geoffrey Murray, unpublished memoirs.
30 Marcel Cadieux, Memorandum for the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 3 November 1955, DEA File 5475-CR-40, NAC.
34 Telegram from the Secretary of State to the Department of State, 13 November 1955, reprinted in FRUS, 1955-1957, Volume XI, 355-56.
In the early 1960s the cold war became dangerously middle age and consensus came undone. As Canadian-American relations began to enter a cold chill, Livingston Merchant, the American Ambassador to Ottawa, complained about the growing influence of neutralist sentiment in Canada and how certain Canadian politicians pandered to such anti-American sentiments. He was especially bitter about one Canadian politician who "vacillated and equivocated outrageously on defense and has been notably unhelpful for reasons I fear more of conviction than of expediency on all matters nuclear including tests." Thankfully for the United States, his opponent had "sound" instincts on the "basic issues of survival in this dangerous world of ours." That politician with sound instincts was John Diefenbaker; the outrageous vacillator, a Canadian "Hamlet," was Lester Pearson. During the 1962 election campaign, Merchant cheered on Diefenbaker, who would be, in his opinion, "a stauncher, more consistent, and reliable ally and understanding friend," than the Nobel Laureate Pearson.

Exactly a year later Prime Minister Pearson met President Kennedy at Hyannisport in a meeting, in the words of Charles Ritchie, "tinged with euphoria. The atmosphere was that of clearing skies after a storm—the clouds of suspicion covering Canada-U.S. relations had parted, the sunshine of friendship shone." On that windswept May day at the Kennedy compound, the President and the Prime Minister shared, again in Ritchie's words, "an atmosphere of complicity between them," and cavorted like schoolboys who had escaped from a tiresome and irrational teacher. Together, they cracked jokes about John Diefenbaker, as they sorted out the differences in the Canadian-American relationship.¹

Hamlet had become, in American eyes, a cold war Hotspur. In January 1963 Pearson reversed his opposition to nuclear weapons for Canadian forces in a speech in Scarborough, Ontario. He decided, he
later wrote, that nuclear weapons were a fundamental part of NATO's strategy. Since Canada had accepted that particular nuclear strategy, Canada must also accept "responsibility for the use of nuclear weapons as part of that strategy." That decision pleased the United States, and the Kennedy administration even offered help to the Liberals for the 1963 campaign, but Pearson wisely declined. Diefenbaker, no longer the staunch and reliable ally described by Merchant, ran an anti-American campaign, and the Americans retaliated officially and unofficially in a way that helped the Liberals.

While Pearson's Scarborough speech pleased Americans, it greatly disappointed others, including Pierre Trudeau who denounced Pearson for selling out to "les hipsters" of Camelot. A young student, who had admired Pearson, expressed sadness "because it is a tragic sight to see a man renegade on past principles, and deny the very policies upon which so much admiration and respect have been built." Canada, the writer continued, has "a great task in bringing some sense to the accelerating growth and spread of nuclear weapons, and this cannot be done by adding to this growth and spread." Canada should never "yield to the pressures of Washington and the United States Air Force" because to do so would impair Canada's "ability to work for moderation and restraint, and certainly our past moral postures would be revealed as nothing more than hypocrisy." Canada must not "abandon the opportunity that we have as a nation to work towards understanding of the seriousness of the nuclear problem, and to aid in the establishment of guidelines for international responsibility." Lloyd Axworthy, then a young student at Princeton, pleaded with Pearson to reconsider because he could no longer support a party that took such a stand.

When Mike Pearson formed his cabinet in April 1963, he asked Paul Martin to lunch and said, "I guess you know what ministry you're going to get." Shortly after the leadership convention in which Pearson defeated Martin in 1958, the former secretary of state for external affairs told Martin that he could have his former portfolio when Pearson became prime minister. Both Martin and the department of external affairs had to wait over five years, much longer than Martin, Pearson, and the department expected or hoped. Basil Robinson has brilliantly described how difficult it was for his department to live in John Diefenbaker's world with its peculiar facts and fantasies. Diefenbaker was, briefly, his own foreign minister as were most prime ministers in the past. But faced with the travel demands of a foreign minister in the age of air travel, Diefenbaker appointed University of Toronto President Sidney Smith in September 1957. Smith had no political experience, and Diefenbaker's fascination with the international stage and Smith's political inexperience meant that "the minister remained in the prime minister's shadow" until he died prematurely in March 1959.5

Howard Green, Smith's successor, seemed naive yet decent and gracious. His views on nuclear weapons were, until January 1963, closer to those of the official opposition than to the government. Despite Green's strong support for nuclear disarmament, Ambassador Merchant admitted in 1962 that Green was "a powerful political asset as an honest, homespun, stand-up-to-the-giants idealist." Within the department, however, Green's defiance of giants troubled foreign service officers, particularly since the prime minister himself was opaque in his remarks about nuclear weapons. The department itself was divided on the question with the under-secretary, Norman Robertson, increasingly supportive of Green's views, and officers who worked on defence issues strongly opposing such attitudes. At NATO, Canadian officials despaired about the attitude of the minister. One Canadian at NATO said that whenever Howard Green came to Paris that he pretended he was an Italian. When Paul Hellyer, the Liberal defence critic, came to Paris in the fall of 1962, he met with General Lauris Norstad, the Supreme Allied Commander, who told him that Canada was not keeping its commitments. Subsequently, Canadian Ambassador to NATO George Ignatieff supported Norstad's complaints and added that Canada had deliberately kept the issue off the agenda of Council meetings.7

That a veteran diplomat criticized government policy in a conversation with an opposition critic reflects the distrust between the department and
the government on the eve of the 1963 election. In their history of the
department, John Hilliker and Donald Barry entitle their section on the
Diefenbaker years, “Learning to Adjust,” but their own fine analysis of
the relationship between the “Pearsonalities” of the department and
Diefenbaker’s government demonstrates that the adjustment was
uncomfortable and unfinished. The department never became “Green’s
department” as it had been “Pearson’s department” in the fifties. Not
surprisingly, most diplomats welcomed Diefenbaker’s defeat and Pearson’s
victory. Even though Diefenbaker had appointed Charles Ritchie
Canada’s Ambassador to the United States, Ritchie refused to write
Diefenbaker after his loss. “I consider his disappearance a deliverance;
there should be prayers of thanksgiving in the churches. And these
sentiments do not come from a Liberal.” Ritchie knew that a Pearson
government would not bring back the “old middle-class, middle-of the
way, reasonable, responsible familiar Canada” of External’s golden years,
but at least there were now familiar faces and ways in the East Block.9

Unlike Howard Green, who had not returned to Europe since he
fought there in World War I, Paul Martin had rich international experience.
He had studied international law and relations at Cambridge, Geneva,
and Harvard, had served on Canadian delegations to international
organizations, and had considerable accomplishments in the international
arena. The official history rightly notes that “Martin and Pearson shared
an attachment to the principles on which post-war Canadian external
policy had been based,” and both shared an internationalist faith born of
the despair of depression and the destruction of war.10 Although Martin
had served with distinction in an important domestic portfolio in the St.
Laurent government, he had a wide range of contacts among European
and American politicians and diplomats. His work in expanding the
membership of the United Nations in 1955 was a remarkable personal
accomplishment that garnered laurels for the department and its minister.

Yet that accomplishment revealed clear differences between Martin
and Pearson, particularly in the former’s willingness to defy the direction
of External Affairs and to challenge Henry Cabot Lodge with the brio of
the House of Commons. “Tenacious determination,” Barry and Donaghy
rightly note, “was the hallmark of his diplomacy.” To Pearson, Martin
“was a trouper in the political arena...the indispensable party tactician.”
Martin had waited ten years to become a cabinet minister; Pearson
entered the cabinet immediately and served as External Affairs minister
which, in his own words, was “not particularly good training for bread-
and-butter politics.”11 Stale sandwiches in church basements, shared
lunchbuckets at Chrysler, and long hours at doorsteps and party
committee rooms had left strong political marks on Martin. Two other
political “troupers,” John Diefenbaker and Lyndon Johnson, recognized
those marks, compared them with their own, and liked Martin. They
could not find those marks on Pearson.

External Affairs had been long sheltered from “bread-and-butter
politics,” and many officers were wary of the smears of bread and butter
politics upon Martin. Historically close to the prime minister, independent in
its recruiting efforts, deeply aware of the British Foreign Office traditions of
the autonomy of foreign policy, and highly critical of the political character of
American foreign policy and the weak State Department, External Affairs tried
to maintain its proud traditions against the populist and ideological strains
that came to mark the 1960s. Martin’s first under-secretary, Norman
Robertson, exemplified the department’s aversion to ostentation and political
display. His mentor Hume Wrong had contempt for politicians and, especially,
political appointees, memorably but cruelly describing Canada’s ministers in
Paris, Washington, and Tokyo as “the deaf, the dumb, and the blind,” which
referred to Philippe Roy’s hearing disorder, Herbert Marler’s fumbling, and
Randolph Bruce’s visual impairment. Roosevelt was weak and incompetent,
King dangerous and foolish. King chose Robertson to be under-secretary. He
served King superbly even though he told friends that he considered Canada’s
longest-serving prime minister to be thoroughly mediocre.12

As the Canadian foreign service emerged from the cocoon of colonial
and political dependence and took shape as one of the most impressive
collection of national diplomats in the postwar world, those memories of
the political interference and appointees of the Bennett and King era
lingered. As missions abroad multiplied, External Affairs became a symbol of Canada's independence and international identity. With Pearson as minister, the department had a remarkable freedom within government and from politics. Reporters fawned over Pearson, “the world's best-known Canadian,” Michael Barkway declared in 1952. Bruce Hutchison, Canada's best-known journalist, dropped any pretense of political neutrality as he privately and publicly urged Pearson to seek the prime minister's office. In those strange times when, as Pearson noted in his diary, “the best political talks are...the non-political ones” the Department of External Affairs flourished.13

Robertson, the quintessential quiet man of influence, persuaded Pearson to appoint Marcel Cadieux as his successor in 1964. Two years earlier Cadieux had written a book on “the Canadian diplomat” that identified the department and its officers with “the steady growth of Canada's sovereignty and independence.” The department enjoyed “an unqualified prestige” and its officers were distinctive in their tasks, discreet in their style, and outstanding generalists in their background. He was, Hilliker and Barry note, “firmly traditional” in his concept of what his role and that of his department should be.14 Cadieux nevertheless believed firmly that one tradition must change: the tradition that departmental work was done in English alone.

Other firm traditions were crumbling when Cadieux became under-secretary. The challenges facing Martin and Pearson came from the numerous young, like Lloyd Axworthy who were as tired of cold war rhetoric as they were inspired by the civil rights movement and the “freedom surge” that swept North America following Kennedy's death in 1963.15 The challenge came from the academy and the media where professors and pundits had celebrated the postwar Canadian diplomats as symbols of Canadian independence and competence but who began to question earlier commitments and to criticize the deliberate ambiguities of diplomatic style. Peter Newman’s vitriolic attack on Diefenbaker in Renegade in Power destroyed the comfortable club that the press gallery and politicians occupied during the fifties. Challenge also came from the provinces, especially Quebec, who no longer accepted the secondary role in which depression and war had cast them. Martin knew that change must come, and, like Cadieux, he knew that some changes were long overdue.

Martin was only the second Canadian foreign minister to speak French, the other being Louis St. Laurent between 1946 and 1948. Yet in the 1961 census French-speaking Canadians were 28.1% of the population of Canada. In the 1960s French-speaking Canadians were no longer willing to accept a situation in External Affairs where, in Cadieux's private comment, 'Si tu veux affirmer un principe, tu peux toujours écrire en français. Si tu veux des lecteurs, il faut écrire en anglais.'16 The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism cast a suspicious glance on the department and found it unrepresentative of the population in many ways. Of 570 officers recruited between 1945 and 1965, only 21.6% were francophones, and the 1958-1964 period saw the rate drop to 20.2%. Moreover, the number of Anglicans recruited after 1945 (27.1%) almost equaled the number of Roman Catholics (31.8%) even though in 1961 Roman Catholics were 45.7% of the population and Anglicans merely 13.1%. In terms of gender, 94.2% of post-1945 officers were male, and rate of female hiring between 1958 and 1964 (12 of 151) was actually lower than that between 1951 and 1957 (15 of 146).17

The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism's criticism of External Affairs linguistic and gender hiring practices struck some as an attack upon departmental autonomy and a political threat to traditional independence. They were also troubled by the report of The Royal Commission on Government Organization, the so-called Glassco Commission, which fundamentally challenged External's belief that it required "recognition of its special administrative needs."18 Martin could not defend the department's record on bilingualism and did not do so in his appearances before the strengthened Standing Committee on External Affairs. With a minority government and an aggressive opposition, he also found it difficult to support the pleas for exceptional treatment that his officials made. External was becoming a department more like the others, and change was difficult.19
Martin’s approach to the department differed from that of his predecessors. He treated the department more like Health and Welfare where weaker lines of authority and greater informality made contact between the minister and the department regular and useful. He often called desk officers directly to ask them questions about particular items, and the minister’s unusual bathing, sleeping, and telephoning habits often meant officers were roused from bed for an early morning phone call or asked to join him at or even in the swimming pool. When he found an officer who was especially helpful, he would ask him to undertake special tasks and often perform them confidentially. Ross Campbell was a particular favourite until he was posted to Yugoslavia in 1964, far from Martin’s reach. In the early years, he would drop in on the Cadieux household Sunday morning after mass for breakfast. Martin’s methods did not match neatly with the “elegance of appearance and correctness of manner” that Cadieux listed as diplomatic characteristics in his 1962 book.20

The department, therefore, became enmeshed more directly in politics through its minister, the standing committee, governmental management practices, and minority government needs, but these new circumstances troubled it less than did the assertiveness of the provinces in the international arena. Quebec, of course, presented the greatest challenge, although W.A.C. Bennett’s independent diplomacy on the Columbia River Treaty certainly irritated federal officials. In the 1960s, Canadian provinces began to look once again at Lord Atkin’s 1937 Judicial Committee of the Privy Council decision that declared ultra vires the federal government’s right to ratify certain International Labour Organization conventions. Although Prime Minister St. Laurent sometimes expressed doubts about international treaties that touched upon provincial jurisdictions, most notably in the case of the Universal Charter of Human Rights in 1948, External Affairs and Pearson quickly overcame his concerns. The government of Canada’s right to sign treaties was not challenged until Jean Lesage’s government responded to the early caress of Gaullist France in the early 1960s. The thick fabric of Canadian international diplomacy that its diplomats had spun so intricately and impressively in the post war years started to fray.

Martin, the under-secretary, the department, Pearson, and his ministers reacted differently to the Quebec government’s argument that the federal government lacked “the constitutional power, human resources and requisite experience to claim that it can adequately represent Quebeckers.”21 A department where often in the past neither the minister nor the under-secretary spoke French, where francophones were underrepresented, and where the traditions were British and North American was highly sensitive to such charges. Martin, Pearson and Cadieux agreed that recruitment of francophone officers should be speeded up, that bilingualism should become a requirement, and that Canada’s international presence must be more thoroughly bicultural. Cherished departmental practices fell before these political imperatives. Hiring quotas, language commitments, and geographic considerations caused some officers to complain about the loss of the merit principle. Political considerations also affected development assistance. In 1963-4, Canada had granted only $300,000 of a $50,000,000 bilateral aid budget to francophone countries; in 1966, such countries received $80,000,000. Keith Spicer, an aid analyst at the time, grumbled that politics instead of need established priorities and that funds would be wasted because “relatively primitive administrations in former French and Belgian colonies” rendered them incapable of absorbing aid.22 Nevertheless, the francophone took form, and Canada’s foreign policy had a bicultural face.

Martin and Cadieux agreed on these approaches, but differences arose in their responses to the legal challenges that the Quebec initiatives represented. Cadieux and departmental legal adviser Max Wershof regarded themselves as international lawyers. Not surprisingly, their response to the Lesage government’s attempts to sign agreements with France and Belgium and the Johnson’s government’s Bill 33 in 1967, which proposed to establish a new department to “co-ordinate” all of Quebec’s dealings with “foreign” governments, was legalistic. Cadieux became absorbed with Quebec’s efforts to establish an international presence, and he later said that no topic took so much of his time. To
develop Ottawa's response, Cadieux appointed another international lawyer, Allan Gotlieb, as a special adviser on federal-provincial matters in October 1966. From this appointment developed a special task force in January 1967 and an informal but highly influential advisory group that included Marc Lalonde, Pierre Trudeau, Jean Beetz, Michael Pitfield, and Gordon Robertson. This group came to reject strongly provincial initiatives in the international arena and to conclude that such initiatives threatened not merely the department but also Canada's future.23

Paul Martin expressed less concern about the legal threats, paid less attention to the frequent comic operas involving the placing of flags and who sat where at diplomatic dinners, and was inclined to seek compromises more often. While wary of Quebec's intentions, he recognized as a politician that most Canadians paid little attention to diplomatic affronts. Maclean's, for example, responded to Quebec ministerial forays to France with the remarkable editorial suggestion that “We're all foreign ministers now,” and suggested that all Canadians had the right to negotiate with foreign governments.24 Martin’s belief that solutions could be found derived strength from his successful effort in 1965 to place a federal “umbrella” over the cultural agreements Quebec signed with Belgium and France.

Canada’s Ambassador to France Jules Léger shared Martin’s view that conciliation rather than confrontation was the better route. He and Martin tried to mediate the angry disputes between Gaullist France and other NATO allies. Cadieux, a self-confessed “hardliner” on cold war questions, was uneasy about such conciliation. He deplored de Gaulle’s attacks on NATO and the United States and France’s withdrawal from NATO’s military structure in March 1966. Pearson was more inclined to conciliate than confront in 1965, but he also reacted strongly when de Gaulle pushed out NATO. He asked one French official, who had expressed regret that Canadian soldiers had to leave French soil, whether the departing Canadian troops should take the hundred thousand Canadians in French graves with them to their new bases in Germany.25

De Gaulle’s actions deeply disappointed Martin and Léger, but Martin continued to believe that France’s presence in NATO was of critical importance for domestic reasons.26 In early 1967, as the government was pondering a de Gaulle visit for centennial year, Martin relied on his good personal relations with de Gaulle and, especially, French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville to smooth the relationship. He told Pearson that the Canada-France difficulties were “due not to ill-will” so much as the difficulties inherent in making Canadian diplomacy bicultural. The “best results” with France would be “secured through a judicious mixture of alertness, firmness and friendliness,” which had served Canada well in the past.27

Such policies, however, did not serve Canada so well in the succeeding months of 1967. In Quebec, there was considerable excitement about the prospect of a de Gaulle visit, and the francophone press depreciated the significance of numerous incidents, such as de Gaulle’s failure to participate in the April ceremony commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of Vimy Ridge. Cadieux, Lalonde, and Gotlieb, who increasingly believed that France’s actions were dedicated to the disruption of Quebec-Ottawa relations, did not share such views. Cadieux became increasingly critical of Martin and believed, wrongly, that Martin was indifferent to matters of foreign policy. Cadieux’s bitterness is described in detail in John Bosher’s study of Canada and France.28 When Martin visited Paris in June, shortly before de Gaulle’s planned visit to Canada, Cadieux asked him to raise Canadian concerns with de Gaulle and Couve de Murville. Martin, to Cadieux’s distress, avoided difficult issues and took de Gaulle’s friendly manner and Couve’s reassurances as appropriate and sufficient in the circumstances. When, then, de Gaulle declared his support for “Québec libre” on 24 July, the differences among officials and ministers became clear. Martin and Léger counselled caution and a delay in the government’s reaction until de Gaulle or his officials could clarify his remarks. But Cadieux and Pearson had heard enough. Pearson’s angry draft was slightly moderated but his rebuke to de Gaulle made the general go home. English Canada’s outrage was reflected in its angry press. This response, however, caused numerous francophone reporters to sign a petition protesting anglophone
coverage of de Gaulle's visit. French language newspapers rarely criticized de Gaulle's remarks, and Claude Ryan of *Le Devoir* denounced the anglophone reaction as hysterical. Polls in Quebec reflected Ryan's attitude with 69.3% approving of de Gaulle's visit in one poll, and another indicating that 58.7% in Quebec thought de Gaulle's remarks had not constituted interference in Canada's internal affairs and that Pearson's rebuke was unjustified.29

“Our efforts to cooperate with the French,” Paul Martin later wrote, “had been an attempt to placate Quebec.”30 No cabinet, however “lenient”, could allow Canada’s international relations to be dictated by the need by placate a province. The insulation from politics, from the differences and debates between francophone and anglophone Canadians that had marked political life in Canada since Confederation, ended for External Affairs in the mid-1960s. The change was not easy for the department or for its minister, particularly when Paul Martin had strong political ambitions that required close attention to the various political gales and tornadoes that swept across the Canadian landscape.

John Holmes, no longer an officer but a frequent departmental consultant, noticed the changes as well. Now with the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, near the University of Toronto where anti-Vietnam protests had begun and professors exhorted students to challenge authority, Holmes agreed to consider how the department could respond to such challenges. He wrote to the department official charged which the task: “I clung myself for a long time to the theory that it was not the function of the Department of External Affairs to serve the Canadian public and I think a case can still be made for it. However, it won’t wash with the public and certainly not with the universities and I think the Department might as well accept the obligation of doing in the most efficient possible way what it is going to have to do anyway.”31 Innenpolitik now trumped Aussenpolitik. External Affairs had to “serve the Canadian public” and participatory democracy, a phrase derived from the 1962 Port Huron statement of the Students for a Democratic Society, was looming on the horizon of the Canadian political future.

Pearson and Martin had taken their first steps into international organizations in the 1930s when the Americans were absent as the world fell apart. They and other Canadian diplomats and politicians believed their task in the 1940s was to ensure the United States into the new international system that was emerging from the rubble of the League of Nations. The cold war had produced a remarkable consensus among Canadians that American leadership was essential in the conflict between western democracy and Soviet communism. Both worried about the quality of American leadership and its impact on Canada: Pearson had declared the “end of easy and automatic relations” in 1951 and Martin had jousted with the Americans during the new members initiative in 1955. Both, however, believed as Pearson told Latin Americans in 1962 that Canada could not “escape the consequences of the cold war, or of United States leadership of the free world coalition in that war.”32 In the mid-1960s, many Canadians became weary of the cold war and some wanted to escape.

When Livingston Merchant and A.D.P. Heeney presented their suggestions for principles for the Canadian-American partnership in July 1965, which urged that differences “should be expressed and if possible resolved in private, through diplomatic channels,” this reiteration of the classic approach of “quiet diplomacy” met surprisingly intense criticism. Charles Lynch, no radical, said the report was the bureaucrat’s dream: “Keep it quiet, boys, work it out, we will all keep out of trouble and things will go smoothly.” Heeney, he said, was the kind of person Pearson would have been had Pearson stayed out of politics.33 The response to Merchant-Heeney was so different from those days at Hyannisport when Kennedy and Pearson had decided that never again would the United States and Canada so publicly and foolishly disagree.

One response came from former finance minister Walter Gordon, who had left the cabinet after the 1965 election but whose views deeply influenced many colleagues and the powerful Toronto Star. In the spring of 1966, Gordon published *A Choice for Canada* with the provocative subtitle *Independence or Colonial Status*. He argued that Canada's support for the Vietnam War and American leadership in NATO was evidence of
colonial status. Canadian support for the war weakened significantly in 1966 with only 27% of Canadians believing that the United States should increase attacks and 31% believing the Americans should withdraw in comparison with 55% of Americans who believed attacks should increase and only 18% who believed they should withdraw. When in the summer of 1966 Bobby Kennedy, then a hawk on the path to a dove’s nest, criticized Canada for its ambiguous stand on the Vietnam war, Maclean’s criticized Kennedy and called for the United States to get out of Vietnam. Le Magazine Maclean went further with one writer accusing Canada of being “complice” in an immoral war, and André Laurendeau indicating that Ottawa officials privately agreed with his view that the Americans should get out.

Laurendeau had not spoken with Marcel Cadieux, who deeply believed in support for the American efforts, as did most of his senior colleagues at the time. The department’s advice to the minister during 1965 and 1966 often criticized American tactics but not the broader purposes of intervention. When Pearson made his speech at Temple University in April 1965 in which he suggested a bombing pause, Cadieux and Martin both warned him of the consequences of such a proposal. Even they did not predict Johnson’s bullying of Pearson at Camp David after the speech, but they deplored the loss of contact between president and prime minister that followed that speech. Pearson was never “Mike” again to LBJ but always a drawled, dismissive “Lester.”

Managing the American relationship was the principal task for Canadian foreign ministers in the postwar era. Martin sensed the dangers that lurked in the growing Canadian doubts about America and its policies. He had leadership ambitions, and his record in the first Pearson government had been good. In 1964 his tenacious diplomacy had been highly effective in creating a peacekeeping force for Cyprus, and that success made President Johnson more willing to negotiate the historic Canada-United States autopact. He stood first in polls which identified potential successors to Pearson, and most pundits thought his chances were good. In 1966, however, his portfolio, the one from which St. Laurent and Pearson had moved effortlessly to the leadership, was becoming a liability. After Kennedy’s death, the United States seemed to come apart. Canadians watched with growing apprehension as young Americans died in Vietnam, downtown Detroit burned, and students at elite universities shouted down the president. Some Canadians recoiled; many suddenly saw darkness and recoiled. In 1963 Pierre Berton, then Canada’s most influential columnist, had declared that “anti-Americanism” was “finished as a political issue.” We have, he wrote, “cast our lot with this continent for better or for worse and the people know it.” Three years later Berton was calling for a renewed Canadian nationalism and an independent Canada.

Martin’s department, however, counselled continuing support for American action in Vietnam, and Martin, like Pearson, knew that Canada could not “close the forty-ninth parallel,” as some nationalist academics urged. Moreover, his personal knowledge of Johnson’s rashness and potential anger worried him and the prime minister. They tried to show critics the difficulties. At Pearson’s urging, Martin took Walter Gordon to a 1967 NATO meeting where Martin alone among foreign ministers tried to have a discussion of Vietnam, and Gordon saw that others would not support Martin. Martin had sent Chester Ronning to Hanoi hoping that Ronning’s pro-Chinese credentials would gain a special hearing; but upon Ronning’s return, the Americans had no interest in what he had heard. Such efforts annoyed the Americans, who blocked them, but could not satisfy critics inside and outside government.

Martin and Pearson were caught in the sweep of sudden change in 1966 and 1967. The young were far from the war, from memories of American isolationism, and from the consensus that had marked Canadian foreign policy in the 1950s. Martin and Pearson, who cherished their close ties with universities and students, faced angry demonstrators and familiar faces when they ventured on campus. At Toronto Bob Rae, son of Ambassador Saul Rae, attacked imperialist America and at McGill, Eddie Goldenberg, son of Martin’s old friend Carl Goldenberg, confronted the foreign minister with demands that the war end. Dennis Lee wrote a political poem that excoriated “quiet diplomacy”:
It was not Mr. Martin who sprayed the poison mist  
On the fields of the Vietnamese, not in person nor fired civilians – he was  
No worse a man than the other sellouts of history...  
Doesn't the  
Service of quiet diplomacy require dirty hands?38

Günter Grass once said: “A poem knows no compromises—but we live on compromises.”39

The genius of postwar Canadian foreign policy had been its skill in finding compromise. In the 1960s compromise, so often the product of quiet diplomacy, became elusive. Language became too strident, emotions too brittle, and the past too distant.

The Department of External Affairs, Bothwell and Granatstein note, began “a generation-long period of unrest.”40 At the end of that generation, both the department and the country were fundamentally different, and the turmoil of the 1960s seemed far away. The Pearson government in its time seemed out-of-date, disordered, confused, and divided, but its legacy in social welfare, open immigration, official bilingualism and new national symbols now seems extraordinary. Martin’s legacy, too, is richer than his critics of the time imagined. The push to bring biculturalism and bilingualism to External Affairs irritated, but it created a foreign policy that reflected more fully what Canada is. The francophonicity was very much Canada’s creation and is now a significant international organization. Martin’s willingness to challenge the American giant while recognizing that Canada could not face the chill winds of international diplomacy alone makes more sense today than the hazily defined independence of Walter Gordon. Above all, Paul Martin knew that politics mattered and, in the 1960s, External Affairs learned that lesson too.

ENDNOTES
1 American Embassy, Ottawa, to Department of State, 8 May 1962. State Department Records 742.00/5-62 (National Archives, Washington). Merchant had soured on Pearson during the last part of the 1950s. See Merchant to Dean Acheson, 11 May 1961, Acheson Papers, Series I, Box 22 (Hill University Archives) Also, Charles Ritchie, Storm Signals: More Undiplomatic Diaries 1962-1971 (Toronto: Macmillan, 1983), 48-9. Kennedy and Pearson agreed to appoint a committee to investigate the “principles” for the Canadian-American partnership. The Canadian representative was A.D.R. Heeney, the American was Merchant.
2 While Merchant was critical of Pearson, Kennedy had preferred Pearson to Diefenbaker on personal grounds. Ben Bradlee later recalled that as early as May 1961 Kennedy was “absolutely discourteous” to Diefenbaker at an embassy party but lively in conversation with Pearson. While he was a senator, Kennedy had reviewed Pearson’s Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age favourably. Ben Bradlee, Conversations with Kennedy (New York: Norton, 1978), 183; and John F. Kennedy. “The Terrain of Today’s Statecraft,” Saturday Review of Literature (1 August 1959), 19-20.
5 Denis Smith, Rogue Torc: The Life and Legend of John Diefenbaker (Toronto: Macfarlane Walter and Ross, 1995), 261; and Basil Robinson, Diefenbaker’s World: A Populist In Foreign Affairs (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1989).
6 Embassy to State, 8 May 1962, loc. cit.
9 Ritchie, Storm Signals, 46-7.
10 Hilliker and Barry, 253
11 Pearson, Mike, III, 17,19.
13 Pearson Diary (PP), 20 Jan. 1953; Michael Barkway, “Lester Pearson, Reluctant Politician,” Saturday Night (26 Apr. 1952); and on the press and Pearson, Patrick Brennan, Reporting the Nation’s Business: Press-Government Relations during the Liberal Years, 1935-1957 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994). Brennan notes the occasion when an American reporter wrote about St. Laurent’s vacation, one of the many subjects that was off limits. St. Laurent interrupted his first press conference to rebuke the American, telling him that “people here know what to publish and what not to publish.” The Canadian reporters did not dissent (183).
14 Marcel Cadieux, The Canadian Diplomat (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963; French original 1962). See also, his "La tâche du Sous-secretaire d'Etat aux Affaires extérieures," International Journal (Summer 1967), 512-20. In this article Cadieux suggests that the under-secretary should "envisager sa tâche, en dernière analyse comme reliée à celle de l'équipe qu'il dirige et mettre l'accent tantôt sur les aspects administratifs selon les exigences toujours changeantes du moment. La sagesse en ce cas consiste à satisfaire aux besoins de l'équipe plutôt qu'à vouloir imposer des règles rigides. C'est encore la meilleure façon de la servir."


16 Quoted in Hilliker and Barry, 187.

17 These figures are taken from Gilles Lalonde, The Department of External Affairs and Biculturalism Studies of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1970), ch.2.

18 Hilliker and Barry, 288-9.

19 Interview with Marcel Cadieux, May 1979. The department adopted only six of the twelve specific recommendations on the department that Glassco made, and only three of these were adopted in their entirety. Cadieux complained bitterly to John Holmes in 1966 about how management and administration interfered with the major concern, the making of foreign policy. Cadieux to Holmes, 20 September 1966. External Affairs Department File 1-1.

20 Cadieux, 27


22 Keith Spicer, A Samaritan State: External Aid In Canada's Foreign Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966), 58.

23 Le Devoir, 2 Dec 1966; Commons Debates, 1 March 1967. Interviews with Paul Martin, March 1976 and Marcel Cadieux, May 1979. I have also drawn in these sections on the first draft of the official history of the department and on documents I was allowed to examine confidentially for a study of Canada-France relations in the 1960s.

24 Maclean's, (May 1967), 4

25 Mike, Ill, 264.

26 Greg Donaghy concludes that "in framing an approach to NATO calculated primarily to satisfy domestic demands for a bilingual and bicultural foreign policy, Martin misjudged both NATO's capacity to nourish a bilateral relationship and its pressing need to respond to the altered international environment. NATO added little to the Franco-Canadian relationship, which remained truncated and atrophied beside the flourishing partnership that had developed between Quebec City and Paris." "Domesticating NATO: Canada and the North Atlantic Alliance, 1963-1968," International Journal (Summer 1997), 463.

27 Martin to Pearson, 24 Feb 1967. External Affairs Papers, file 20-1-2FF.


30 Martin, ibid, 578.


33 Ottawa Citizen, 14 July 1965.

34 Canadian Institute of Public Opinion. Poll 320 August 1966


**Concluding Remarks**

At the conclusion of the presentation of the papers, the Hon. Paul Martin made the following comments on the papers and his father's career following an introduction by deputy minister Donald Campbell.

Je vais dire au tout début à quel point c'est vraiment pour moi une occasion très émotionnelle d’être ici avec vous. En même temps c'est un énorme plaisir de pouvoir partager ces discussions et je suis énormément et vraiment très reconnaissant à vous-mêmes et au ministère de me donner cette occasion d’écouter et de faire quelques commentaires.

It is with a great deal of trepidation that I approach this podium. My father’s view of ministers of Finance was that they were essentially people in the way who you could never understand. I am sure that my father looking down upon this occasion would not be pleased to think that in these hallowed halls, in this building that meant so much to him, that you would allow a minister of Finance to speak.

On the one hand, he would be pleased that you have given the three who presented papers twenty minutes each, and you have only given me five. On the other hand, it is wonderful to be here and to hear these papers, not only because they are papers about my father's career, but because I will be able to go back to the Department of Finance and tell them that over in Foreign Affairs they actually do occasionally think things through.

Or at least, they did 30 years ago.

But the real reason for my trepidation — I can tell you that it is genuine — comes when I look out in this audience I see so many of the great names of my youth, so many of the great names of Canadian public life-names and people for whom my awe remains unabated.

I must say I feel very, very shrunken and certainly not up to the task. As a result I am not going to speak as a member of the Cabinet. I will speak to you as my dad’s son and that is certainly how so many of you knew me.

I can do it in many ways. My dad may have said that he spoke or even that he was “The Government of Canada.” But those of you who
knew my mother know that if she were here she would say: "Perhaps, but you don’t speak for me."

Let me simply give you from the family’s point of view, my view of events that were raised in the papers, such as the entry of the new members.

I was at the United Nations when that event occurred. Before going down, I had been with my father at the opening of the post office in Belle River. Now, I don’t suppose that very many of you have been to Belle River, but I remember it and the event very, very well. You would have thought that my father had laid every single brick of the post office and, in fact, I think my father told them that he did.

He took total credit, but the fact is that at that event, the opening of the post office in Belle River – praise was poured down on my father for what he had done.

I listened to it and took it all in the way that any young fellow would. Then we went down to New York the next day. I sat there as foreign minister after foreign minister, as head of delegation after head of delegation, stood up and heaped praise upon my father for the entry of the new members.

When it was all over, my father turned to me and said – my father was obviously very proud – “What did you think about what all of those great men from around the world said about me?”

I said, “Well, you know Pop, they were a lot more generous in Belle River.”

The other paper has to do, of course, with the war in Vietnam. Now, I was of that generation that protested virtually everything. At that point in time, I was at the University of Toronto and I remember the enormous difficulty caused by the quiet diplomacy [of the Canadian government]. My natural tendency was to be out protesting the war in Vietnam and the terrible thing that was being done.

But then I would go home and I would sit down with my father and he would talk to me about Chester Ronning. He would talk to me about quiet diplomacy. He would talk to me about the fact that for a country like Canada, the ability to get things to be done would be greater if we spoke somewhat softly.

But this was very difficult because I didn’t want to speak softly. I wanted to go back and protest. It was a way of meeting girls at that time! The fact that I was burdened down with quiet diplomacy and was not able to go out there and protest and burn things was very difficult.

But I will tell you what eventually happened. Once my dad went to McGill (in the 1960s) and there was a huge demonstration organized by Eddie Goldenberg – Eddie has gotten in my way a lot – every time we do a budget.

In the later years of his life, my dad delivered a series of special lectures at McGill. He would stay with us in Montreal and give these lectures. He did it for about three or four years in a row and one day – I guess in the middle 80s – he was really quite nervous. We were having breakfast and I said, “What are you so nervous about?” He said, “Well, I am going to McGill and I am going to deliver the lecture on Vietnam.” And I said: “Well, what are you nervous about?”, and he said, “Well, don’t you remember the last time I dealt with Vietnam at McGill, there were 5,000 students who rioted.”

So, we finished the conversation and he went off. He came back that night and I said to him, “How did it go?” He said, “It went fine.” I said, “There were no riots?” And he said, “Most of them were even born.”

I think that is one of the reasons that this series that the Department puts on is so important because it does make history live.

Now, Don Campbell mentioned how things continue. They do in Finance. When I first became the Minister of Finance, I probably spent about 5 per cent of my time on international affairs. Today I probably spend anywhere from 30 to 40 per cent of my time today on international affairs – the Canadian economy is obviously doing very well. But twice, first in the case of the Mexican peso crisis in 1994 and then the Asian crisis of a year and a half ago, [outside events] threatened to derail us. I recognized the absolute necessity of building within the international economy the same kind of structure and the same kind of
rule of law that all of you in this room, in the Department of External Affairs, have attempted to do in the dealings between states. It has now become as crucial in terms of the future of our economy as these other structures were during the whole period of the Cold War.

And you know, the same problems exist. About a year ago, we announced at the G-7 the formation of an organization called the Financial Stability Forum. The Financial Stability Forum is a creation of the G-7, and its Secretariat is the Bank of International Settlements in Switzerland. Its purpose essentially is to allow the G-7 to set out a new structure, a new economic structure by which nations can govern themselves.

We have spent 50 years, as you know, setting up trade relationships and the structure of trade relationships between respective countries, but capital flows now dwarf trade relationships by a factor of about five to one and there is no structure that governs these huge capital flows which are occurring. So, the Financial Stability Forum was set up by the G-7 to do it and there is, at the present time, a major debate that is taking place. Canada, unlike some of the other members – I won’t name them all because this is obviously an outpouring of quiet diplomacy – but a number of the other members simply feel that the Financial Stability Forum should be limited to the G-7 and that we will, in effect, establish the rules for the rest of the world and that the rest of the world will follow.

Well, obviously, this is not going to be tenable. Just like the entry of the new members into the United Nations, the Financial Stability Forum is going to have to expand far more broadly and bring in new members, many more than simply the original G-7. And yet that debate goes on and, in fact, it will be, undoubtedly, part of the debate that will be taking place at the founding meeting of the G-20 in Berlin in about seven days. And so the world does turn and yet it comes back with the same problems that were dealt with in my father’s time. And it may well be, under different circumstances, dealt with by other generations to come.

In closing I would say that the ability to reach back into history and to understand that other men and women, at an earlier time, had to deal with problems that we are facing, obviously does give us a beacon, the beacon that we need to solve the problems of our time.

And the countries and the people who don’t understand their history are obviously, as it has been said by others, countries that are doomed. But, it is also true, I think, that politicians or people who are involved in affairs of state should understand that which went before. It obviously does give us a foundation to bring the kinds of improvements we all want to make.

And on that basis, I would like to say to you, Don, and I want to say to the Department of Foreign Affairs how very, very grateful I am that you have given me this opportunity to participate in this conference. I say it perhaps as the Minister of Finance, but, in fact, I really say it as my father’s son, a father of whom I am immensely proud.
Notes on Contributors

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