

T. WHITNEY LACKENBAVER

CANADA and NATO

Uneasy Past, Uncertain Future

edited by

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in association with

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Introduction

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The past several years have brought about some of the most important and unexpected changes since World War II – changes that surely rank as among the most important of this century. The “Cold War” arrangements in Europe have suddenly become unhinged, and the East-West alignments that have typified much of how Europe was organized have been replaced with a whole new set of arrangements, the shape of which remains largely unknown in 1990.

All of this change makes it difficult for both policy makers and policy analysts to have much confidence in their analyses and predictions. (And if we may strike a selfish note, it makes it difficult for editors of books on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) even to choose a title that does not suggest either an epitaph or absurd optimism.) The comfortable old shoe of NATO - Warsaw Pact rivalry and danger in Europe, which sustained analysts for forty years, is worn out, and things written about the defence of Europe as little as a year ago are mostly obsolete. What the new political map of Europe might look like in a few years is anyone's guess, though some things appear almost certain. The Warsaw Pact is, for example, probably a dead letter now, and many of those Eastern European nations that once belonged to it (and still do, if only in theory) are now asking Soviet troops to leave their nations, which in turn are taking on the cast of sovereignty for the first time in more than forty years. Second, German unification, which even in 1989 seemed impossible in even the distant future, is now an emerging reality that no nation seems willing or able to stop. NATO's unacknowledged second role, that of guarding against the re-emergence of a German threat, is now being discussed more openly. Will it come to pass that this role will be what sustains what is left of NATO?

In Canada, on the other hand, the emerging reality may well be dismemberment of the Confederation or at the very least a loosening of its bonds. The failure of the Meech Lake constitutional accord has brought into question the very structure of the country. Will Quebec secede? Will it remain in a relation-

ship of “sovereignty-association” with the rest of Canada? What does sovereignty-association mean? From the perspective of this book, what does it mean for Canada’s treaty obligations? The Parti Québécois, so far the most vociferous of the forces for independence, has stated that an independent Quebec would remain in both NATO and NORAD (North American Air Defence Command) – but policies formed in opposition have, as we all know, a tendency to change in power.

The contributors and co-editors of this volume have hardly escaped the dilemma that political change in Europe and in Canada has produced. We first came together for a conference on “Canada, the United States and the Atlantic Alliance,” held in Toronto in May of 1987, when both the Cold War and Canada seemed more permanent than they have since proved. The conference was the result of a recognition by both Canadian and foreign experts that Canada’s role in the Atlantic Alliance had not been seriously studied for some years. It brought together academics, diplomats and politicians to examine the history of Canadian participation in the Alliance, the nature of the relationship in the late 1980’s and its future directions. The conference sponsors indicate the wide scope of the program: The Atlantic Council of Canada, the Canadian Committee on the History of the Second World War, the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, the Centre on Foreign Policy and Federalism at the Universities of Waterloo and Wilfrid Laurier University, and the Lyman L. Lemnitzer Center for NATO Studies at Kent State University.

At the time the assumption was that the past would explain both the present and future. But all contributors found in the ensuing months following the conference that their work, based on the politics of Europe 1987, was increasingly inappropriate to the Europe of 1990. Thus all the papers given in 1987 were revised substantially. There were some casualties – a paper on the Canadian commitment of a brigade to Norway in wartime (the “CAST” brigade) was rendered partially obsolete even during the conference, when the latest Canadian White Paper on defence came out in draft with a recommendation that the CAST brigade be eliminated. That this book has emerged at all is a testimonial to the fact that many of the issues raised in 1987 were still important in 1990 – and to the quality of the work originally done by our contributors.

The first part of this volume deals with the history of Canada and NATO since World War II. At a time when the future of the Alliance is unclear and when its primary task of providing security against attacks from the east seems strangely inappropriate, it is salutary to be reminded that there were debates, disagreement even, over its purpose in the past. The possibility, being discussed in some quarters, that NATO might evolve into an organization that concentrates on building economic and cultural as well as political ties among its members on both sides of the Atlantic is one that arouses particular memories for Canadians. Article 2 of the original treaty – “the Canadian article” –

envisaged precisely that but the exigencies of the Cold War meant that NATO’s military role remained paramount. If the events of the summer of 1990 in the Middle East have demonstrated anything, it is surely that of the desirability of international consultation and cooperation. The United Nations has played a role that many of us thought it could no longer play – that is providing both a forum and a centre for international action. It is not surely beyond the realm of possibility that NATO might evolve into a forum for similar consultation and action for democracies on both sides of the Atlantic.

In her chapter Mary Halloran looks at the origin of Canada’s commitment to NATO in the war years. The talented and influential generation of Canadian policy makers in the Department of External Affairs was also working in an atmosphere of crisis, at a time when the prewar certainties seemed dead or at least dying. She demonstrates clearly that Canadians were thinking in terms of shaping a new world in which Europe – and that included a new Germany – and North America shared democratic values. She concludes that Canadians – and here she goes beyond the political elites – were prepared to contribute to building the postwar world but on Canadian and not European terms.

David Bercuson comes to a similar conclusion in his study of an episode in Canadian policy in the early 1950’s – and that is the debate among Canada’s senior military and government officials over where to station Canadian troops in Europe. He argues that the Canadian government accepted the need to contribute to the defence of Western Europe. At issue was whether Canadian troops would be stationed with British or American forces. As a case study of the evolution of policy it is interesting in itself. Bercuson shows how practical considerations, matters of high policy, and even personal ambitions intersected. Moreover the debate brought in what were perennial concerns for Canada: how to avoid dominance by either Britain or the United States; the possibility of Canada’s acting as a balance between the United States and other members of NATO; and even the government’s fear that the Canadian taxpayer might suddenly revolt against expensive commitments to a far-off alliance.

The Canadians have often been accused of willful idealism in their support for Article 2. Joseph Sinasac argues convincingly that Canadian policy makers were in fact well-aware of the unlikelihood of developing the Atlantic Alliance into a political and economic one. Their motives, even in the late 1940’s, had been a mixture of altruistic and pragmatic. His chapter deals with the Committee of Three – often known as the Three Wise Men Committee – which was set up in 1956 to review Article 2. Because of changes in the international scene – notably a more reasonable Soviet stance after the death of Stalin and growing European integration marked by the Treaty of Rome – members of the Alliance were prepared to consider a revised role for it. While the Canadians had long urged such a review by the mid-1950’s they had become cynical about its usefulness. From the start, Lester Pearson, one of the Three Wise Men, was prepared to recommend only limited changes in NATO’s

structure. And as the Committee gathered opinion it became clear that there were widely-differing views on what non-military cooperation could mean. While the Suez and Hungarian crises of late 1956 underscored the need for greater communication among the Allies, the report failed to bring about sweeping changes.

By the 1960's the fears of the 1950's had been at least partially allayed by Western Europe's economic and political revival and by a stabilization in the relationship between the superpowers. The decline in the military importance of the Alliance was accompanied, however, by growing tensions between Europe and the United States, in particular over nuclear weapons policy and American involvement in Vietnam. As John English shows in his chapter, Canadians shared some of the concerns of Europeans over the management of the Alliance. In 1965 Prime Minister Lester Pearson openly questioned the organization of NATO and suggested that the time had come for Canada to reconsider the nature of its contribution. It was clear that the informed public shared his doubts, especially in light of the fact that Canada had been relegated to the sidelines in policy discussions between the Americans and the Europeans. The 1966 decision by General De Gaulle to withdraw from the military side of NATO was greeted thoughtfully in Canada with some commentators suggesting that Canada might do well to emulate his independence. Canadian criticism, as English demonstrates, was both a reflection of problems in the Alliance and disappointment in Canada that the hopes embodied in Article 2 had not been realized. The debate in Canada in the late 1960's, English concludes, helped to prepare the way for the thorough-going re-evaluation of the early Trudeau years.

The second section of the book is necessarily more speculative, dealing as it does with Canada and NATO in a changing world. Even before the events of 1989 Canada, like its allies, found itself re-evaluating its NATO policy. It has not been alone in finding that the maintenance of a military presence in Europe produces increasing strains on its budget. These strains, coming in a time when the risk of war in Europe seems more distant than at any time since 1945, make it more difficult to justify the commitment. In this context it is interesting to note that there are more CF-18 combat aircraft in Europe than there are in Canada. Canada faces another dilemma not shared by some NATO nations – its other security requirements. With the world's longest coastline and the world's second largest land mass, it must draw from a comparatively small population base to defend this large area, in a time when defence commitments seem particularly expensive. The changes in Europe are increasingly forcing Canadians to make some difficult choices, and as the perception of threat recedes, the need for a major readjustment in Canadian commitments to Europe becomes even greater. The difficulty is, though, that Canadians are finding what all others interested in Europe are also discovering – that the landscape is confused and uncertain and that the frameworks of the past no longer fit very well.

One of Canada's more pressing issues on defence is its relationship with the United States. Canada and the U.S. are partners in several defence relationships, including both NATO and NORAD. A persistent irritant for Canada in this relationship has been the United States' pressure on Canadians to spend more on defence and to expand their defence activities. Joseph Jockel predicts that the U.S. will seek the same kind of defence commitments from Canada as it has in the past. Canada will face greater coercion, not less from the U.S. and other members of NATO to maintain Canadian forces in the Federal Republic of Germany even as the U.S. and probably some European NATO nations reduce their own forces there.

For Canada, this will require some difficult choices – including the purchase of some expensive new equipment, such as tanks. Jockel argues that modernization is also necessary in NORAD which will result in further pressure on the Canadian budget. In addition the United States is encouraging Canada to maintain a navy of small vessels capable of escort and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) duty. Canada, like the United States, faces a considerable budget deficit problem. But Jockel indicates that the U.S. will “gently nag” Canada to spend more on defence. As U.S. defence budgets themselves actually decline in purchasing power, Canada will most likely find such requests a source of annoyance, to say the least.

Several contributors in this section remind us that we should not forget NATO's military significance. We must remember that change is not irreversible, that conditions of hostility can re-emerge, that Gorbachev is mortal politically as well as physically, and that the world has seen too many wars for complacency to set in just yet. Geoffrey Till's chapter looks at Canada as a seapower. It is not just a matter of guarding the coastline, he argues, but protecting overseas trade and maintaining Canada's links to European defence. Even in peacetime, Till notes, the Soviet navy poses potential problems for Canada. Although it has not done so in recent years it is capable of patrolling far into the North Atlantic. This of course poses a threat not just to Canada but to the United States. In the event of war, it would be difficult to remove the Soviet navy from waters of strategic importance to North America.

Till notes that the Soviet navy has some particular difficulties, including a lot of territory to defend, an aging fleet, and low status in comparison to the other elements of the Soviet military. Nevertheless, he argues, the Soviet navy needs to be accorded respect, not only because of its size and capability, but also because NATO is, after all, a maritime alliance. Thus Canada, as a maritime nation herself, has a real interest in helping to maintain NATO seapower. It is in both its own and NATO's interests for Canada to continue to and even enhance its contribution to the Standing Naval Forces Atlantic, to develop counter-mine measures, and to keep its role as a protector of trans-Atlantic shipping.

While Till concentrates on Canada's maritime contribution to NATO, David Sorenson examines Canadian ground and air roles in the Federal Republic of Germany. At one point Canada had almost 8000 troops in Germany, but that number was cut by almost half by the Trudeau Government in 1969. The contribution of Canadian forces in Germany has provoked controversy both in and outside of Canada. Some have argued that the force makes little impact either to NATO's military capability or to Canada's influence within NATO, and thus should be withdrawn. Others have argued that the force should be enhanced, perhaps bringing it up to its pre-Trudeau size. Sorenson contends, though, that while the Canadian contribution in Germany is significant and should be continued, some consolidation and reassignment might be in order. For example, he suggests that Canada might concentrate on air defence, taking advantage of both the newness and quality of Canadian equipment and the skills of Canadian pilots. He also proposes a reconfiguration of Canadian ground forces, to emphasize a more mobile role with smaller units. While specialization in NATO is controversial, it is more affordable than the other options of buying new tanks, APCs, and other equipment necessary if the present Canadian roles are to be sustained.

The implications of both the Till and Sorenson chapters are that Canada will have to spend more money to carry out the missions they propose. But are the citizens of Canada prepared to make the necessary sacrifices for such increases? Geoffrey Pearson looks at Canadian public opinion and finds, among other things, that Canadians now view the nuclear arms race as more of a threat to them than the USSR. And twice as many found the U.S. to be the main threat to peace as compared to the USSR. While it is possible to ascribe some of the reaction against the U.S. to anti-Reagan sentiment, given the dates of the polls Pearson uses, it is difficult to imagine any increase in Canadian fear of the USSR. The astonishing changes in the USSR and Eastern Europe surely will have the effect on Canadians that they have had on others in NATO, including Americans. The daily and very public collapse of the Soviet threat is probably already eroding Canadian support for defence in general and the Atlantic Alliance in particular. Even in the late 1980's, a large majority of Canadians believed that "military force is no longer an appropriate way for countries to pursue their interests"; not surprisingly they were reluctant to see the defence budget increased. On the other hand, they have so far continued to support the stationing of Canadian forces in Europe. At the moment it is difficult to gauge how the Canadian public will react to defence issues in the coming years.

Canada, as noted above, has other defence and foreign policy interests outside of NATO. There is also the perennial matter of NATO policy in "peripheral" areas, such as the Persian Gulf, where its members may have interests. Just as the situation in Europe is fluid and likely to remain so, the relative importance of the peripheries may alter as well. While Charles Doran

notes the changing nature of the competition for influence between East and West, he argues that Soviet pressure on its own southern periphery is still possible. He argues that NATO may still play an indirect role in preventing such pressure. How to do this, though, is likely to evoke different responses from the United States and from Canada. The United States and Canada, the only two North American members of NATO, may have some real differences over the nature of the threat found in the peripheries. Canada tends to view nationalism as a greater source of instability than does the United States, which has customarily viewed Marxist-Leninist movements as more serious threats. In addition the United States is more prepared than Canada, according to Doran, to see NATO forces used in peripheral areas. Canada generally prefers to use the United Nations in a peacekeeping role.

It is fitting that the concluding chapter should be written by John Halstead who brings to bear two perspectives as a former Canadian ambassador to NATO and now an academic. We have not set him an easy task in asking him to look at Canada and NATO in the 1990's. He reminds us – and the reminder is timely – that NATO has been a success. It has kept the peace. And it has brought particular benefits to Canada, giving it a place at tables that it might otherwise not have had.

The coming years will not be easy ones for NATO. Halstead identifies three issues from NATO's past which could be divisive in the future: the management and use of the nuclear deterrent; the evolving relationship between the United States and the European community; and the relationship with the Soviet Union. There is also the worrying possibility – referred to by Geoffrey Pearson – that the apparent collapse of the Soviet Empire will lead Canadians to conclude that NATO is no longer necessary. Halstead insists that NATO – as a political instrument rather than a primarily military one – is more necessary than ever to enable the West to co-ordinate its response to the enormous changes taking place in the international environment such as the emergence of Japan as a major power and the end of superpower dominance.

Glossary

4CMBG	Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group
5GBC	Groupe-brigade du Canada
ADI	Air Defense Initiative
AIP	Air-independent propulsion
ALCMs	Air-launched cruise missiles
AMF-L	Allied Mobile Force-Land
AORs	Operational Support Ships
APCs	Armored personnel carriers
ASTS	Advanced Surveillance and Tracking System
ASW	Anti-submarine warfare
ATF	Advanced tactical fighters
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control Aircraft
BAOR	British Army of the Rhine
BM/C3	Battle management/communications, command, and control
BMD	Ballistic missile defense
CANLANT	Canadian Atlantic
CAST	Canadian Air-Sea Transportable
CCOS	Chairman, Chiefs of Staff (Canada)
CENTAG	Central Army Group
CFB	Canadian forces base
CFE	Canadian Forces Europe
CGS	Chief of the General Staff (Canada)
CRO	Commonwealth Relations Office
DEW	Distant early warning
DND	Department of National Defence (Canada)
DOBs	Dispersed operating bases
FOLs	Forward operating locations
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
GDP	Gross domestic product
GUIK	Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap
ICBMs	Intercontinental ballistic missiles
MARCOM	Maritime Command
MCM	Mine counter-measures
MND	Minister of National Defence (Canada)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NORAD	North American Aerospace Defence Command
NWS	North warning system
OMG	Operational maneuver groups
OTH-B	Over-the-horizon backscatter
RCN	Royal Canadian Navy
RCAF	Royal Canadian Airforce
SDI	Strategic Defense Initiative
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SLBMs	Submarine-launched ballistic missiles
SLCMs	Sea-launched cruise missiles
SLOC	Sea lines of communication
SPETSNAZ	Soviet special forces
SSBMs	Ballistic missile submarine
SSNs	Nuclear-powered submarines
STANAFORLANT	Standing Naval Force Atlantic
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
TOW	Tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided missile
UK	United Kingdom
USAF	United States Air Force
USN	United States Navy

I

The Historical Background

Canada and the Origins of the Post-War Commitment

Mary Halloran

Given the important role Canada played in the formation of NATO, it may seem curious that initial Canadian policy at the end of World War II was to pull back from Europe and overseas commitments. In fact this is not as contradictory as it appears. It is true that the withdrawal of the Canadian Armed Forces was complete by the autumn of 1946. It is equally true that no elected official or civil servant in Canada foresaw in 1946 the return of Canadian troops to European soil within five years in fulfillment of duties under the North Atlantic Treaty. That Canada chose to shoulder some measure of responsibility for the protection of Europe can be explained primarily by the onset of the Cold War. But the seeds of her interest in and commitment to Europe are to be found in the war years, when Canadian policymakers, notably those in the Department of External Affairs (DEA), turned their attention to the shape of the post-war world. The planners envisaged a role for Canada in shaping that world, but they were not prepared, nor were the politicians prepared, to participate on terms dictated by their wartime allies.

In December 1945 the government of Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King informed the British cabinet that it intended to withdraw the Canadian Occupation Force from Europe. The Occupation Force consisted of an army group of 18,000 all ranks, stationed in north-west Germany, and ten of an original thirteen RCAF squadrons. The force was created by the Cabinet War Committee in 1944 to assist the British with Stage II of the occupation, a period of "adjustment and disarmament" following the operational occupation of Germany.¹ But that commitment was coming to an end. With the repatriation of the Canadian Army Overseas, King told the British, keeping the occupation forces abroad "would create administrative difficulties out of all proportion to the numbers involved." Beginning in April 1946, withdrawal from Europe would begin, with the complete removal of all army and air force personnel expected by the autumn.² That this decision surprised and disconcerted the British is a matter of record. Prime Minister Clement Attlee did his best to dissuade the Canadians. In a telegram to King he appealed to his sense of fairness. "It would seem hard," wrote Attlee, "that this country should be expected to bear the whole burden of occupational duties in Europe. This

would, in effect, be on behalf of all of us in the British Commonwealth who have fought together in the war and are seeking in the same spirit of partnership to play our part in restoring Europe and the world in general."³ At a meeting at Downing Street, he lobbied a delegation of Canadian cabinet ministers, among them Louis St. Laurent, King's Justice Minister and Quebec lieutenant. Attlee's message was clear. Canada's decision to pull out of Germany was leaving Britain in the lurch in her hour of need. A survey of Britain's commitments showed that at least one million personnel would be needed to carry out occupation duties. Attlee reminded his visitors that the British overhead costs were no less onerous than those of the Canadians, nor home leave for their men any more feasible. Finally, he appealed in the name of Commonwealth solidarity. The UK was only as effective within the Security Council of the United Nations as the forces available to support her. Canada's independent membership in the UN notwithstanding, it was only through united action in the Commonwealth that the "British people" could wield influence.⁴ In reply, St. Laurent elaborated on the administrative problems cited by Mackenzie King. The overhead costs of maintaining occupation forces overseas were prohibitive, while the work itself seemed less than useful. The decision to bring the men home was irrevocable. No appeal on behalf of the Commonwealth could change it. In brief, Attlee was lobbying the wrong party. The Liberals who governed in Canada had long been opposed to the policy of "one voice and one army for the Empire," as indeed were the majority of Canadians. Moreover, the wartime arrangements under which decisions were made by the Big Three to be carried out by all the Allies could not continue in peacetime. Canada had not been consulted as to the extent and nature of the responsibilities to be shouldered by the British and was not to be held accountable now.⁵

Canada's abrupt decision to withdraw from Europe caused problems not only with Attlee's government. Once the news was released, the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion recorded 37 percent opposed to withdrawal and 46 percent in favour. Outside Quebec, however, 43 percent opposed the measure, while only 40 percent approved.⁶ Editorial opinion was less equivocal. The Tory press in Canada excoriated the government for its decision. The *Toronto Globe and Mail* saw the withdrawal as "this nation's last descent in the valley of humiliation as a result of the Government's manpower policies." The government's record in "military matters where there were political undertones" prompted the *Montreal Gazette* to conclude that "King and his colleagues have long since passed the blushing point." The reaction of the Tory press was hardly surprising. But the decision to withdraw was no more popular with the Liberal papers. The *Ottawa Citizen*, normally a supporter of the government, sympathized with the UK over the burden that Canada was leaving her to bear. Even sterner was the judgement of the staunchly Liberal *Winnipeg Free Press*. The editorial in the *Free Press* pondered the ramifications of the government's decision on Canada's international relations. By pulling out of Germany, the

paper said, "we open ourselves to the assumption that we are trying to keep our efforts of international collaboration to a minimum, to judge them by our convenience rather than our duty and our long term interest in peace. The Government is leaving Britain already desperately pressed for manpower to see occupation through alone."⁷

The *Winnipeg Free Press* raised an important issue. The climate of opinion had changed since the twenties and thirties, when the government, with the apparent blessing of the electorate, had worked hard to sabotage Article 10, the collective security clause of the League of Nations Covenant, in order to avoid overseas commitments. By the middle of the war, the polls showed a willingness on the part of Canadians to accept international responsibilities, and a desire for representation on international councils.⁸ Canada's wartime policies reflected the new mood but they were not by and large shaped by the cabinet, dominated as it was by Mackenzie King in his dual capacity as Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs. The leader never fully overcame his personal distaste for open-ended commitments, even though he was to preside over a period of unprecedented Canadian initiative in foreign affairs. The impetus for this shift in policy came instead from the Department of External Affairs. The mandarins at DEA had made their ambitions for Canada plain in their pursuit of membership on wartime boards and had found justification for their demand of wider international recognition in the functional principle, by which it was understood that Canada would be consulted to the extent that she was able and willing to assume responsibility. A change had plainly taken place in the way Canada perceived her relations with the outside world. How then to explain the abrupt withdrawal from Europe, at a time when her allies were clearly still in need of her help? Did the decision to quit Europe signify a retreat to a policy of "no commitments"?

It is the contention of this paper that it did not. The decision to end Canadian occupation duties was not a renunciation of Europe, but rather a refusal to accept a European role on the terms offered. To understand fully that decision, and the nature of Canada's commitment to post-war Europe, one must look to the early forties, when a talented group of officials in the Canadian government first turned their attention to Canada's role in preserving the peace.

The war years coincided with the passing of a generation within the Department of External Affairs. Nineteen forty-one marked the death of O.D. Skelton and Loring Christie. As Under-Secretary, Skelton had presided over the department since 1925. A nationalist with a healthy dislike of all things British, he had laboured to keep Canada free from European entanglements. In this he was ably assisted by Christie. Sir Robert Borden's one-time adviser had returned to the department as counsellor in 1935. Together, Skelton and Christie epitomized the disinclination for overseas commitments that was the hallmark of Canadian external policy in the thirties. The men who succeeded

them – Norman Robertson as Under-Secretary, Hume Wrong as Assistant Under-Secretary and Lester Pearson as second-in-command at the Canadian Legation in Washington – were united in their determination to reverse that policy. They were the leaders of a new generation of civil servants who, in the words of one of them, “sought for things Canada might do rather than things Canada might avoid doing.”⁹ To abandon the policies of the thirties was to accept for Canada a role in the shaping of the post-war world. More specifically, it meant a role in shaping a new Europe, the cradle of two world wars.

The new members of the civil service were in many ways predisposed to fix their gaze across the Atlantic. Though they were, almost to a man, born in Canada, many of the most influential had been educated at Oxford, Cambridge or the London School of Economics. Among them were the triumvirate of Pearson, Robertson and Wrong, as well as Escott Reid and Charles Ritchie of External Affairs, Arnold Heeney, Clerk of the Privy Council and Cabinet Secretary, J.W. Pickersgill of the Prime Minister’s Office, Louis Rasminsky and Alex Skelton of the Bank of Canada, and A.F.W. Plumptre of the Department of Finance.¹⁰ Education abroad nurtured bonds of friendship with Britain and furnished opportunities to wander the continent. The result was a group of policymakers with a world view encompassing Europe. Some were particularly “European” in their outlook. Norman Robertson’s frequent visits to France fostered an abiding love for that country, while his marriage to a native of Holland only strengthened his continental ties. Charles Ritchie, future Canadian representative in London, Paris and Bonn, began early to soak up the richness of continental life. Apart from boyhood trips, there was a period of residence at the Ecole Libres des Sciences Politiques in Paris. Finally, the friendships that J.W. Pickersgill made in France in the twenties sparked a keen and early interest in the cause of European unity.¹¹ It would seem more than mere coincidence that a new Canadian commitment to Europe was undertaken by a generation of civil servants bound to that continent by their tastes and personal experience.

In time, that commitment would translate into membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Canadian sponsorship of Article 2, a non-military clause in the treaty specially designed to foster economic, political and cultural ties within an Atlantic community. Even the new breed of mandarins could not have imagined such a European link in their wartime planning for the future. What made participation in the post-war alliance possible was the political acuity of Mackenzie King. Though he never came to share the internationalist zeal of his civil servants, Mackenzie King at least recognized that they reflected the popular consensus. Lacking the energy in his final years in office to chart a new course in foreign policy, the Prime Minister relinquished control of External Affairs to Louis St. Laurent in 1946. The bright young men in the department at last had a politician to champion their cause in cabinet.

An early signal of Canada’s interest in the future of Europe was the response of DEA to the proposed United Nations Commission for Europe. That proposal emanated from the British War Cabinet and was submitted to the dominions for consideration in June 1943. The British had begun to consider a number of matters relating to the end of hostilities, such as the signing and administration of the armistice. Their deliberations led to the proposed establishment of a supervisory body of “high-ranking political representatives of the United Kingdom, United States and the USSR, of France and any other European Allies, and if so desired of any Dominion prepared to contribute to [the] policing of Europe.” The commission would coordinate the efforts of armistice committees, the allied commander-in-chief and civilian authorities, and would handle military, political and economic affairs. Overseeing the commission would be a steering committee comprised of representatives of the UK, US, USSR and possibly France.¹²

The Dominions Office requested that the Canadian government review the proposal and indicate what interest, if any, it had in serving on the commission. That request generated much discussion at DEA. A memorandum on the subject was prepared by two officers of the department, George Glazebrook and John Holmes. They pointed out the importance of weighing carefully the arguments for and against participation. Representation on the commission entailed a willingness to contribute to the policing of Europe. There was no underestimating its significance. The proposed commission was to play a crucial role in the concluding of the armistice and in the immediate post-war period. Canada would need more information before a decision could be taken. What relation would the steering committee have to the United Nations Commission? What were the current plans for “policing Europe”? What had come of the discussions among the Big Three? Not surprisingly, the authors recommended detailed study by the relevant departments and informal talks between the High Commission in London and the UK government.¹³

Hume Wrong put the matter succinctly to Norman Robertson. “The question of Canadian participation,” he wrote, “may well involve a preliminary decision on our readiness to play an active part in a new world security system. Our armies are in the European theatre and so is the bulk of our operational air force. A commitment to contribute to the policing of Europe would presumably in the main involve an undertaking to participate to some degree in providing the necessary armies of occupation.” Wrong recommended circulation of the British proposals among the relevant departments and their immediate consideration by the Cabinet War Committee.¹⁴

The question went to the Cabinet War Committee who requested further study. Accordingly, Robertson, Wrong and their staff met with the Clerk of the Privy Council and the Chiefs of Staff on 22 July to discuss a draft response to the British proposal. The exchange of opinion proved revealing. The Chief of the Air Staff expressed surprise at the tepid attitude toward Canadian participa-

tion on the commission revealed in the draft telegram. With the concurrence of the Chief of the Naval Staff, he urged the government to undertake a role in post-war policing on terms to be decided later. After Canada's insistence on being taken into account, how could she do less if she had any claim to "national status"?

The officials from External Affairs saw the issue somewhat differently. Hume Wrong questioned the British assumption that only those dominions willing to undertake a policing role were entitled to a place on the commission. After all, Canada expected to play an active role in relief, another area of responsibility for the proposed commission. Arnold Heeney and Norman Robertson took up this theme. Could not the Canadian government propose to the British that contributions other than those of a military nature entitle a country to membership? After all, the task of relief and rehabilitation would go on long after the demilitarization of the area. Awarding membership on the basis proposed by the Canadians would be applying the functional principle, a principle they would come to advocate often in the next few years.

Robertson was concerned about the possibility of further military service for Canadian soldiers beyond war's end. As he pointed out, Canadian soldiers would have been away longer than any other potential members of the United Nations Commission. But neither he nor any other member of his department appeared to consider the possibility of a flat rejection of membership. In placing their recommendations before the Cabinet War Committee, Robertson suggested that they underscore the importance of the British proposal. It marked "the first instalment in the plans for post-war world order and ... a refusal by Canada to take part would mean a reversion to isolationism." That was not an idea entertained by Robertson or anyone else on his staff.¹⁵

Despite the politicians' concern that the public and the forces overseas might demand immediate demobilization at war's end, the Cabinet War Committee was persuaded to give the British proposal further consideration.¹⁶ A reply was sent to the Dominions Secretary. In it, the Canadian government requested clarification of the term "policing of Europe" and made it plain that it did not conceive of a Canadian role in purely military terms. But Canada's attitude toward membership on the United Nations Commission for Europe was unequivocal. Because of its prospective role in "the shaping of the terms of the European settlement and determining in large measure the pattern of international political collaboration," the government was "greatly interested and concerned in the proposed Commission." Further, the telegram made plain Canada's assumption that she qualified for representation on the commission not only on the basis of her military contribution but for her participation in relief and other civil duties.¹⁷

The correspondence between Canada and Britain on the United Nations Commission for Europe is notable for a number of reasons. It marked a distinct break with what Robertson viewed as DEA's isolationist past. Robertson and

his staff wanted to pursue an active role in European policy and were prepared to contribute substantially in order to secure it. The concern that Canada's contribution to European stability should not be purely military but economic and political as well foreshadowed the position DEA would take in backing Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Finally, the episode showed the bureaucrats to be somewhat bolder than their political masters. Hence Robertson's warning to the Cabinet War Committee against reverting to isolationism. A later submission to the Cabinet War Committee, in November 1943, urged the government to press strongly for Canadian participation "in any inter-allied machinery of control" as an "essential condition" of contributions to the policing of Europe after the war.¹⁸ Although the War Committee acquiesced in some of the areas promoted by DEA, as in the setting up of a Post-Hostilities Advisory Committee and Working Committee to be comprised of Robertson, Heeney and the Chiefs of Staff, they demurred on the matter of pressing for Canadian representation on inter-allied bodies. The Prime Minister "expressed the view that it was important to avoid commitments which would involve the use of extensive Canadian forces in Europe after the cessation of hostilities."¹⁹

In the end, the senior partners in the alliance frustrated DEA's desire to help determine the fate of Europe in the immediate post-war period. In the fall of 1943 came word of the establishment of the Advisory Council for Italy and the European Advisory Commission. At first, the British reassured the anxious Canadians that neither body was intended to take the place of the proposed United Nations Commission for Europe.²⁰ But events proved otherwise. The Big Three allowed no such representative body a role in determining post-war settlement.

Canada did not press for membership on either the European Advisory Commission or the Advisory Council for Italy. Was there a retreat from DEA's commitment of July 1943 to pursue an active European policy? The cautious attitude to the new European bodies more likely represents DEA's realization that a request for membership would be futile. That the Big Three intended to dominate the European Advisory Commission was clear from the outset.

Canadian representation on the Advisory Council for Italy was given more serious consideration – in Canada, at any rate. Dana Wilgress, the Canadian Minister in the USSR, argued the case most forcefully in November 1943. Wilgress reasoned that the presence of the Canadian Army Corps in Italy allowed the government "to present with dignity" its bid for membership on the Advisory Council. The Advisory Council at that time was more prestigious than the European Advisory Commission. It was supposed to deal with current political problems in that country and provide executive control at the end of the war. As such it would serve as a model in the post-war treatment of other enemy countries. Members of the council would therefore gain experience and wield "important influence in shaping future policy." And lastly, Canadian membership on the council would help to secure a place on the European

Advisory Commission when the proposed expansion of membership occurred.²¹

It was Hume Wrong, with the support of Glazebrook, Holmes and others, who vetoed Wilgress's plan. They seemed to have sensed the futility of trying to convince the Big Three of their right to representation.²² Perhaps they still held out hope for a place on the United Nations Commission for Europe. The most that Wilgress could win from the department was a disclaimer that acceptance of their exclusion from the Advisory Council for Italy did not mean that they would "stand aside" as graciously in other circumstances. Canada had not given up on Europe. But the senior partners in the Allied cause were no more prepared to delegate to the eager Canadians than to any other small power.

Another area which received sustained attention at External Affairs was the post-war treatment of Germany. The importance of that subject in securing a lasting peace was underscored in a ten-page departmental memorandum on "The Future of Germany" in February 1944. As the author put it, "the hope of lasting peace depends, more than on any other single factor, on the solution of the German problem." Without coercion, there was no hope that Germany could be counted on to renounce aggression, and would therefore continue to pose a threat to world security. The task, then, was to devise a policy calculated to protect against that danger. The memo weighed the possible methods of controlling the German problem: the dismemberment of Germany, the forced reduction and control of German armaments, the dismantling of German economic power. If the victors resorted to punitive measures in the form of reparations and the trial of war criminals, what would be the effect on the German psyche? The author's conclusions were not optimistic. The United Nations could "hope for, but not depend on, a change of heart amongst the German people". While an international organization would offer the best safeguards against renewed German aggression, no such organization currently existed. Among the other means of control, the victors should avoid "forced reorganization of German internal affairs" in favour of stringent control. That control might be relaxed "in response to a co-operative attitude on the part of future German governments and people," but not in the foreseeable future.²³

The memo was circulated by Hume Wrong among various heads of mission and department officials. The matter prompted extensive comment and revealed a range of opinion on the stand Canada should adopt on post-war European problems. One early response came from Pierre Dupuy, the *Chargé d'affaires* to the Allied governments in London. His assessment of the chances for rehabilitation of the German people was grim. At heart was the problem of psychology. "For 150 years," he wrote, "Herder, Fichte and all the political thinkers have propagated the doctrine of the superiority of the German race over all others. They have therefore become imbued with the belief that they are entitled to dominate Europe, and eventually the whole world, and it will take a long time to convince them otherwise." That psychology, which he

described as "arrogant and complicated," would take some time to change. A decade or two would be too little time for the emergence of "a democratic peace-loving people, reasoning as we do on important matters of justice, and political and social progress."

How then should the victors treat the Germans so as to bring about a lasting peace? Dupuy argued for punitive measures not just against the military but against the industrialists and intellectuals as well, as they had all conspired to produce Hitlerism with the backing of a large majority. Some effort must be made to come to terms with their mentality, as "it will not be possible to kill them all". Dismantling the military would be the first task. But as the military leadership was primarily Prussian in origin and education, Dupuy argued for separate and severe treatment of that territory. Among the "harsh and drastic" measures he advocated were isolation from the rest of Germany, and international controls over its military, financial, political, industrial and economic life.

Apart from the abject humiliation of Prussia, Dupuy supported a measure of leniency for those German states which proved themselves amenable to international cooperation. But German industry across the board ought to be subsumed in an international system of production, to prevent German rearmament.²⁴

Dupuy's response excited no comment in Ottawa. His position as *Chargé d'affaires* might have been expected to lend weight to his opinion. But Dupuy's professional standing was not high. His reporting from Vichy France had earned him a reputation, in the words of one scholar, as a "loose-tongued naïf."²⁵

Of more moment was the view of Dana Wilgress, the widely respected Canadian representative in Moscow. Wilgress had given a good deal of thought to the German problem. It was a question he had discussed with officials of the Soviet Union and fellow diplomats in Moscow. His ruminations on the departmental memo were not as flagrantly anti-German as those of Pierre Dupuy. Still, he did not advocate leniency in the post-war treatment of Germany. "I regret," he wrote, "that the burden of the argument in the departmental memorandum is against the splitting-up of Germany into parts. This I consider to be the only really satisfactory solution of the German problem." He argued for the division of Germany into three zones corresponding to areas of occupation. With the views of his host country in mind, Wilgress proposed the nationalization of large industrial concerns which would be made to pay a percentage of their output as reparations. Reparations, he noted, were of special importance to the Soviets.²⁶

Perhaps the most acute observations were made by Charles Ritchie, then first secretary at the Canadian High Commission in London. Ritchie set out to address an issue not raised in the departmental memo: that of the specific relations Canada herself might have to the problem of Germany's post-war future.

Ritchie summed up the issue neatly: "It is axiomatic that our main interest in Germany like that of the other United Nations is that she be made and kept incapable of starting another war. Our position differs from that of some of the other United Nations in that we have no territorial claims against Germany. But two generations of Canadians have been involved in war by Germany's aggressions. And Canada may be asked to participate with the other United Nations in plans extending over a period of years to keep Germany disarmed." Any responsibilities that Canadians might be asked to shoulder could be long term. Germany would be at the crux of any problem addressed by the new world security organization in which Canada would surely play a role. Therefore, the Canadian public must feel "that Canadian policy towards Germany has been decided in terms of Canada's interests and that full opportunity has been given for Canada's views to be heard" when the Allies determined Germany's fate. With that consideration in mind, Ritchie went on to list the practical matters which the government must keep to the fore in determining its policy toward Germany. In the first place, Canada must be kept apprised of the claims of Russia and Poland to the eastern territories of Germany. Moreover, Canada must be kept fully informed in advance of the British government's policy toward Germany. This latter point was vital, as all of Europe assumed that any statement made by Churchill was done in the name of the whole Commonwealth.

There was also the problem of Canada's signature of the armistice. Echoing the frustration of many others, Ritchie lamented the tendency of the Russians and Americans "to behave as if they and the UK were the only participants in the war against Germany". That tendency was quite apparent in the Russian and American armistice plan. Canada must see to it that she was associated with the signature of the armistice with Germany, even if she did not sign directly.

Ritchie anticipated a number of problems in connection with the possible participation of Canada in the occupation of Germany. He urged that policy be decided on several questions. To what extent would Canada take part in civil affairs in Germany? He argued that any significant participation necessitated Canadian representation at the planning level. To what extent would Canada involve itself in the control of the German economy? The activities of UNRRA, with which Canada was sure to be associated, would involve the government in such matters as relief and displaced persons. Would Canada be associated with the armistice control commission after Germany's defeat?

Ritchie urged that the government be represented on the High Commission for Germany currently being planned. Some liaison between Canada and the High Commission could greatly facilitate managing the tangle of issues he outlined. Finally, Canada and her allies had to determine the German problem in relation to the international security organization in which they set such store for a lasting peace.²⁷

Of those who commented on the departmental memorandum, Ritchie seems to have had the keenest perception that Canada could and should have a role to play in deciding the future of post-war Germany. That perception impressed Under-Secretary of State Norman Robertson, who called the Prime Minister's attention to Ritchie's memorandum. The idea that the government should start now to define more narrowly its post-war German policy seemed wise. One issue about which External Affairs sought to clarify its views was the dismemberment of Germany.

The reaction of DEA to the question of dismemberment was expressed most clearly in a memorandum by George Glazebrook. The author weighed the conflicting views of Canada's allies: the tendency within the State Department to back away from plans to partition or dismember Germany, the involvement of the European Advisory Commission in deciding the issue, the differences of opinion among the Big Three revealed at the Tehran Conference. At that conference, FDR proposed partitioning Germany into five self-governing parts and two to be administered by the Allies, Churchill suggested the isolation of Prussia, and Stalin argued for the kind of crushing dismemberment which would prevent further union.

With so few clear signals from the principal players, Glazebrook produced a statement remarkable for its restraint and its view to the post-war future of Europe. "The object of policy toward Germany is not revenge or punishment," argued the author, "but the prevention of further aggression." That object could be sought by either external control of Germany, by an international organization or by a co-operative effort among interested states, or by the reduction of German power to a point where it was not capable of further aggression. While either of these options might entail disarmament and reparations, neither required so drastic a step as dismemberment.

The memo was unequivocal on the significance of the issue. "The decision on whether a policy of forced dismemberment should be adopted is of the greatest importance, for on it – more than on any other factor – may hang the stability of Europe and the peace of the world." If it could be shown that Germany could be controlled either by an international organization or by the interested states, there would be no need to resort to dismemberment. And dismemberment was what the victors should seek to avoid, because "German nationalism, though it might be forcefully held in chains, would feed on adversity and become more dangerous." Under those circumstances, force would be necessary to keep the separate German states apart. Far better that force be used "to restrain a United Germany from re-arming or in other ways breaking whatever controls are considered necessary." In short, the dismemberment of Germany was, of all the solutions under consideration, the most risky.²⁸

Even as consensus on the question was developing within the Canadian bureaucracy, the matter was being heatedly debated within the American government. By the fall, the American press was reporting the controversy within

the Roosevelt administration over the Morgenthau plan for the demolition of Germany's industrial power.²⁹ The Canadian High Commission in London reported that the question was equally vexing for the government of Great Britain.³⁰ With the governments of her two major allies divided among themselves on the German question, Canada did not hold out much hope that she would be able to influence in any substantial way the settlement to be imposed on a defeated Germany. But what is significant is the perception within the Department of External Affairs that the fate of Germany was of primary concern to Canada, because on it hinged her hopes for peace.

It might be argued that the Canadian preoccupation with the future of Germany signified something more. In many of the departmental memoranda there is the unspoken assumption that a new Germany would emerge from the settlement imposed by the victors, a Germany which might better reflect the values Canada hoped to see enshrined in a new international organization. That notion emerges most plainly in the writings of Escott Reid. Reid deplored what he identified as a tendency to exaggerate the problem of creating and maintaining an anti-Nazi regime in Germany. In his view, social and economic change in Germany could be brought about under the terms of the peace settlement. As he put it, "We can ... make such an omelette of at least some of the nazi elements in German life that these Hitlerite eggs can never get back into their shells again." Reid wrote of forcing Germany to accept a new national constitution which would make illegal those crimes "which the nazi regime has perpetrated against the non-nazi element in the German community – torture, beating, imprisonment and execution without trial, racial and religious discrimination." It was clear that Reid's aim was to nurture in Germany some semblance of liberalism, a concept he did not define but which he plainly identified as the set of values underpinning Canadian society.³¹

Not everyone, of course, shared Escott Reid's optimism. John Read, the Department of External Affairs' legal adviser, attacked the notion that the victors could impose their own values on German society. But even he thought it possible to create "a set of circumstances in which it might be reasonably practicable for a nation to grow and develop which was capable of living with the rest of the world."³² The tacit assumption that Canadians might have a role to play in re-shaping Europe, in re-casting Europe in their own image, underlies much of DEA's wartime planning for the post-war world.

We know well what became of those plans. Despite their concerted efforts, Canadians were given no voice in determining the European settlement.³³ Far from staying to fashion a new Europe, the government withdrew its troops with what even some of its supporters deemed to be undue haste. In part, the retreat from Europe reflected the popular desire to close the door on the last six years and concentrate on matters closer to home. For the politicians with a view to pleasing the electorate, retreat was inevitable.

But it might be argued that retreat was equally inevitable for those men at External Affairs who had held such high hopes for a Canadian presence in Europe. For the only European role they had considered was one for which they would dictate the terms. Even in 1943 when Canada was offered membership on the ill-fated United Nations Commission for Europe, DEA had demanded Canadian representation on any inter-allied control machinery as an "essential condition" of a Canadian contribution to the policing of Europe.³⁴ As Norman Robertson explained to the British High Commissioner when Canada broke the news of its impending withdrawal, the Big Three had left the government with no choice. Had they given Canadians a say in the original plans for the occupation of Germany, the cabinet "would have been predisposed to maintain Canadian forces in Germany instead of being predisposed to withdraw them." But he did hold out some hope for a renewed Canadian role if and when the United Nations took over responsibility for peace-keeping in the area.³⁵

Canada's commitment to Europe was the product of wartime preoccupation with the shape of the post-war world. Her withdrawal from Europe in 1946 did not signify a renunciation of that commitment. Rather, it was a refusal to fulfill that commitment on the terms offered. Her position was no different three years later, when she fought for, and won, the inclusion of Article 2 – the "Canadian Article" – in the North Atlantic Treaty.

Endnotes

- ¹ C.P. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939-1945* (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1970), 65.
- ² Canadian Government to DO, 8 December 1945, PREM 8, 523, No. 265, Public Records Office (PRO).
- ³ *Documents on Canadian External Relations (DCER). Volume 12: 1946* (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1977), 152-153.
- ⁴ Minutes of meeting held 22 January 1946 at Downing Street, PREM 8 (PRO).
- ⁵ *Ibid.* See also *DCER*, 12, 1379-81.
- ⁶ John Holmes, *The Shaping of Peace, Volume 1* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), 110.
- ⁷ Malcom MacDonald, HC Ottawa, to Sir Eric Machtig, Dominions Office, 11 March 1946, PREM 8, 523 (PRO).
- ⁸ Holmes, *The Shaping of Peace*, 1:27-8.
- ⁹ *Ibid.*, 25.
- ¹⁰ J.L. Granatstein, *The Ottawa Men* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1982), 7.
- ¹¹ Interview with J.W. Pickersgill, 29 April 1986.
- ¹² *DCER*, 9, 556-557.
- ¹³ *Ibid.*, 560-561.
- ¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 558-559.
- ¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 562-564.
- ¹⁶ Holmes, *The Shaping of Peace*, 1:109.
- ¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 564-565.
- ¹⁸ *DCER*, 9, 576.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 577-78.

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- 27 Ibid., No. A.159, Charles Ritchie, Canadian High Commission, London, to SSEA, 30 March 1944, attached to memorandum for the PM by Norman Robertson, 8 April 1944.
- 28 Ibid., Memorandum by George Glazebrook, 22 March 1944, attached to No. 351, N.A. Robertson, Ottawa, to High Commissioner for Canada (HCC), London, 25 March 1944.
- 29 Ibid., Wrong, Canadian Legation, Washington to SSEA, 25 September 1944, No. 2226.
- 30 Ibid., file 7-BC(s), Memorandum by John Holmes to HCC, London, 17 March 1945, attached to No. 87, HCC, London to SSEA, 17 March 1945.
- 31 "Policy Towards Germany," 14 September 1943, Escott Reid Papers, MG31 E46, v. 6, file 10 (NAC).
- 32 Ibid., "A Lost Cause," confidential paper by JER.
- 33 See John Hilliker, "No Bread at the Table: Canada and the European Settlement, 1943-7," *Canadian Historical Review* 61, No. 1, (1980), 69-86.
- 34 *DCER*, 9, 576.
- 35 MacDonald, HC Ottawa, to Machtig, Dominions Office, 15 February 1946, PREM 8, 523 (PRO).

The Return of the Canadians to Europe: Britannia Rules the Rhine

David J. Bercuson

On November 21, 1951 Canada's Minister of National Defence, Brooke Claxton, stood on a reviewing stand in front of the Rotterdam city hall and welcomed 1500 men of the 27th Canadian Infantry Brigade to Europe. General Dwight David Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, stood beside him to take the salute from the troops. These Canadians were part of a larger contingent of 5500 men sent overseas in the late fall of 1951 as Canada's contribution to NATO's Integrated Force. They constituted the first significant Canadian military presence in Europe since Canadian occupation troops had been withdrawn from Germany in 1946.

When Claxton spoke, he turned to Eisenhower and declared: "It is our good fortune that again under your leadership our collective military strength is being built up in order to secure the peace which we hoped had been brought with the end of the war."¹ Claxton had good reason to be grateful to Eisenhower on that blustery day in Rotterdam. Ike had knowingly saved Claxton and his colleagues in the Canadian government from having to make an embarrassing political choice – to station the Canadian contingent with the American Army or with the British.

The re-establishment of a Canadian military presence in Europe in 1951 was fraught with difficulties. The raising and training of the 27th brigade was undertaken at the same time that Canada was building up the 25th brigade – the Canadian Army Special Force – for service in Korea. It was a heavy burden for a nation that had so recently slashed defence expenditures. There were also political problems to solve connected to the imminent end of the Allied occupation of Germany and the beginning of the stationing of non-German NATO detachments on German soil. Was the Canadian contingent an occupation force? Canada said no. What then was their relationship to the new German federal government and what law governed the conduct of Canadian soldiers in Germany? Since they were not occupiers, who was obliged to pay what for their maintenance?²

Some of these issues took years of negotiation to resolve. But for Canada, none was quite as difficult as the problem of where to station the brigade – in the American zone of occupation in Germany or in the British zone. What

should have been a simple choice, based on military considerations alone, became a political decision with Canadian general pitted against Canadian general in what the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Gen. Charles G. Foulkes, called "a critical dispute."³ This dispute revealed that for some Canadian military and political leaders solidarity with Britain was still a prime defence policy objective despite the full emergence to nationhood that Canada was supposed to have made during World War II and its entry to NATO as a full and equal partner.

In his book, *Growing Up Allied*, the fourth volume of his In Defence of Canada series, Canadian political scientist James Eayrs first sketched out the dimensions of this struggle. He wrote that the choices facing Canada were to place its troops under American command in France or British command in Germany. That was wrong. He wrote that the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee decided in mid-August, 1951, that the 27th should be grouped with the British Army of the Rhine in northern Germany. That was wrong. He took issue with Guy Simonds, former Chief of the General Staff, who told a House of Commons committee in 1967 that the final decision on the grouping had been made by Eisenhower, not the Canadian government. The decision, Eayrs wrote, "was the Canadian government's." That was also wrong because Simonds was right; Eisenhower had saved the Canadian government from having to make a decision that would have had major political repercussions.⁴

In the months following the outbreak of war in Korea, NATO's Defence Committee orchestrated a drive to build up the military strength of alliance members and to increase NATO's capacity to meet what many NATO government leaders feared would be an imminent Soviet attack. Canada was asked to contribute one third of an infantry division and an air division. Ottawa was decidedly reluctant to comply; it had, after all, recently authorized the despatch of the Special Force to Korea. Claxton, for example, thought that the stationing of Canadian troops in Europe would be expensive, a great nuisance and not much use.⁵ But he recognized that Canada could hardly refuse the NATO Defence Committee request when the United States was stretching its resources to the limit to build up forces in both Korea and Europe. On December 29, 1950, therefore, Ottawa authorized the despatch to Europe of one air division, and a brigade-sized force.⁶

Claxton's initial reluctance to fulfill Canada's NATO commitment was not the result of any "softness" towards Communism, hesitation about the value of NATO, or optimism about future harmony in east-west relations. Claxton was, in fact, convinced that the opening battles of World War Three were already being fought in the hills of Korea, and that the west stood in extreme danger at that particular moment.⁷ But he had not climbed as high as he had in the political ranks without a well-developed, some said over-developed, political instinct. And fear the Reds though he might, he feared the wrath of the Canadian taxpayers just as much.

Before setting out to raise the new contingent, Claxton and Foulkes looked for ways to stretch the Special Force to cover the European obligation. On a trip to the Pentagon in February, 1951, Foulkes met General Omar Bradley, Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, and emphasized the difficulties Canada faced in trying to meet both the Korean and the European commitment. He tried to feel Bradley out about diverting Canadian units originally intended for Korea to Europe, especially since the fighting in Korea seemed to have tapered off. Bradley was unsympathetic. He told Foulkes that Canada "should fulfill [its] offer to send a full brigade to Korea in spite of the desirability of despatching forces immediately to the Integrated Force."⁸

Foulkes next saw General J.L. Collins, Chief of Staff of the US Army, and discussed tentative arrangements for the lodgement of Canadian troops in Europe. The two decided that the US Army would provide housing and maintenance for the Canadian troops within the US zone of occupation in Germany if Canada requested this.⁹ This was a new departure for Canada. Through two world wars and in Korea the Canadian army had been grouped with British troops and had fought under British command. Since 1945, however, Canada's armed forces had been changing from UK equipment to American¹⁰ and it was perfectly natural for Foulkes to plan that the US-equipped Canadian troops in Europe would utilize a US line of communication giving them access to US spares and replacements. It would have been costly beyond measure to have tried to establish a separate Canadian line of communication for such a small number of troops. (The Special Force sent to Korea used UK equipment because it contained a large number of World War II veterans used to UK weapons, and Foulkes, who was Chief of the General Staff when the force was authorized, believed that the use of US equipment by it would have necessitated "major changes in ... minor tactical doctrine."¹¹

At the time of his visit to Washington, Foulkes held the position of Chairman, Chiefs of Staff (CCOS). The Chiefs of Staff was composed of the Chief of the General Staff (CGS), Chief of the Air Staff, Chief of the Naval Staff and the CCOS. It was the collective voice of the government's military advisers. Foulkes was first among equals on this committee and primarily responsible for liaison with the Minister of National Defence (MND) on most matters of an international and inter-service nature. However, each chief retained the right to approach the MND on issues that directly affected his particular service.

Although Foulkes had not distinguished himself on the battlefield as a brilliant tactician, his war record had been good – he had ended the war in command of the 1st Canadian Corps. He possessed a good political instinct and he knew how to function as a military bureaucrat. His superiors considered him eminently suitable for senior staff rank and he was made Chief of the General Staff in August, 1945. In 1947 he also assumed the post of Chairman

of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. When it was re-organized in February, 1951, he became CCOS. In the months before the question of where the Canadian troops were to be stationed became a crisis, Foulkes took the view that military necessity, not sentiment or politics, should be the deciding factor. At no point was he inclined to draw Claxton into the discussion. He undoubtedly believed that the issue was for the military alone to decide, and on military grounds. In that, he miscalculated.

After Foulkes returned from Washington, he and Lt-Gen. Guy Simonds, who had succeeded him as CGS, wrestled with the problem of how best to recruit and train the European-bound troops. Simonds at one point recommended raising two regimental combat teams or two brigades, with one stationed in Canada to train and provide replacements for the other.¹² There was some precedent for such a separation of units from the active or regular forces in the formation of the 25th brigade. It had been recruited especially for service in Korea and was originally considered as somehow separate from the rest of the Active Force.¹³ But Foulkes opposed this and by late April a decision was made to recruit one new brigade – the 27th – on the framework of existing reserve units as part of the regular forces.¹⁴ Recruiting for it began on May 7 and training on “US type weapons and equipment” commenced in Canada in July.¹⁵ The issue of where the troops would be stationed had not yet arisen between the two men. Foulkes clearly assumed at that point that they would go with the Americans.¹⁶ That would have been the logical course given the decision to supply them with US equipment.

The question of where to place the Canadian contribution was first discussed at SHAPE, in Paris, not long after recruiting got under way in Canada. Plans were made to position the 27th brigade in the United States zone of occupation in Germany where it would come under the operational control of the United States Army’s European Command. No plans were made for the placement of the first RCAF squadrons, not due to arrive until 1953, although SHAPE noted that the RCAF’s Air Vice Marshal Smith had indicated that the RCAF was “very keen to be affiliated to the USAF” both for training and logistics purposes.¹⁷

Although no definite plans were made at this meeting, Brigadier De Havilland, the United Kingdom Liaison Officer on Eisenhower’s staff, telegraphed the gist of the discussion to London. He pointed out that “deliberately to associate with and place under American command instead of under British command, the first Commonwealth contingent to NATO would seem to raise political issues of some magnitude.”¹⁸ This brought the issue to Whitehall’s attention.

De Havilland’s report provoked a discussion in the Commonwealth Relations Office in London. At first the prevailing opinion was that although “the passing of Commonwealth troops under direct US command” would be “a regrettable precedent”, there were obvious practical reasons for it. One CRO

officer pointed out that Britain could hardly ask Eisenhower “to dispose his forces according to UK political considerations” while another thought De Havilland was exaggerating the whole episode.¹⁹ All this changed, however, when the British Vice Chiefs of Staff met on June 1. At that meeting representatives of both the army and the Royal Air Force claimed that arguments for grouping Canadian forces in the US zone based on logistics were “not really valid” because SHAPE was already planning to place Dutch and Belgian units, using American equipment and organized on American lines, under British command. The vice chiefs laid plans for the service chiefs to discuss the question with Guy Simonds and Canadian Air Marshall W. A. Curtis, both due shortly in London, and asked the Commonwealth Relations Office to refer the matter to Sir Alexander Clutterbuck, UK High Commissioner in Ottawa.²⁰

The first indication that Canadian political leaders had that the grouping of Canadian forces in Europe would be anything other than routine came when Curtis met with Sir John Slessor, Chief of the British Air Staff, at SHAPE on June 7. Slessor told Curtis that “the Colonial Office (sic) had asked him to persuade Canada to continue her operational effort in close cooperation with the British [army] rather than with the U[nited] S[tates] A[rmy]” and that Chief of the Imperial General Staff Sir William Slim had been requested to make a similar approach to Simonds when he arrived in London. Slessor told Curtis the British were very pleased that the Canadians were serving with the Commonwealth Division in Korea and were “most anxious” to tie Canada’s forces in Europe to those from the United Kingdom “along the lines of World War II.” Curtis reported the conversation to Claxton and noted that “this whole matter was undoubtedly uppermost in Sir John’s mind because he approached me at the first opportunity even though it was not the most appropriate place to do so.”²¹

Foulkes’ Executive Staff Officer, Lt-Col. R. L. Raymont, was incensed at the contents of Curtis’ message. Although many top officers in the army had difficulty adjusting to the political requirements of a Canada not subordinate to Britain, Raymont was not one of them – he was a Canadian autonomist to the core. He was astonished to see “how hard the original British Commonwealth concept still lingers” and wondered “who actually made the blunder about referring to the office of Commonwealth Relations as the Colonial Office.” He thought it significant that the Commonwealth Relations Office was enlisting the aid of UK military leaders; he worried that if Canadian forces in Europe were grouped with the British, the RCAF might be used only for the defence of Britain, while the army might “eventually find itself outside the NATO orbit and even fighting in the Middle East or elsewhere.”²²

Curtis and the RCAF wanted to work with the United States Air Force for logistic reasons and because of the need to cooperate with the Americans on North American air defence matters. Slessor told the British Chiefs of Staff that his meeting with Curtis had been “unsatisfactory” and that the RCAF

wanted the best of both worlds – bases in the UK, but operations with the Americans.²³ But Simonds was a different matter. On June 14 he met Slim in London and gave him the impression that “although the [Canadian] fighting services would prefer to come to the British Sector it had been decided on political grounds that they should go to the American sector.”²⁴ That was certainly not true: the RCAF held no such opinion; the matter had not been discussed in Ottawa by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, the Cabinet Defence Committee, or the Cabinet; no final decision had been made; Foulkes’ talk with Collins in February had been routine, and certainly not political.

Foulkes was not the Yankee-lover that Simonds was making him out to be. Foulkes was a pragmatist. He had authorized the use of UK equipment by the Canadian Army Special Force in Korea and its grouping with Commonwealth units because he thought this would increase its fighting efficiency. He had arrived at opposite conclusions in the case of the 27th brigade. For Simonds to admit that Foulkes may have been correct, however, would have meant to subordinate his own strong emotional ties to the British.

Simonds had been born in England. He had spent most of his military career outside of Canada and much of it in the UK. He was a strong Anglophile, a strict disciplinarian, an innovative soldier, and a mercurial personality. He had been recognized as a brilliant tactician and leader during the war but his superior, Gen. H.D.G. Crerar, thought him temperamentally unsuited for a senior staff posting after the war and in August, 1945, the job of Chief of the General Staff was given to Foulkes.

When Simonds was denied promotion to CGS, he first tried to secure an appointment to the Imperial General Staff in Britain. When that fell through because he was not offered a senior enough position, he took command of the Imperial Defence College in London – a signal honour for a Canadian officer. In 1949 he was named Commandant of Canada’s National Defence College and in February, 1951, he was finally promoted to Chief of the General Staff. There was clearly little love lost between Simonds and Foulkes at the best of times.²⁵ Simonds found it very difficult either to allow his troops to serve under US command in peacetime, or to knuckle under to Foulkes.

On June 27, Patrick Gordon-Walker, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, met Lester B. Pearson, Canada’s Secretary of State for External Affairs, in London. The entire conversation centred on NATO issues, especially the grouping of Canadian forces in Europe. Gordon-Walker mentioned Britain’s “concern” that Canadians were going to be grouped with Americans and claimed that the logistical reasons for such a move were “not strong.” “Were there politics in it?” he asked. Pearson dodged the question and told Gordon-Walker that the politics “about balanced out”, but that there was support for “stationing Canadian troops in the most convenient place for supplies.” Gordon-Walker stressed the urgency of finding a solution to the issue and suggested that “something ... be said quickly to Eisenhower.” Pearson

promised to look into it and told Gordon-Walker that there ought not to be difficulties, “political or otherwise”, with whatever Eisenhower suggested.²⁶

What ought to have been a routine military decision had now become a political issue of some magnitude, as De Havilland had labelled it back in May, and that was certainly how Guy Simonds approached it. He returned from his meeting with Slim to prepare an eight page memo to Claxton arguing in favour of grouping the Canadian forces in Europe with the British. This was the first time the issue was officially laid before the Minister of National Defence although Claxton was undoubtedly aware of the growing controversy. Simonds devoted some space to the purely military advantages he thought such a grouping would bring, but the bulk of his argument was based on political considerations.

Simonds believed that the establishment of a line of communication through the British Army of the Rhine posed no serious problems for a Canadian force using US equipment and that other factors should predominate in making the decision. He claimed it would be easier to preserve the identity of Canadian troops in Europe if they were stationed with the British rather than with the Americans. He thought the presence of the Canadian army in the British zone would have a beneficial impact on Dutch and Belgian troops attached to the BAOR because it would spark their “military efforts into far greater and more realistic activity.” He asserted that Canadian officers preferred to serve with the British and he pointed out that the grouping of Canadian troops with the BAOR would continue the beneficial military association that had existed to the satisfaction of both countries in two world wars.

Simonds’ main argument, however, rested on the need for Canada to help maintain a “balance of power” within NATO. He argued that the United States had “risen to an unprecedented position of dominance in the modern world” and that Canada’s best interest would be served “by helping to provide a counter-balance to the power of the US [within NATO] rather than by augmenting that power” by stationing its troops in the US zone of occupation: “The question for Canada to decide is whether it is in her best interests to move in a direction which may start a land-slide towards the US camp and assure complete dominance of the US, or whether her influence should be used as one of the locking stones in building a dam against this strong pressure.”²⁷ American diplomat George P. Kennan had wanted to contain the Soviet Union; Simonds wanted to contain the Americans!

Simonds used his personal contacts in London to keep the Imperial General Staff informed of the situation and to ensure their continuing support in his cause. On August 9 he took pen in hand and wrote a personal letter to Slim; it began “Dear Uncle Bill.” Simonds told Slim that he was “convinced” it was in the best interests of Canada that the 27th brigade “should be grouped with the British Army of the Rhine” and that he had been “pressing for such a

decision in face of considerable political opposition." He would not have pressed the case unless he believed it was in Canada's interests, he wrote, but he also thought the arrangement would "help the UK and the Commonwealth." He asked for Slim's help: "if the decision is taken to group with the British Army, and the announcement is heralded ... with cries of 'the Empire forever' and 'Canada decides for the Empire' ... it will later raise political embarrassments here. Anything you can do to restrain statements of this kind would be most helpful." He asked Slim to spread the word that the military aspects of the question were to be stressed at all times in London.²⁸ Slim was only too happy to oblige. The Chiefs of Staff, the Ministry of Defence, the Commonwealth Relations Office, and the High Commissioner to Canada, were all given a summary of Simonds' letter.²⁹

The battle within the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee over the grouping of Canadian forces in Europe was joined in Ottawa in August. Foulkes, supported by R.L. Raymont, his Executive Staff Officer, strongly disagreed with Simonds. Raymont thought Simonds' notion about balancing the power of the United States in the Atlantic Alliance "disturbing" and "a most unfortunate concept to introduce into ... NATO." He told Foulkes that any suggestion that powers be grouped within NATO to provide a counter-balance to other powers was "extremely dangerous." Canada was the one NATO country that did not need US military aid, he pointed out, and in a good position to mediate between different points of view. Foulkes used these arguments and others in notes prepared for a Chiefs of Staff Committee meeting on August 14 (which he did not attend) and he also raised the spectre of having to reverse the policy of equipping Canadian forces with US equipment should Simonds win his case.³⁰

Simonds was not, of course, moved by Foulkes. In fact, he found an important ally in the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Arnold Heeney. Heeney, who had served as Clerk of the Privy Council from 1940 to 1949, thought Simonds' arguments "impressive" and told the Chiefs of Staff Committee that his department was "attracted by the advantage of having Canadian forces under UK command and serving thus with the smaller continental allies." He often seemed to take a harder line on cooperation with the US than many of his colleagues.³¹ Air Marshall Curtis proposed a middle ground; group the army with the British and the air force with the Americans. This would make it clear "that the Canadian forces were not aligned with any particular power." Vice Admiral H.T.W. Grant, Chief of the Naval Staff, agreed with Curtis but the meeting adjourned without a decision.³²

Foulkes and Simonds clashed directly at the next Chiefs of Staff Committee meeting eight days later. Foulkes led off the discussion. He suggested that the grouping of the 27th brigade be discussed with Eisenhower since it would be unwise to "recommend any plan in which the commander who would be responsible for committing the troops to battle was not at the

same time responsible for the maintenance of [those] forces." He pointed out once again that if Simonds' reasoning were to be endorsed, Canada ought to reverse its decision to supply its forces with US equipment.

Simonds countered that Eisenhower would not wish to have the decision thrust on him and claimed that Foulkes' arguments about the use of US equipment were not persuasive because the 27th would be using a mixture of US and UK equipment for at least two years. But he still did not win out. The Committee decided to endorse SHAPE's plans for grouping the air division with the USAF but suggested that the grouping of the 27th brigade should be further discussed by Foulkes, Simonds and Claxton.³³

On August 30, the Cabinet Defence Committee tackled this by-now thorny problem for the first time. Before them was a memo prepared in the Department of National Defence over Claxton's signature which leaned towards grouping the 27th Brigade with the British Army of the Rhine but which made no definite recommendation. As the meeting was in progress word came from the Canadian Joint Staff in London that the War Office had indicated that "it could not accommodate the [Canadian] brigade in Germany for another 6 to 8 months, but that it would be happy to accommodate it temporarily in the United Kingdom at any time." For the moment, that decided the issue. Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent, who chaired the meeting, was opposed to stationing the brigade in Britain and was strongly backed by Pearson. But even though Simonds was forced to give ground by this startling news, the Committee refused to make a decision. It endorsed the COSC's recommendation to group the RCAF with the USAF, and it decided to send the 27th brigade to Europe in November, but it reserved judgment on where the brigade should be placed.³⁴ The problem was kicked upstairs to the cabinet.

Before the cabinet could meet on the issue, Heeney got busy. He told Clutterbuck that the cabinet would never agree to station the brigade in the UK, no matter how temporarily, and Clutterbuck, in turn, pressed the Defence Ministry in London to review the accommodation situation and to let him know the results of that review as soon as possible. Within two days, he had his answer: accommodation of units already in Germany would be reshuffled and the arrival of units from the UK would be delayed. The BAOR would be able to receive the Canadians in Germany in the latter half of November.³⁵

The Cabinet considered the issue at its meeting on September 5. Claxton reviewed the many arguments that had been advanced on both sides and suggested "that it would be advantageous if General Eisenhower could indicate his preference as to the stationing of Canadian troops on the basis of military efficiency and requirements." This would let the Cabinet off the hook by allowing the Canadian government to claim that Eisenhower had made the decision purely on the basis of NATO's military needs as he saw them. Cabinet readily agreed and authorized Claxton to discuss the issue "informally" with

Eisenhower and to decide where to place the troops in light of that discussion.³⁶ Thus a political hot potato was dumped into Eisenhower's lap.

On Wednesday, September 13, eight days after the cabinet had discussed the issue, the stationing of Canadian troops in Europe was brought up once again at SHAPE. The arguments for placing the Canadians with the British Army of the Rhine or with the European Command of the United States Army were "about even", a British officer observed, and no decision was arrived at. But Major General Smith, attached to the Canadian Joint Staff, London, was due to visit Eisenhower on Friday and it was decided that the final decision would be made at that time.³⁷

The following day, Major General Redman of the British Army, Personal Staff Officer to the Deputy Commander of SHAPE, conferred with Eisenhower and passed along Whitehall's "very strong views" on the subject. He told Eisenhower that if the Norwegian Brigade attached to the BAOR was withdrawn from Germany, a move which was under consideration at the time, the British would be short of a brigade group to carry out their assigned tasks.³⁸ Redman apparently carried the day.

When Smith arrived on Friday, Eisenhower announced that he was recommending that the 27th brigade be located in the British zone to shore up a potential weakness in the Frankfurt-Kassel gap. He told Smith that the Canadians would have an easier time maintaining their identity if attached to the BAOR and that their relationship with the British had been both beneficial and satisfactory in the past. Ironically (or was it more than coincidence?) he used much the same language in making these points that Simonds liked to use. He pointedly assured Smith that his recommendation could be "used officially and publicly as might be desired ... by the Canadian government."³⁹

Eisenhower had learned the game of soldier politics during World War II, and by 1951 he was an expert at it. The Americans had no strong feelings about the placement of the Canadian troops in their zone; the British did. Canada could not or would not choose, so Eisenhower did what Ottawa asked of him. Claxton, of course, accepted the recommendation as he had been authorized to do by the cabinet; to do otherwise would have been political suicide. Technically, the Canadian government had made the decision; in fact, however, the decision had been Ike's.

The problem of where to group the 27th Canadian Infantry Brigade should never have taken on the proportions that it did. It ought to have been a purely military decision based on considerations of supply and command. But it became a battle to preserve an already non-existent Canadian-British unity inside a larger alliance. Canada's entry into NATO was certainly a milestone in its post-World War II evolution into a truly independent nation. But this whole episode proves that in the early 1950s, for a small number of still important Canadian and British military men, politicians, and bureaucrats, the Empire still lived on the banks of the Rhine.

Endnotes

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- 1 Canada, Department of External Affairs, *External Affairs* 3:406-409 (December 1951).
- 2 I addressed some of these issues in "Allies or Occupiers: The Canadian Forces in Germany, 1951-1954," a paper read to the Canadian Historical Association, Quebec City, (June 1989). Available from the author.
- 3 James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada: Volume III, Growing Up Allied* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), 215ff.
- 4 *Ibid.*, 212-215.
- 5 Memo of talk with Brooke Claxton, 3 May 1951, Grant Dexter Papers (Queen's University Archives).
- 6 Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada*, 3:205-210.
- 7 Memorandum to the Cabinet, 28 December 1950. Cabinet Defence Committee Papers, Department of National Defence, Directorate of History (DHist). The memo was signed by Claxton and Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester B. Pearson. It stressed the extreme war danger facing the west at that moment.
- 8 Minutes, 20 February 1951. Cabinet Defence Committee. There is, incredibly, no complete set of Cabinet Defence Committee minutes for the late 1940s and early 1950s. I pieced together a relatively complete set from files at the Directorate of History, Department of National Defence; the History Division (now defunct) at the Department of External Affairs; the Privy Council records at the National Archives of Canada (NAC) and other collections in Ottawa.
- 9 Simonds to Claxton, 16 July 1951, Claxton Papers, v. 108, file "Integrated Force (I)" (NAC).
- 10 H.F. Wood, *Strange Battleground: Official History of the Canadian Army in Korea* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1966), 20.
- 11 *Ibid.*, 37.
- 12 See, for example, various memos in Claxton papers, v. 108, File "Integrated Force I" and DHist, Chiefs of Staff Committee minutes for March and April, 1951.
- 13 For a brief explanation of the reasons why a "special force" was raised for Korea and what this meant in military terms, see Wood, 16-26.
- 14 "Draft News Release by the Minister of National Defence," 26 April 1951, file 73/596, DHist.
- 15 Memo "27th Infantry Brigade," n.d. Claxton Papers, v. 97, file "28th Cdn Infantry Brigade".
- 16 *Ibid.*, Foulkes to Chief of the Air Staff, 31 March 1951, v. 108, file "Integrated Force (I)".
- 17 Commonwealth Relations Office to UK High Commissioner in Canada, 5 June 1951, DO 35/2445, Public Records Office, London (PRO).
- 18 *Ibid.*
- 19 *Ibid.* See various minutes in the jacket.
- 20 *Ibid.* See also Commonwealth Relations Office to UK High Commissioner in Canada, 5 June 1951, and Extract from C.O.S. (51) 90th meeting, 1 June 1951.
- 21 Telegram, Canadian Ambassador, Paris, to Secretary of State for External Affairs, 8 June 1951, attached to ESO to CCOS, 11 June 1951, file 193.002 (D1), Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, Files of Daily Correspondence, DHist.
- 22 *Ibid.*, ESO to CCOS, 11 June 1951.
- 23 *Ibid.*, "Posting of Canadian Forces in Europe," 13 June 1951, DO 35/2445 (PRO).
- 24 "Defence Relations with Canada - Notes for the use of the Secretary of State when meeting with Mr. Pearson ...," n.d. DO 35/2445 (PRO).

- ²⁵ There is a good sketch of Simonds and Foulkes in J. Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada, Volume 3, Peacemaking and Deterrence* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), 60-62. See also C.P. Stacey, *A Date With History, Memoirs of a Canadian Historian* (Ottawa: Deneau Publishers, 1983), 174-175.
- ²⁶ "Record of Conversation between the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and the Hon. L.B. Pearson ...," 27 June 1951, DO 35/2445 (PRO).
- ²⁷ Simonds to Claxton, 16 July 1951, Claxton Papers, v. 108, file "Integrated Force (I)".
- ²⁸ Simonds to Slim, 9 August 1951, WO 216/419 (PRO).
- ²⁹ *Ibid.*
- ³⁰ Minutes of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 14 August 1951, DHist.
- ³¹ See, for example, his role in negotiation between Canada and the United States over the lease of Goose Bay to the US in David J. Bercuson, "SAC vs Sovereignty: The Origins of the Goose Bay Lease, 1946-1952," *Canadian Historical Review*, 52, No. 2 (June 1989), 216.
- ³² Minutes of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 14 August 1951, DHist.
- ³³ *Ibid.*, 22 August 1951.
- ³⁴ Cabinet Defence Committee Minutes, 30 August 1951.
- ³⁵ War Office to UKSLS Ottawa, 3 September 1951, DO 35/2445 (PRO).
- ³⁶ Cabinet Conclusions, meeting of 5 September 1951, RG2,16, v. 26, (NAC).
- ³⁷ EXFOR to War Office, 13 September 1951, WO 216/419 (PRO).
- ³⁸ *Ibid.*, War Office to EXFOR, 14 September 1951.
- ³⁹ Chairman CJS London to Chairman CSC Ottawa, 14 September 1951, Claxton Papers, v. 108, file "Integrated Force (I)". Naval Staff agreed with Curtis but the meeting adjourned without a decision.

The Three Wise Men: The Effects of the 1956 Committee of Three on NATO

Joseph Sinasac

Even before discussions began that would lead to the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Canadian diplomats and politicians had some very definite ideas about what kind of pact they preferred. They were summed up in the words of the isolationist Prime Minister Mackenzie King, who told the House of Commons on March 17, 1948, that the pact should be "far more than an alliance of the old kind," the "old kind" being an arrangement that had dragged Canada into two World Wars.¹ What followed was a major diplomatic offensive by the Canadians to attain their goal. The modest result was Article 2 in the treaty, which called on pact members to cooperate on economic policy. In the ensuing years, Canada would make several attempts to turn this vague clause into concrete measures. The most serious of these would be the Committee of Three, established by the North Atlantic Council in May 1956 and chaired by the then Canadian External Affairs Minister Lester Pearson.

In their pursuit of action on Article 2, the Canadians were driven by a mixed bag of motives, some altruistic, others wholly pragmatic. Prior to the signing of the treaty, Canadian politicians had drummed up support for the pact by describing it as a crusade for democracy, freedom and Christianity. It would be a counter-attraction to the communism that was sweeping war-devastated Europe. Such glowing terms were used to overcome fears at home that Canadians would be dragged into another great power conflict that was none of their making. To a certain extent the politicians, and some of their advisors in the external affairs department, believed their own rhetoric. In the aftermath of the Second World War, with international relations in a state of flux, daring alternatives to the old formulas seemed to have a chance of success. Why not try to forge a new political union out of the western allies, argued people like Escott Reid, then second in command at External.² Moreover, with a nervous eye on the military and economic superpower to the south, the Canadians saw in a political union that included European nations a counterweight to American domination.

Support for Article 2 among other members of the Alliance was rarely more than moderate. Some nations, such as Britain, opposed its inclusion in the treaty on the grounds that it would require the pact to duplicate work being done by the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), which was coordinating aid under the U.S. Marshall Plan, or other international agencies involved in non-military activity. Others simply thought the clause cluttered up what was essentially a military alliance. U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson tried to derail Article 2 in early 1949, fearing it would provoke opposition to the treaty in the Senate. Even after being overruled by President Harry Truman, Acheson refused to change his opinion that the clause was an unnecessary addition to the treaty. As he later wrote in his memoirs, "Article 2 has continued to bedevil NATO. Lester Pearson has continually urged the Council to set up committees of 'wise men' to find a use for it, which the 'wise men' have continually failed to do."³

For the first few years after the treaty was signed, no one tried terribly hard to find something to do with Article 2. Any efforts were deflected by those pact members who were consumed with decreasing the perceived edge in conventional arms and troops held by the Soviet Union. The United States, Britain and France were preoccupied with the various facets of the military problem – first rearming, then accepting new members like Turkey and Greece, then getting Germany into the fold, and, not least, determining the role of nuclear weapons. This concentration on rearming was fuelled by the Korean War, a conflict which fed fears that another world war was imminent.

NATO's non-military potential was never completely forgotten, however. Pearson, during a trip to several European capitals in July 1951, floated as a trial balloon the idea of overhauling all machinery for European cooperation with an eye to creating a parallel body to NATO for non-military cooperation. By isolating the military function within its own agency, he hoped to entice the neutral nations of Switzerland and Sweden into a pacific NATO.⁴ The idea didn't go too far. For his agitating, Pearson was appointed by the North Atlantic Council to chair a committee to examine cooperation in economic, cultural and social spheres. His fellow members were representatives from Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway. When the committee reported to the Council in February 1952, it recommended that no concrete action be taken. As Lord Ismay, who would soon be NATO's secretary general, wrote later, none of the pact's members were willing to do anything more than talk about matters such as economic cooperation.⁵

It wasn't until mid-decade, however, that the Alliance members began to think seriously about reviving Article 2. Events in the preceding years had diminished the immediacy of the Soviet military threat and created tensions among Alliance members. The United States, under Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, was predisposed to act unilaterally after only minimum consultation with other NATO members. Meanwhile, the death of Stalin led to a "soft

look" in Soviet foreign policy. As Nikita Khrushchev consolidated his power, the Soviet sabre-rattling was replaced by a more subtle, accommodating approach to international relations. At the same time, talks were underway that would eventually lead to the Treaty of Rome in 1957, provoking Canadian fears that they would lose their counterweight to the economic might of the United States if Europe turned inward.

All these events strained NATO. As the threat of invasion receded, it became harder for the Alliance members not to become irritated over their own differences. As 1956 opened, Dulles began to see that military might alone would not ensure the survival of NATO. In April 1956, he threw the weight of the United States behind a review of Article 2.

Britain, under Prime Minister Anthony Eden, had come to the same conclusion following a visit by Soviet leaders Nikolai Bulganin and Khrushchev. As Eden wrote to his foreign minister, Harold Macmillan, a few days before the May North Atlantic Council meeting:

Now that the Russian visit is over, it is necessary to review our policy. There are a number of points to be looked at. Our main weapons of resistance to Soviet encroachment have hitherto been military. But do they meet the needs of the present time? I do not believe that the Russians have any plans at present for military aggression in the West. On the other hand, are we prepared with other weapons to meet the new challenge? This seems to me to be the major issue of foreign policy. It will not be dealt with merely by Dulles' new thoughts for NATO, whatever they may be. But it is bound up with a review of our defence policy and it may be better to handle it in that connection. We must discuss this before you leave for NATO.

It bears repeating that both these countries had previously been the main objectors to significant action on non-military cooperation. Their change of heart, therefore, represented the first real opportunity in NATO's young life to obtain consensus on concrete action under Article 2.

A month later, the Committee of Three was born and its members – Pearson, Halvard Lange of Norway and Gaetano Martino of Italy – were soon dubbed the "wise men." While Washington and London were undergoing their metamorphoses, Ottawa had been toiling away on plans to raise the issue at the May Council meeting. In March, Pearson had received signals from some NATO colleagues that if he presented some ideas on non-military cooperation, he would – this time – get a serious hearing. With that encouragement, he asked his officials in the External Affairs Department for some suggestions. The result was a memorandum that opposed the creation of any new NATO machinery while recommending some minor improvements to the structure of the organization.⁶

The Council meeting took place in Paris on May 4-5. Non-military cooperation proved to be the main topic on the agenda. Though Dana Wilgress was able to present Canada's suggestions, the NATO foreign ministers looked to the United States to take the lead in assessing the situation and recommending action. Dulles was glad to comply. For the Secretary of State, NATO "had reached a critical moment in its life" and required immediate attention to its non-military side, though not at the expense of the military effort.⁷ Dulles' analysis appeared too gloomy to some of the Europeans, particularly the French and Belgian representatives. The French believed it implied some criticism of their own policies regarding the rearming of Germany. The Canadians, however, thought Dulles' views realistic. The ensuing debate turned into a lengthy wrangle with each country trying to rationalize its lack of desire to pursue greater cooperation on economic, social and cultural matters. It was what diplomatic parlance calls a "full and frank discussion."

Dulles set the tone by listing his country's restrictions on greater political consultation due to the right of Congress to declare war and the fact that the United States, with its world-wide responsibilities, sometimes needed to act faster than consultation with allies would allow. He also repeated past cautions about not duplicating the work of the OEEC in economic affairs. Finally, he was not keen on using NATO as a conduit for aid to developing nations for fear that such aid would be misconstrued as a tool of European imperialism.⁸

Christian Pineau, France's foreign minister, outlined his nation's limits to greater NATO participation. Continued unrest in French North Africa, which required the constant attention of the government, and a large native population of communists (as much as a quarter of the electorate voted Communist) led the French government to emphasize disarmament negotiations with the Soviet Union and downplay closer NATO relations. The French gave more credence to recent Soviet stances on disarmament than the other NATO allies. Paul-Henri Spaak, the Belgium foreign minister, and Dr. Heinrich von Brentano of Germany in particular were convinced of the need for continued vigilance and western unity. Conversely, Pineau supported greater cultural exchanges as the best route for establishing closer links among the allies, a prospect that Dulles found to be insignificant.⁹ Though Dulles had placed limits on the American ability to improve political consultation, he did make a proposal that gave momentum to the discussion and was eventually adopted. The Committee of Three was his country's idea and its members were the American nominations. It was greeted with mixed emotions by the Canadians. After his experience in 1951, Pearson had all but given up on Article 2 and was reluctant to lead yet another committee established to review possible avenues for greater cooperation. "By 1956," he later wrote, "in fact, I was losing hope that NATO would evolve beyond an alliance for defence; and even there I was beginning to have doubts about its future."¹⁰ The committee seemed a rather tepid response to what Dulles had described as a "critical moment" in the life

of NATO. It was also disappointing to Pearson that the committee was not chaired by an influential American official with a British lieutenant.

Pearson for one was disappointed to find himself nominated not because he minded doing the work, but because he thought the committee would have a better chance of getting something done if it were recruited from bigger countries. He had hoped that an American, perhaps of the calibre of Harold Stassen, who was President Eisenhower's spokesman on disarmament matters, might have been assigned to the job, with some eminent Briton to help him.¹¹

The only heartening news for Pearson was that one of the committee members would be his good friend Lange, someone he respected highly and worked well with. It didn't help matters that every country represented at the May meeting had different ideas about what was meant by non-military cooperation. "They don't know exactly what it is they are looking for and neither does anybody else," Blair Fraser accurately wrote in his monthly international affairs column in *Maclean's Magazine*.¹² Thus the Canadians were sent home with a plethora of often contradictory ideas from which to devise a plan of action for the committee.¹³

What did the Council agree upon? To start, the members recognized that NATO "would have to show more flexibility and imagination in developing non-military activities if it was to hold its own with the Soviet bloc in competitive co-existence." It appeared the most fruitful field for consultation was in exchanging information on political problems, rather than economic ones. Thirdly, there was much agreement that procedural changes could be made to the Council meetings and the NATO secretariat to reduce friction between member nations.¹⁴ The committee was given the task of surveying all NATO members, reviewing past practice, and recommending practical methods to increase non-military cooperation. Over the summer, with the help of seconded Canadian External Affairs officials and a staff of experts supplied by NATO and headed by American diplomat Lincoln Gordon, the committee was to explore the attitudes of the member nations through a questionnaire, followed by a series of interviews in September.

There were also seven questions posed for the committee to ponder. These were:

1. "If NATO were formed today would the present grouping of states be the most satisfactory for (a) collective defence and (b) non-military cooperation?"
2. "What kind of organization would best reflect a sense of Atlantic community as a basis for cooperation, NATO or OEEC? Or would it be wise to seek a new kind of organization for this purpose?"
3. "How can European integration be brought about so that it will strengthen rather than weaken Atlantic ties?"

4. "What do we really mean by 'political consultation'? What is its extent and purpose?"
5. "What should be the relationship between NATO and the UN, between NATO and OEEC, EURATOM, the Economic Commission for Europe, and other functional and regional agencies?" (The OEEC had been the most active of these organizations. EURATOM was still labouring to become an international agency to develop the peaceful use of nuclear energy, while the Economic Commission for Europe had been established in 1947 by the United Nations to assist in the economic recovery of all Europe. It was made ineffective by the partition of Europe into eastern and western spheres.)
6. "Can NATO deal effectively with the problem of closer economic collaboration between its members?"
7. "Should NATO concern itself with colonial problems; with economic aid to developing countries?"¹⁵

The Canadians left Paris in a disconsolate mood. Though it finally seemed that their arguments in favor of Article 2 were taken seriously, the gap in understanding between member nations over what non-military cooperation should mean was too wide to offer much hope of easy answers for the Committee of Three. The biggest obstacle was the lack of political will on the part of the pact members to commit themselves seriously to action under Article 2 which could potentially limit their sovereign power. Another major impediment was the desire of European nations not to let other international obligations hamper their own movement towards economic integration, something the Canadians feared would be fatal to effective action on Article 2. The Canadian assessment of the May meeting was bleak, though not totally devoid of hope:

The main substantive issue remains to be settled, whether the alliance can successfully adapt itself to a changing international environment in which the cohesive effect of imminent military danger has declined to the point where something more is necessary to ensure close and effective cooperation between member governments in the field of policy. The meeting in Paris found no solution to this issue and gave no ground for complacency or comfort that any such solution will be easy to find. Nevertheless insofar as the discussions revealed weaknesses of the present state of the alliance and offered, through the study of the Committee of Three, an opportunity to review and reexamine its basic requirements, the Paris meeting served a valuable purpose.¹⁶

For the report to have any chance of being accepted by the North Atlantic Council, Pearson knew it required the backing of the United States and either Britain or France, if not both. To that end, before his first meeting with the other committee members, he travelled to Washington to hear Dulles' views on the potential for cooperation. The meeting took place June 12 with Senator Walter George, a Georgia Democrat appointed to be the president's special representative to the committee, also in attendance. By this time Ottawa had also obtained a draft internal memorandum through the British embassy of the United Kingdom's thoughts on the NATO review. The views of both nations were useful in rounding out the questions to be put on the questionnaire for the other member nations.

Pearson was not overly satisfied with his interview with Dulles. In dealing with the questions raised at the May Council meeting, the Secretary of State was "cautious and not very encouraging, even though he kept emphasizing their importance."¹⁷ He repeated some of his earlier warnings, especially regarding the ability of the United States to consult its allies before making foreign policy decisions outside the NATO geographic area. As one of two of the world's superpowers, the United States, Dulles pointed out, had greater responsibilities around the globe than any of the other allies. Britain shared American concerns about the importance of the work of the Committee of Three; it also shared the same fears about diluting NATO's emphasis on military strength. It believed the NATO should be the cornerstone of the foreign policy of western nations in their battle for "competitive co-existence" with the East. To encourage that, it believed the North Atlantic Council could become a high-level chamber for wide-ranging discussion on various subjects, though economic matters should be related to the Cold War. "Since it is our aim to encourage member countries to look to NATO as the cornerstone of their policy, it might be inexpedient to come out in direct opposition and better to try to steer discussion towards the economic topics which are more directly related to the Cold War."¹⁸ Britain also had fears about the willingness of some pact members to remain part of the united front against the East; here it had France in mind considering Pineau's statements at the May Council meeting. To discourage any temptations to make bilateral arrangements with the Soviet Union, Britain wanted any such discussions brought to the Council before decisions were made.¹⁹

Britain had other worries not wholly related to NATO. Like other European nations devastated by the Second World War it had rebuilt its economy with the help of the Marshall Plan and then been forced by the Korean War and the resulting NATO rearmament program to increase its defence spending dramatically. By mid-decade, however, it was feeling the pinch of these expenditures and seeking ways to reduce them. In June, 1956, Eden announced Britain's decision to do hydrogen bomb tests in the Pacific Ocean; the motives were partially financial (the bombs were much less expensive than

conventional military arrangements). Secondly, Eden believed that Britain, with its extensive global responsibilities, should play in the same league as the United States and Russia. During this same period, Britain was scaling down the capacity of overseas' naval bases, reducing army reserves and the size of some air force bomber commands.²⁰ Eden felt safe in making these military reductions because he believed the Soviet Union was pursuing its traditional aims of global domination through other than military means. "The main threat to our position and influence in the world is now political and economic rather than military; and our policies should be adapted to meet that changed situation."²¹

The Canadian position, developed after hearing from Britain and the United States, was both bold and cautious. On political consultation, Ottawa felt it had more room for making suggestions that would be acceptable to the majority of NATO members. But on economic cooperation, Pearson believed the probability for obtaining substantial reforms was nil. Canada called for greater cohesion of foreign policy among the NATO members to counter the Soviet Union's diplomatic offensive, while recognizing that approach could not commit member states to specific policies. To reach that goal, Canada set out seven principles for guiding political consultation:

1. The North Atlantic Council should be kept fully and promptly informed of any development in its geographic area.
2. Member governments to have the responsibility of informing the Council early on in the formation of any new foreign policy.
3. The Council should recognize the right of members to raise a subject of common concern even if there is no unanimity on whether it was suitable for NATO discussion.
4. No decisions should be made by Council until all pertinent information is available.
5. Members should refrain from making public political statements affecting the Alliance until after consultation has taken place.
6. No members should firmly adopt new foreign policies until after consultation with other Alliance members.
7. Members should consider the interests of other members when adopting new policies.²²

To accomplish Canada's aims for greater political consultation, no structural changes were necessary. Modifying some procedures with regard to Council meetings and increasing ministerial presence would probably solve the problems they had experienced. The Secretary-General would be useful here if he were allowed to mediate disputes between member states, the Canadians

believed. Regarding economic cooperation, once considered by the Canadian government to be one of the more important uses for NATO, there were no new ideas. As Pearson later wrote:

On economic questions we were more cautious in our reply, having learned from experience that earlier ideas on this aspect of Article 2 simply could not be realized. We approved the discussion of economic matters in the North Atlantic Council but opposed taking over any of the functions of existing international agencies. We also agreed that NATO should not become an agency for formulating or carrying out trade or aid policies on behalf of its members.²³

Pearson also wanted to avoid appearing to be a roadblock to European integration.

Having determined Canada's position and listened to the United States and Britain, Pearson directed the gathering of responses from member nations to the questionnaires. The month of September was spent in Europe where the three committee members met for personal interviews with delegations from the member states. As well, the committee received memoranda from Norway and Italy since the membership of the foreign ministers of those countries on the committee precluded the necessity of having interviews.

The following is a synopsis of the differing views of the pact members, as summarized by Canadian External Affairs staff.²⁴ A Belgian delegation headed by Spaak was interviewed September 14. In many ways the position of Belgium was in favour of the status quo. On economic matters, the Belgians did not believe NATO had a significant role to play and feared that any new mechanisms would duplicate the work done by other agencies. The Belgian stance reflected Spaak's longstanding commitment of his country to European economic integration. The country was already part of the Benelux economic union and Spaak also saw many benefits in the proposed European Economic Community.²⁵ Belgium also refrained from advocating the co-ordination of foreign aid to undeveloped nations or of policy in other organizations such as the UN (responding to suggestions that NATO countries could form a voting bloc at the UN to ensure the adoption of pro-Western policies). The only area where Belgium wanted change was in political consultation. Here, the Belgians pushed for North Atlantic Council meetings to be open to a wider range of topics raised by member nations. There was one caveat, however. These topics could only be considered for their political ramifications.

The Danes, in their interview on September 18, were less adventurous than the Belgians. NATO's only role in the economy was to provide a forum for discussions on economic matters that related to military and political issues. The Social Democrat Government of Denmark was also reserved towards greater political consultation, arguing that each country had to decide

for itself whether it would be useful to have a North Atlantic Council discussion on its problems. Disputes between member nations could only be resolved through NATO mediation if the disputing parties agreed to submit their disagreement to the Council. France's shaky government was willing to go further than either Belgium or Denmark on economic matters. Foreign Minister Pineau, in his interview on September 17, said economic problems could be discussed by the Council on an ad hoc basis. But NATO could do more, he said, by undertaking civil works projects in developing countries or defining a common program of foreign aid – all in the name of battling communist influence. Pineau balked at formalizing procedures to increase political consultation and was similarly reticent about developing a common approach among pact members for handling issues in other agencies. But he supported getting NATO staff to play a larger role in handling disputes between members and placed great emphasis on using private, informal meetings (with no records kept) for problem solving.

The Germany of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer was quite bullish on NATO reform. In an afternoon session on September 14, the Germans outlined various methods by which NATO could get directly involved in economic matters and improve political consultation. Germany was willing to use NATO as a forum for producing strategies to wage economic war against the East. Some methods were: getting NATO members to spend money on civil defence projects to boost weak economies in developing nations; allowing bilateral trading agreements with Eastern Bloc nations to expire; and boycotting goods shipped through Eastern Bloc countries. On political consultation, the Germans approved giving the Secretary-General more freedom to mediate disputes, with the help of a Council committee. To ensure that member nations lived up to their commitment to improve consultations, the Secretary-General would be empowered to write an annual report on the performance of individual members.

Greece's delegation, interviewed September 13, liked the idea of greater political consultation, even going so far as to suggest the establishment of a fact-finding committee for disputes leading to arbitration. This was no doubt related to the ongoing quarrel between the Greece of Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis and Turkey, another NATO member. With that extra mechanism would go extended powers to the Secretary-General to help mediate disagreements. If there was to be a common foreign aid policy for NATO, Greece wanted to ensure that NATO's poorer members would have the first chance to obtain it.

On September 12, Iceland, with its centre-right coalition government, was the first country to be interviewed. The delegation, led by H.G. Andersen, wanted NATO to do whatever it could to further political and economic consultation.

Luxembourg, interviewed September 17, had views similar to those held by Denmark on economic cooperation. Such matters should only be discussed by NATO if they had military and political implications. Likewise, there should be no attempt to form common NATO stands in other organizations. Luxembourg was more interested in European economic integration than in a closer Atlantic community.

Portugal, one of the few dictatorships in NATO, didn't care for any type of dispute-settling mechanism and balked at allowing the Council to discuss any issue raised by a member nation. The Portuguese, in their September 17 interview, wanted to exclude domestic questions from the list of potential discussion topics and, furthermore, wanted to exclude all topics to which at least one member objected. On economic matters, Portugal was more willing to allow greater discussion though it did not want NATO to become an economic agency.

Like Belgium, the Netherlands also seemed satisfied with the status quo. The Dutch delegation, interviewed September 13, said NATO members should not be apologetic about the Alliance's military role. The Labour-Catholic coalition believed that there was no need either for expansion into economic matters, or for a dispute-settling mechanism, and furthermore that a political annual review was not necessary. The Dutch also feared turning the Cold War into an economic battle with the Eastern Bloc nations.

Turkey under Prime Minister Adnan Menderes liked expanding the economic role but was cautious about establishing a dispute-settling mechanism, a position opposite to that taken by Greece. The Turks, interviewed September 12, approved of economic war with the Eastern Bloc, though the individual countries would be the agents of action. NATO would simply provide a forum for aligning strategies and improving links with other economic agencies like OEEC.

On September 18 the British had a chance to expand on their previous memorandum received by the Canadian government. The delegation called its approach "strongly pragmatic," which meant they didn't want a host of new rules and regulations. The British were willing to allow more political consultation, though they foresaw some of the same difficulties predicted by the Americans. They were also agreeable to discussing some economic questions, or at least their political ramifications, at Council meetings. The Secretary-General should limit his involvement in mediating disputes to providing his "good offices" if invited to do so.

The Americans, led by Senator George, had a chance on September 17 to repeat the concerns raised by Dulles in June. They went further than Dulles in a few respects. On economic matters, they did not see the difficulties perceived by other NATO members with bloc-voting in other agencies. They also thought NATO should establish a new body to deal with economic questions, one with "sub-cabinet" rank that would meet several times a year. The

Americans also thought an annual political review would be helpful for developing unity and pointing out weaknesses that needed attention. Finally, the Americans thought an arbitration panel would be the most successful method for settling disputes between pact members.

Norway's memorandum, in addition to its response to the questionnaire, raised no new ideas though it approved of greater political and economic discussion. The Norwegians wanted to give NATO members the right to take their disputes to the Council for mediation. Norway also saw the advantages of using NATO to form common strategies in other organizations. Italy's memorandum similarly approved of greater political and economic consultation. It defined "greater" political consultation as more frequent ministerial meetings. Its definition of economic cooperation was unclear, however.

There were two issues considered by the Committee of Three that didn't make it into the final report, though they were discussed at length during the interviews and by the committee itself. The first, proposed by Denmark, was the creation of an Atlantic Studies Institute. The second was a survey of activities already taking place among NATO countries that could reasonably be considered to be fulfilling the spirit of Article 2. The Danish idea for a research institute was for a centre attached to one of the universities in Paris. It "would be able to foster a more profound appreciation of the solidarity within the Atlantic Community and disseminate this knowledge to wider circles."²⁶ It would be a centre for advanced education for teachers, journalists, leaders of youth and civil servants. NATO would finance the institute though it would have the same independent status as a university. Norway supported Denmark's idea. Canada did, though with a few significant differences. Canada saw the centre modelled after the Institute for Advanced Studies at Princeton. It would not be a teaching centre, but rather a "contemplative" place where accomplished scholars could accept fellowships and pursue studies without the burden of teaching. Canada also wanted to be host country and would house it near "a first-rate library," which in the 1950's probably meant the University of Toronto.²⁷ Few other countries cared for the idea, however, believing it a waste of energy and money. Hence it did not get past the interviews.

The second issue was being discussed by Canadian External Affairs officials who were doing the work long past the acceptance of the Committee of Three report by the North Atlantic Council. Some of those Canadian officials had begun doing a survey of Article 2 activities during the summer and had drafted a report by October. At that stage it ran into trouble. The report was tossed to a sub-committee of External Affairs officials for rewriting. Some of the members, such as Dana Wilgress, complained that the report was biased, contained obsolete statistics and credited achievements of other organizations to NATO. There was apparently not enough economic cooperation under NATO auspices to provide an impressive report.²⁸ After some attempts at redrafting the report, the committee decided to give it to the politicians for final

disposal. The report wasn't ready for the December ministerial meeting, however, and after several more months of struggling, External Affairs quietly shelved it. By this time it was believed that the publication of an uninspiring account of past Article 2 activities "would be a bad anticlimax" to the original report.²⁹

The time for gathering information had passed and the time for writing begun. Pearson and Lange worked closely on drafting the report, with Martino, who was a relative novice to foreign affairs at this stage, mainly providing encouragement. Pearson's son, Geoffrey, then third secretary at the Canadian embassy in Paris, believed the report was a typically Canadian document.

Whoever drafted the report was mainly Canadian and not Norwegian or Italian. ... My father rewrote it. You'll find a lot of the language in that report is typically his language. I recognize the style. He would go over that carefully with Lange, the Norwegian. He was a very good personal friend and they worked very closely together. They agreed often on what to do. Martino, the Italian, was a medical doctor and was less interested, less knowledgeable about these issues. He happened to be the foreign minister of Italy but he was not a diplomat by trade. ... The three of them were co-authors but nevertheless it was my father and Lange who were really the major idea men and Canada provided the staff and actually the drafting.³⁰

The final draft was reviewed by the committee on November 14 in New York. By that time the Western allies were preoccupied with far more pressing international problems that would have an indirect bearing on their report. These problems – the Suez crisis and the invasion of Hungary – would demonstrate two aspects of the same dilemma for NATO. Suez poignantly illustrated how a breakdown in communication between allies could seriously threaten the Atlantic Alliance. The Soviet invasion of Hungary reminded the allies of the iron hammer behind Khrushchev's soothing words.

Although it had simmered since July when Egypt nationalized the Canal, the Suez crisis reached a climax when Israel attacked Egypt on Oct. 29, in obvious collusion with Britain and France. The two European countries followed up by invading the Canal Zone ostensibly to pry the combatants apart. Pearson recalled having no prior notification of the invasion and Prime Minister St. Laurent learned via press reports of the British decision to invade.³¹ The Americans were hardly better informed of the British intentions and refused to back the action, thus bringing to a head the growing misunderstanding between the allies.³² Pearson used his diplomatic skills at the UN to help bring an end to the conflict and replace the Anglo-French forces with a UN peace-keeping mission. His efforts were to win him a Nobel Peace Prize in 1957.

The Hungarian invasion occurred almost concurrently with affairs in the Suez. The first signs of disturbances in Hungary were on Oct. 23 and Russian troops moved into Budapest the next day. Over the next few weeks, the Russians would brutally quell the rebellion, forcing some 150,000 refugees to flee the country. Though it was condemned by the UN, the Soviet action did not capture the full attention of the allies as they were caught up with their own internal bickering. Both crises were still fresh in the minds of the NATO foreign ministers when they gathered for the December Council meeting. By this time the events of the previous three months had made some of the more recalcitrant members a little more amenable to NATO reforms.

All the same, the members of the Committee of Three had understood the restrictions placed upon them. Even the most daring member nations of the Alliance had not advocated any major changes in NATO's structure or significant departures from past practice on economic matters. Their responses over the summer to the Committee of Three, in tone and substance, were a significant retreat from the dramatic terms they had used to discuss NATO's dilemma at the May Council meeting. In its recommendations, the committee's final report accurately reflected these sober second thoughts. These modest aims were set out in one of the introductory paragraphs:

North Atlantic political and economic cooperation, however, let alone unity, will not be brought about in a day or by a declaration, but by creating over the years and through a whole series of national acts and policies, the habits and traditions and precedents for such cooperation and unity. The process will be a slow and gradual one at best; slower than we might wish. We can be satisfied if it is steady and sure. ... At best this [report] will result in collective decisions on matters of common interest affecting the Alliance. At the least it will ensure that no action is taken by one member without a knowledge of the views of others.³³

The introduction of the report was a general analysis of the status of the Cold War and its effects on NATO. It covered familiar territory, and in fact sounded much like one of Pearson's speeches. It acknowledged that fear of Soviet invasion was the primary impetus for NATO but that "a sense of Atlantic community" was also present in the negotiations leading up to the signing of the treaty. That "sense" was embodied in Articles 2 and 4 (a clause committing the members to consult in the event of a threat to the territory, political independence or security of a fellow member). "They reflected the very real anxiety that if NATO failed to meet this test, it would disappear with the immediate crisis which produced it, even though the need for it might be as great as ever."³⁴

To ensure NATO's success as a security agency over the long term, more than guns and tanks were necessary, the committee argued. Economic

cooperation, progress in education, greater political consultation and the development of resources were equally important. The report concluded that NATO's progress in these areas had been hesitant, that the organization had suffered through lethargy and dissent once the immediate military threat had been overcome.

Yet the Soviet threat had not disappeared; it had merely changed shape into something more alluring, less seemingly threatening, but just as dangerous all the same. Since the death of Stalin, however, politburo tactics had changed; economic enticements and political subversion were being used rather than military power to extend Soviet influence not only in Europe but worldwide. Hence, in the battle against communism, NATO interests were not limited to its geographic area. The individual members had historic interests all over the globe and these had a bearing on NATO policy.³⁵ NATO had to wake up to this challenge if it was to show the world's developing nations that it wasn't merely the military arm of capitalistic imperialism, the report said. To meet this goal successfully, the NATO countries had to eschew unilateralism in foreign policy and, instead, seek to harmonize their policies, taking into account the interests of the entire international community.

That was the analysis. To achieve that lofty aim, the report listed a number of very specific recommendations on how NATO countries should treat each other, on procedural changes for Council meetings, on settling disputes between members, on sharing scientific and technical information, economic cooperation and cultural exchanges. The goal of recommendations to improve political consultation was to ensure that such discussions took place before national positions became fixed. There were five principles:

1. That the North Atlantic Council be informed by member nations of any development significantly affecting the alliance "as a preliminary to effective political consultation."
2. That the Secretary-General has the right to raise any subject of common NATO concern for discussion at Council meetings.
3. That member nations should not adopt firm policies or make major political announcements without adequate consultations with NATO allies, unless it is obviously impossible because of time restraints or similar difficulties.
4. That member nations take into account the policies of other NATO members when developing their own.
5. That member nations fully support any Council recommendation which all the members have agreed upon. To encourage the Alliance members to adopt these principles, the committee recommended that the Secretary-General write an annual report citing progress or problems of political consultation — including a review of the behaviour of individual members.

Secondly, the committee urged that more information on subjects to be discussed at Council meetings be circulated in advance to allow time for preparation. Finally, it was recommended that a committee of permanent representatives chaired by a member of the secretariat be established to keep an eye on trends in Soviet policy.³⁶

The report also contained a formula for settling squabbles between members, based on mediation by the Secretary-General and the Council itself, if necessary. It contained several steps in which NATO involvement escalated with each one. Members were first asked to attempt to settle disputes peacefully between themselves. If that failed, they could be presented to NATO unless another body, such as an economic one, would more appropriately handle the subject. If the problem affected the effectiveness of the alliance, it would be taken immediately to the Council. If not, the Secretary-General was empowered to act as a mediator and could ask for the help of up to three of the permanent representatives.³⁷

Economic cooperation was discussed at length but the report did not recommend the establishment of any new mechanisms for dealing with the topic inside NATO. The report preferred that the pact members use other organizations, namely OEEC, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the International Monetary Fund. At the same time, however, the report urged the NATO members to work together informally to achieve healthy and expanding economies, to reduce trade barriers, to provide better assistance to developing nations, and to design policies that demonstrated the superiority of Western capitalism to communism.

How would this happen? The Committee envisioned that there would be "NATO consultation whenever economic issues of special interest to the Alliance are involved; particularly those which have political or defence implications or affect the economic health of the Atlantic Community as a whole." That meant a "substantial expansion" of the exchange of information and views on economic matters at Council meetings. The committee also foresaw the day when NATO members would form common policies on economic matters, particularly those "clearly related to the political and security interests of the Alliance." What those matters might be, the committee did not say. In any event, action resulting from such consultation would still be left to the individual nations, "either directly or through other international organizations."³⁸ To prepare the Council for discussions on economic matters, the creation of a Committee of Economic Advisors was recommended. A plethora of minor recommendations were also posed to improve exchanges on scientific, technical and cultural matters. Cultural exchanges could be promoted by expanded support among NATO nations for student exchanges, NATO fellowships and scholarships, the creation of university chairs in Atlantic studies, visiting professorships and contacts with youth organizations and parliamentarians. The committee also called for a review of national restrictions on currency

exchanges which inhibited travel. Finally, NATO should work harder to get its story out to the general public and develop information programs.³⁹

The committee also had a few thoughts on improving Council discussions. To start, the committee complained that the ministerial meetings were always too short for in-depth discussions. The Canadians had long complained that agendas for the two-day ministerial sessions were always overloaded. The recommendation was, naturally enough, that the meetings should be longer. Secondly, the Secretary-General should be allowed to play a larger role in them. His previous role had been that of a staff advisor. The committee suggested he should preside over Council meetings, though Council presidents would still be chosen from among the NATO members on an alphabetical rotation. As the presider he would be able to propose items for discussion. The committee also thought it would be useful to have periodic meetings of the chief civil servants in charge of the foreign ministries of NATO countries.⁴⁰

Pearson had no illusions about his report or its potential for reforming NATO.

By this time experience had confirmed beyond any doubt that the North Atlantic coalition, in spite of ringing public speeches and declarations by governments, could develop its non-military potential only as far as the United States, and to a lesser degree, Britain and France, were prepared to go. Middle and smaller powers can rarely lay down policies which greater powers will adopt unless it is clearly in their own interests to do so. They can, however, influence the policy of their more powerful friends if their proposals are sound in principle and their diplomacy in advocating them is skilful and determined. We kept this very much in mind in preparing our report. We did not venture so far beyond what we knew to be the views of the Big Three as to risk swift and impatient rejection, but we did not hesitate to make proposals for change based on principles which the Big Three had endorsed in public statements. These they were bound to consider, even if the consideration led to no positive results.⁴¹

The committee members from the three smaller nations had gauged correctly the response of their allies. The report was praised and approved by the Council on December 16. Yet even then it was not wholeheartedly endorsed. Several of the members, notably Dulles and Pineau (no doubt with Algeria in mind), once again voiced their caveats about greater political consultation and the task of determining how to best implement the report – "in light of the comments made by the governments" – was given to the permanent representatives and the international secretariat.⁴²

The fate of the first serious attempt to implement the committee's recommendations illustrated effectively how little the Alliance was interested in cooperation on non-military matters. The Belgian, Spaak, became Lord

Ismay's successor, bringing to the job enthusiasm for greatly expanded political cooperation and a belief that the Council had "empowered (him) to initiate action and ... to be the effective head of the Alliance."⁴³ He would be disabused of that notion soon enough by Alliance members, Canada among them, who thought he was going too far.⁴⁴ After some initial success, the cracks became apparent again, especially when the Alliance was confronted with Khrushchev's attempt to sow dissension among them over the fate of Berlin in 1959. Political consultation survived that storm only to be beaten by Charles de Gaulle, who took power in France in 1958. The general, after Britain and the United States rebuffed his proposal to create a triumvirate to shape global politics, undercut NATO cooperation at every opportunity. His strategy culminated in France pulling out of NATO's combined military forces in Europe in 1966. By 1961 Spaak had lost patience with de Gaulle's scheming and the inability of the United States and Britain to deal with it effectively. He was also exasperated by NATO's continued preoccupation with military matters. Spaak resigned, leaving Article 2 with no more champions.

Notwithstanding Spaak's interpretation of the committee's recommendations, the fact is the report of the Three Wise Men was calculated not to water down NATO's military flavour. Though draped in the language of Article 2, the report deliberately rejected mechanisms that would actually implement the article's provisions on economic cooperation. Rather, the report suggested tinkering with methods of consultation, hoping that by criticizing past breaches in the consultation process and recommending minor improvements, it could satisfy those who felt frustrated with past communication breakdowns and create the perception that NATO was more than just a military alliance. As chairman of the committee that wrote this report, Lester Pearson knew he was sacrificing some of Canada's primary reasons for belonging to NATO, as expressed in the battle by Canadian officials to obtain the inclusion of Article 2 in the treaty. Though Canadians were told NATO would be more than military, an organization that would prove the superiority of western democratic civilization, the Committee of Three report blessed its existing military nature. The unspoken hope that Canada could use a cohesive Atlantic Community as a tool for reducing American domination also proved to be unfounded. Few countries strongly supported Article 2 when it was championed by the Canadians during the treaty negotiations; eight years later even fewer were interested in creating the kind of economic and political association envisioned by the Canadians. By 1956, not many Canadians were interested either. As Gellner has noted: "There would not again be, in Canada, the enthusiasm for the North Atlantic alliance there was in the close to nine years that Louis St. Laurent stood behind it as the country's prime minister, and Lester Pearson as its secretary of state for external affairs."⁴⁵ Pearson was saddened by the experience but others were most definitely not. On his maiden speech in the British House of Lords on March 1, 1961, Gladwyn Jebb, never a fan of Article 2, declared with satisfaction that

the clause was "a dead letter."⁴⁶ Despite the strenuous efforts by Canadian politicians and bureaucrats to impose their vision of the Alliance's future on the other members, they were forced to adapt to the prescriptions of more powerful members. Thus, the Canadians shelved their visions and reluctantly went along with most of the wishes of their allies, believing that membership in NATO was necessary to retain influence in international circles, particularly over the United States.⁴⁷ The one Canadian objective that NATO did achieve was only indirectly affected by the Committee of Three report. It was, obviously, to put an end to Soviet expansionism in Europe and counter the Soviet military threat with a credible deterrent. The threat of a general war and global nuclear devastation was enough to give the Soviet leaders pause before taking overt military actions against Western Europe, while the rapid recovery of the Alliance's European members weakened the allure of Soviet-inspired political solutions.

It has been noted that by the time Pearson was appointed chairman of the committee, he had already scaled down his earlier idealistic hopes to a desire to achieve a vague "better political consultation." For the Three Wise Men to write a report that reflected the original spirit of Article 2 would have only exacerbated the existing differences of opinion among the Alliance members. Hence Pearson and his two associates decided deliberately that it was more necessary to perpetuate the myth that the alliance was more than military than to insist on adherence to the original principles of the treaty. They believed more in the might of the alliance than in its ability to prove that it was right in the East-West ideological struggle.

Endnotes

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Problems in Middle Life

John English

The world of 1963 was not the world of 1948. But it remained a dangerous world for the weak, the unwary and the unwise, even if policy for security had no longer to be based on the over-hanging and immediate threat of a powerful, aggressive, monolithic communist conspiracy, centred in Moscow and controlled by Stalin. Unhappily while collective arrangements could now be based on something more constructive and lasting than fear, fear remained the strongest incentive to effective international co-operation. As fear diminished, so did the pressures for international organization for peace; and so did the willingness to accept without too much questioning United States leadership of the alliance for collective security.¹ *L.B. Pearson*

When Dirk Stikker introduced Mike Pearson at the 1964 Special Meeting of the NATO Council, he called Pearson a "Founding Father" of the alliance, a man whose return to the NATO Council was a homecoming, a return to old times.² So it was, but Canada's prime minister did not find the setting so congenial or comfortable as in earlier days when NATO's purpose was more certain and its future and Canada's part in it much more assured. During the 1950s NATO and the Commonwealth had been complementary instruments of Canadian diplomacy which broadened the scope of Canadian international action. Through NATO Canada could influence other western powers and could avoid the entrapment of a narrowly bilateral relationship with the United States. Neither a great power nor a colonial master, nor closely tied to the United Kingdom, Canada, it was hoped, possessed a unique ability to effect compromise. "This association with different camps," John Holmes wrote in 1965, "can continue so long as the camps maintain their liberality of outlook."³ This liberality, however, was already imperilled. In NATO, the Europeans no longer accepted American pre-eminence so easily and the Americans resented European assertiveness. The Canadians, very simply, began to feel left out. Even NORAD, the bilateral defence arrangement with the Americans, obviously meant much more to Canada than it did to the United States. Canadians began to reconsider what their old partnerships meant and if they should continue.

No relationship faced closer scrutiny than NATO. One of its foremost critics in the Liberal caucus and, later, in the Pearson cabinet summed up his objections to NATO. According to Pierre Trudeau, in the Pearson years, "We had no defence policy, so to speak, except that of NATO. And our defence policy had determined all of our foreign policy. And we had no foreign policy of any importance except that which flowed from NATO."⁴ Trudeau was wrong and, to his predecessor, most unfair, but his remarks do suggest how much the so-called NATO question came to dominate foreign and defence policy debate in the last half of the nineteen-sixties. To understand why Canadians criticized NATO, it is useful to recall what NATO had originally meant to Canada.

In 1966 Dean Acheson, the American Secretary of State at NATO's birth, wrote that "The plain fact, of course, is that NATO is a military alliance. Its purpose was and is to deter and, if necessary, to meet the use of Russian military power or the fear of its use in Europe."⁵ This fact, however, was not so plain to Canadians in 1949, as Joe Sinasac and Mary Halloran point out in other essays in this volume. Canada strongly supported the elements of the NATO Treaty which provided for economic cooperation and political consultation within the alliance. Indeed, Article 2 which provided for economic cooperation was often referred to as the Canadian article. When it amounted to little in the early years of NATO, Lester Pearson, then Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, prodded the Americans and Europeans to act upon their promises. His efforts had little effect in the economic realm, and the founding of the European Common Market in 1957 made the Atlanticist dream fade. Although the machinery for political consultation did improve as a result of the re-examination, the usefulness of the NATO Council was not so apparent to Canadians. One of the Council's strongest proponents, Escott Reid, wrote in 1960 that a stronger NATO Council was "an appropriate prescription for the 1950s." For the 1960s, it would no longer suffice. NATO had become little more than the American military pledge to Europe – and even that was in doubt.⁶

In his brilliant 1965 analysis of NATO, *The Troubled Partnership*, Henry Kissinger pointed to four factors that had altered the alliance balance in the late fifties and early sixties: "European economic recovery; European integration; decolonization; and the Cuban missile crisis and its aftermath." Kissinger's analysis stands up well. Economic recovery and integration meant the return of European interests separate from those of the United States. Decolonization meant that Europe possessed a new freedom in international affairs, and it brought with it a reluctance to share the United States' expanding activities in former European colonies, such as Indochina. The Cuban Missile Crisis showed that even "eyeball to eyeball" confrontations could be avoided and that the United States and the Soviet Union were more disposed to deal with each other directly. These dealings, which were soon labelled "detente", as well as the Kennedy administration's strategic doctrine of "flexible response"

profoundly affected the military basis of the alliance. Europeans came to doubt that Soviet aggression in Europe would be met with a full nuclear response. The American "guarantee" no longer offered the assurance it had under the earlier doctrine of massive retaliation. For the Americans, the European carping was irritating and unfair. For some Europeans, especially France's President Charles de Gaulle, the Americans' suspicion was evidence of their hegemonic designs. United States came to see Europe as a partner which failed to carry its load and in the early 1960s, the Kennedy administration turned its fascination with technical gimmickry towards the fashioning of schemes that would restore a Europe that the Americans could understand. These schemes and these debates had one element in common: Canada had little part in them. In Kissinger's 251 page study of the troubled partners, Canada rated not one mention.⁷

The omission was symbolic if inexcusable: in the major alliance troubles Canada apparently mattered very little to the principals. Moreover, with the changes in deterrence strategy and in European economic institutions, NATO's purpose seemed less important and less understandable to Canadians. The 1963 election had turned Canadian attention to Canadian military commitments and, in particular, to Canada's position on nuclear arms. The Diefenbaker government had ordered CF104s for Canada's European air force squadrons and Honest John missiles for the Canadian army brigade in Europe. It hesitated, however, in accepting the nuclear weapons which these instruments of war apparently required. In January 1963 Lester Pearson, now leader of the opposition, pledged himself to accept these weapons, but he also indicated that, after acceptance, his government would "begin to negotiate Canada into more appropriate roles, ones which would not require Canadian forces to use nuclear weapons."⁸ The Liberals tried to carry out this pledge after the election. In the White Paper on Defence of March 1964, the Liberal government supported flexible response as a doctrine that would end "excessive reliance upon nuclear weapons." NATO remained, the Paper further declared, a "nuclear-armed defensive alliance" in which Canada must share responsibility: "One cannot be a member of a military alliance and at the same time avoid some share of responsibility for its strategic policies."⁹ The *White Paper* nevertheless pointed to a future role for Canada in the alliance where Canada's nuclear role would be small if not negligible. In fact, the *White Paper* called for an "intervention force" which would allow Canada to make a "flexible" rather than nuclear response. The CF104s, acquired by the Diefenbaker government, would be allowed to become obsolete, and the Canadian emphasis in the future would be aircraft for direct support of Canadian ground forces. The White Paper's plan for defence unification, with its provision for functional commands, created further confusion since the Canadian Brigade Group and the First Air Division did not fit neatly into the new functional commands (Air Defence, Air Transport, Training, Maritime, and Materiel). In fact, the Brigade

Group and the Air Division seemed, from a military viewpoint, to make less and less sense.¹⁰ The Brigade's approximately 6,500 men possessed a high reputation for professionalism. It was, one commentator declared, "The most self sufficient offensive/defensive field unit in the history of warfare." But this acclaim did not mean that military experts accepted its purpose in 1964. The Brigade was poorly placed in Europe, facing overwhelming Soviet numbers flanked by weak British, German and Belgium forces, and inadequately supported in the air. It was well positioned for heroic suicide in a European war.¹¹ At home the Brigade's nuclear-tipped Honest John missiles made it a regular target for political sniping. Neither in war nor in peace was its future assured.

In 1964, the Pearson government let the number of squadrons in the Air Division fall to six from the twelve originally promised to NATO, even though Pearson had promised in the 1963 campaign that the Air Division would be strengthened. Here again the military value of the Division was unclear. The CF104 was not the ideal plane for the purposes the Canadian Division was assigned. Moreover, the high cost of the plane meant that the Division would never acquire the numbers the Division needed and had been promised. High cost also meant that the consolidation of the Air Division with the Brigade, a highly popular idea in 1963-64, never took place. For all these reasons and because of the controversial nuclear commitment, the Air Squadrons were bloated targets for political attacks.

Secretary of State for External Affairs Paul Martin reflected Canada's concern about its own contribution to NATO and about the European and American differences on future nuclear strategy when he won approval at the December 1964 NATO council meeting for a study of NATO's future tasks. At that same meeting, the Canadians spoke out against the American-sponsored proposal for a Multilateral Nuclear Force (MNF). The MNF proposal sought to prevent nuclear proliferation while allowing Europeans the moral satisfaction of being involved in nuclear decision-making. Fearing an independent German nuclear force and the possibility of Franco-German nuclear cooperation, the American proponents of the MNF carried out "a public relations campaign to gain official, political and academic support, of an energy and ruthlessness unknown since Harriet Beecher Stowe."¹² The campaign created so much smoke that NATO's broader problems were often ignored. The French, profoundly distrustful of American intentions, especially resented the American proposal. The Canadians, desperate to maintain French participation in the alliance and sceptical of the MNF, warned the Americans about their impetuosity.¹³ When the British proposed an Atlantic Nuclear Force as an alternative, the Canadians told both the United Kingdom and the United States that the alternative was no better than the original. Both proposals had little or no Canadian content; they presaged a future for NATO where Canada counted little. Thus, politically and militarily, Canada had reasons to question NATO's direction. This rarely occurred in public fora during 1963 and 1964, perhaps

because both public and politicians did not want to irritate the wounds from the 1963 nuclear debate. In early 1965, Pearson seems to have decided that silence no longer served his political ends or Canada's national interest. On 10 February 1965, Pearson told the Canadian Club of Ottawa that "the defence arrangements suitable for 1948 may not be appropriate for 1965, or possibly, for long after 1965." Canada should therefore consider whether its NATO contribution was "the best use of our resources for the defence of peace." He emphasized Europe's new economic and political strength and spoke of the importance of France to the alliance's future. The speech attracted attention in the Department of External Affairs, as well as in European embassies. Paul Martin had not cleared the speech, and he was unsure of Pearson's meaning. So were some European diplomats. The French asked for a copy of the text, and the Dutch Ambassador, speaking for some other European allies, asked Martin whether Canada was reneging on its NATO commitments. Martin said no, but then, privately, asked Pearson what, in fact, he had meant in his remarks. Pearson's reply was reassuring: he had not intended to change Canadian policy. He had spoken to encourage debate and provoke thinking. This satisfied Martin who knew that a prime minister when speaking on foreign policy must often respond to Canadian political pressures. In this case, Martin thought, Pearson was speaking to Quebec, reminding the province of Canada's sympathy for France, and to the growing nationalist left, showing Canada's independence from American policy.¹⁴

Pearson did have political motives, but, as his memoirs reveal, he also had strong doubts about NATO's future. He blamed the Europeans as much as the Americans for the malady, the former because they refused to do enough for a strong alliance, the latter because they sought to do too much alone. In a 4 March 1965 speech to the Cleveland Council on World Affairs, Martin echoed Pearson's concerns while reiterating Canadian support for NATO. He welcomed the NATO review which had begun in December.¹⁵ His hopes that it would offer solutions to NATO's problems were unfulfilled. At the 11-12 May meeting of the NATO ministers, the confusion grew, and Franco-American differences broadened. American Defense Secretary Robert McNamara began to speak about a "technical committee" which might be created to consider the problem of nuclear cooperation. This committee, McNamara urged, should include the American, French, and British defence ministers and one or two other defence ministers. The Canadians naturally objected to their likely exclusion, but they were more troubled by the strong French opposition to the McNamara proposal. De Gaulle thought these "technical discussions" were a clever device designed to smother the independent French nuclear deterrent under a NATO blanket. Martin warned the Americans about the French fears, but, in his view, the Americans seemed to care no longer how their actions affected the French.¹⁶ The McNamara proposal was presented in fuller form at a NATO defence minister meeting on 1-2 June. The French remained

unconvinced. When Defence Minister Paul Hellyer (who had proposed the conference in 1964) reported to the House that the meeting was very fruitful, the press and opposition members were openly sceptical.¹⁷ They had a right to be.

At the July NATO meetings, which a bad fall kept Martin from attending, the allies fell further apart. The Americans moved back from their support for the MNF; this irritated the Germans and Italians. On the other hand, the Americans continued to push the McNamara "technical committee" which offended the French. The Canadian Ambassador to NATO, George Ignatieff, reported to Ottawa that the differences between France and the United States were most serious. He did report that although France would not serve on the McNamara committee it would not oppose its creation. Canada had been asked to help but could do little. The Canadian delegation remained cool about the McNamara committee, refusing to serve unless the NATO Secretary-General Manlio Brosio was a member. The objection carried little weight; Canada was not asked to serve. Martin, who became NATO president on 30 September, was most unhappy.

His objections led McNamara and others to agree to open discussions. These discussions among the defence ministers did not resolve the problem of nuclear sharing. In a late November meeting of defence ministers, the so-called special committee was broken into three committees in order to solve the representation problem. Canada was represented on two committees, consultation and intelligence, but it was not a member of the nuclear strategy committee. Only the British and Americans were represented on all three. The French accepted this compromise but did not participate in any committee.

The December 1965 ministerial meetings were of special significance for Canada because Martin as president presided. For NATO their significance lay in the impasse they revealed. Martin later recalled that "Nobody felt at ease, yet it was a time when close consultation (for which we had called repeatedly) could have paid off."¹⁸ The Americans showed their boredom with the nuclear discussions, the German and the French did not conceal their resentments. Martin regretted the apparent American desire to isolate France, and he feared the effect of German participation in an independent NATO nuclear deterrent. Canada's position was therefore ambiguous: On the one hand, Canada called for closer consultation and sharing; on the other, it could not support the major plans that seemed to promote that goal. NATO's defence policy was becoming caught up in the whirlwind of external events in the middle 1960s. Defence Minister Paul Hellyer expressed this well when he remarked to a reporter at the meetings: "You can't just look at this area and ignore what is going on in Vietnam, China and Rhodesia."¹⁹ In December 1965, the NATO ministers, for the first time, did not ignore what was going on about them.

Vietnam, Cyprus and detente were discussed openly. This greatly pleased the Canadians even if the substance of the discussion was not always hearten-

ing. On Vietnam, Dean Rusk made clear his government's belief that America's allies owed it some support in Vietnam. Martin disagreed with Rusk's interpretation of the responsibility of America's allies. Other nations responded to Rusk's hints with silence. On Cyprus, the dispute that made two NATO partners enemies, Martin warned the Greeks and Turks that the peace-keeping contingent he had helped to organize could not stay on indefinitely. Other NATO countries supported Canada's views, but the discussion floundered because of the implacable hostility between the Greeks and the Turks. Similarly, the differences in the approaches to detente could not be resolved. Still, discussion had occurred. This was, Martin reported, "a major breakthrough in thinking."²⁰

In breaking through the barriers to freewheeling discussion, the NATO allies found no solid ground, and this was noticed. NATO's disunity was more commonly reported in the Canadian press and analyzed in academic journals. The popularity of detente, the intensification of the United States' Vietnam involvement and its growing unpopularity, and the French refusal to work within the NATO military and political framework combined to create a mood of doubt regarding NATO. The doubts were general. Maxwell Cohen, who Pearson had asked for advice on a wide range of issues, reflected them in a letter written to Pearson during the 1965 election campaign:²¹

As to NATO, little can be done to repair the continuing erosion resulting from De Gaulle's new vision of Europe and European defence. I have a feeling that Canada on the whole is bored with NATO problems, is unconvinced of NATO's essential military role as the super powers both get more powerful and more interested in 'detente' and as De Gaulle whittles away at the political uses of the Organization.

There may have been boredom, but it did not result in inaction.

The election over, NATO became the focus of more attention and more criticism. In February 1966, the new House debated foreign affairs at greater length and depth than had occurred for several years. The New Democrats (NDP) were more vigorous than ever in their attack upon NATO. The NDP defence critic Andrew Brewin welcomed the apparent abandonment of the planned nuclear force because, in his view, the abandonment would ease the negotiations for a non-proliferation treaty. The West Germans, Brewin argued, should be ready to renounce any nuclear role in the interests of world peace. Fellow New Democrat Bert Herridge reflected this spirit more fully when he criticized Canada for permitting West German troops to train in Canada. This action, Herridge warned, would offend the Soviet Union. Martin replied tartly: "What was done here was to treat one NATO partner as we expect ourselves to be treated and as, in fact, we are treated." The Conservatives were, as expected, the most enthusiastic supporters of NATO aims. Gordon Churchill

asked for a strengthening of Canada's military commitments to NATO in order that the United States could increase its strength in Vietnam. John Diefenbaker did not back this proposal, but he did lament what he perceived to be a weakening of the alliance. In a few weeks, grounds for Diefenbaker's belief were strengthened.²²

On 11 March 1966 France withdrew from the military side of NATO, demanding also that NATO installations and forces be removed from French soil. On 29 March, the French asked the Canadians to remove the RCAF installations (an air base at Marville and the air division headquarters at Metz) by 1 April 1967. The old arrangements were "no longer in accord with present conditions" and France must therefore "resume on French territory the full exercise of French sovereignty."²³ This action especially offended Canadians. Pearson spoke for many others when he asked "a high ranking French public servant" whether he thought "we should take our hundred thousand dead with us to German territory." This bitterness appeared in his diary account of his reaction, but so did a thoughtful appraisal of France's position and of NATO's problems.

De Gaulle has not tried to conceal his impatience with NATO in recent years and no one should really have been surprised over his decision. It was obviously coming, even though France's allies had the right to expect a more decent procedure, some consultation and an exchange of views before the curt announcement that all had been decided and nothing remained to be discussed but the 'modalities.'

The basic de Gaulle thesis that NATO had outlived its usefulness is right – up to this point; that there should have been a radical re-examination of the whole NATO structure in the light of the changes that had occurred since the Treaty had been signed 16 years ago.

Everybody seemed to agree that changes had to be made to give the European side of the coalition greater influence and power in its direction and control. Everybody talked about the need for a new NATO, but nobody did anything about it. If we had done so, it would have been more difficult for France to move out. Indeed, de Gaulle *might* not have wished to do so.²⁴

Martin shared Pearson's anger towards France and his recognition that NATO bore much responsibility for the French action. Speaking in Windsor, Ontario, on 21 March, Martin rejected the French arguments, pointedly noting that "our experience in the last two wars has led us to conclude that there is no effective alternative to unified command and planning arrangements for armed forces." Yet much of the message was conciliatory. Martin pointed to the failure of the review Canada had requested in 1964 as a possible cause of France's

action. Well aware of the broader implications of France's action for Canada, he added:²⁵

One object of Canadian policy will be to ensure that nothing is done which would make more difficult the resumption by France of full military participation in NATO, should France so decide. No matter how great our regret that the French Government should have taken the decision it has, we shall do all we can not to allow this action to affect the existing warm and friendly relations between Canada and France, which form an important and basic element of our foreign policy. Indeed, if the institutional links between France and NATO must be loosened, it is all the more important to maintain and strengthen, if possible, the bilateral relations.

Neither privately nor publicly did Canadian diplomats share the relief some NATO diplomats felt when France withdrew from the military side of NATO. Canada's disagreement with the French decision was vigorously expressed as was Canada's commitment to NATO.²⁶ Nevertheless, the Canadians worked to minimize the effects of the French departure. When Pearson spoke to Lyndon Johnson in May 1966, he emphasized the structural problems of NATO to which France had objected. He expressed a similar understanding of NATO's problems in an important public address in Springfield, Illinois. He spoke of NATO's accomplishments and urged optimism: "If we tend to become too depressed over the troubles that face the world today, we should recall how things seemed in the Atlantic world in the forties." But that alliance that had served the Atlantic community so well in the darkest post-war days had not matured. "Unhappily," Pearson declared, "it is man's weakness to cling to the ideas, the institutions and the habits of the past – even the recent past – instead of adapting them to the needs of today and tomorrow." This was the case with NATO.²⁷

The weight of inertia and a vested interest in a new status quo felt especially among the most powerful governments of the alliance, made it difficult to find anyone in a responsible position on either side of the Atlantic who was prepared to come forward and specify in any detail what should be changed. A lot of people were talking about the need for change but nobody, no government, in a position of power was really doing much about it. Their abrupt and unilateral action by France thrust change upon us. Crisis, as always, forced our hands. ...

While France is not alone in this feeling, only de Gaulle has translated it into policy and action. If he has gone too far in that action (as I think he has), if he is on the wrong course, we should not drive him farther in the wrong direction but try to bring him back to the right course

by seriously re-examining the purposes and the organization of NATO in the light of 1966, not 1948. ... If the reason for General de Gaulle's action is his belief that the other allies will not consider any change to NATO to meet new conditions, let's take positive action about the necessary reforms. Surely it doesn't make sense any longer to take the position that NATO is sacrosanct and mustn't be altered. Our reaction should be just the opposite.

The French action caused much reaction. Several commentators went beyond Pearson in calling for re-evaluation of the alliance. In the leftist *Canadian Forum*, University of Toronto professor Abraham Rotstein gave guarded approval to Pearson's remarks at Springfield. While approving of Pearson's recognition that NATO needed re-examination, Rotstein deprecated Pearson's continuing commitment to "Atlanticism": "The basic reluctance in Ottawa has been to face up to the alternative to an Atlantic Community – a movement toward a European Community where Gaullism and resistance to American influence would play a key role. With the growing autonomy of Eastern Europe and the major detente between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, such a scheme becomes the more likely alternative." To the nationalist Rotstein, this alternative was obviously attractive. Its attraction lay in the impetus it would give to Canadian "independence." As his colleague Stephen Clarkson put it: "Above all Gaullism means independence, especially from the United States." The Gaullist recipe was one Canada itself should follow.²⁸ These reactions are interesting in the assumptions they reveal: NATO restricted the freedom of Canadian diplomacy; NATO was an American-dominated institution resented by the "new" Europeans; detente made the military significance of NATO much less, if not negligible; and, finally, NATO was not a body that could coordinate western moves towards detente. Unlike Pearson and Martin, Clarkson and Rotstein could not imagine that Canada could extend the range of its diplomacy through NATO and create links beyond the United States. The difference in points of view was fundamental.

From the summer of 1966 to the early 1970s a vigorous public debate on NATO's future reflected these different points of view. The debate may have often been, as one student of it alleges, "marked by a singular disregard for fact and an abysmally low intellectual content." It is none the less of much significance. The purposes of NATO's critics may have had little to do with NATO but very much to do with a generation's disillusionment with "anticommunist rhetoric" and arms build-up, a view later expressed by a prominent but by 1980 repentant NATO critic, Jack Granatstein.²⁹ Nevertheless, the critics had influence and did affect the foreign policy of the Pearson government even though the debate took place among attentive public groups. In November 1968 two years after de Gaulle's dramatic NATO withdrawal, 48% of Canadians

answered "no" to this question. "Do you happen to have heard or read anything about NATO – that is, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization?"³⁰

In his excellent analysis of "attentive publics" and the NATO debate, Professor R.B. Byers breaks down the commentators on NATO into revisionists and traditionalists. He found in 1960-67 that there was "increasing disillusionment with the Canadian role in NATO" although he shows that one "attentive public group," the delegates at the June 1967 Canadian Institute of International Affairs study conference seemed to be "predominantly in favour of continuing Canada's role in NATO." But this view was not reflected in the Canadian newspapers. The newspapers taken collectively had shown less support of NATO than had the government. "The fact," Byers wrote, "that half the papers commenting on the Canadian forces in Europe are in favour of withdrawal or a reduction [of Canadian NATO forces] is indicative of increasing dissatisfaction. Papers that have often supported NATO in the past such as the *Toronto Globe and Mail*, the *Edmonton Journal*, and the *Vancouver Sun* have in some instances become increasingly anti-NATO." *The Globe and Mail* and the *Montreal Star*, Byers noted, became more critical of NATO after publishing articles by academic revisionists such as Stephen Clarkson and James Eayrs. Receptiveness to the arguments of these revisionists was not limited to the editorial rooms.³¹

In the Pearson government several new or younger members were sceptical about NATO. Jean Marchand, Gérard Pelletier, and Pierre Trudeau reflected the growing NATO criticism expressed by the Quebec academics and journalists they knew so well (Marchand more than Trudeau and Pelletier). In English Canada, Walter Gordon, though absent from the cabinet in 1966, continued to move leftwards and came to share his academic friends Rotstein and Clarkson's criticisms of NATO. Some younger MPs close to Gordon, such as Donald Macdonald, reflected Gordon's views, and in private gatherings did not hesitate to express them.³² The Canadian government responded to these pressures first by openly calling for an examination of NATO's aims and by seeking to limit the impact of the French withdrawal.

Before the 7-9 June NATO meetings, a special committee of fourteen (France being excluded since it was no longer a part of the military NATO) met to discuss what French withdrawal meant. Martin has described the situation and the Canadian position:

Before I left for Brussels, I tried to convince my fellow foreign ministers, ... that despite the importance of a Council statement on the alliance's role in ameliorating East-West relations, every effort should be made to adopt a formula to which France could agree. This would tie de Gaulle's hands in his talks with the Kremlin. Josef Luns of the Netherlands seemed determined to seize any opportunity to rid the alliance of the general's deadening hand, and the British saw little reason

to bear the Cross of Lorraine any longer. Wilson had made up his mind that NATO should be an instrument of detente, and the price of total French withdrawal was not too high. Michael Stewart, Britain's foreign secretary, and Denis Healey wanted the Council to leave Fontainebleau. I opposed this because it would further maroon France. ...

Martin's and Canada's position did annoy others who believed that Canada was placing its domestic political concerns above the interests of Western unity.³³ Certainly the Canadians believed that NATO without France would make NATO less acceptable in Canada and make France more susceptible to wooing by Quebec nationalists. At the meeting Canada worked to postpone the moving of Council headquarters from Paris. Such postponement was obtained, and the statement on detente did not reflect the strong desire of some NATO members that the alliance's leading role be recognized. Martin met Couve de Murville who thanked Martin for his mediatory efforts. Although some other NATO participants criticized Martin, the Canadian press and the political opposition was largely approving. *The Globe and Mail*, for example, criticized the "unfair and ill-informed attack on Mr. Martin" and lauded his mediatory efforts. In the Commons, John Diefenbaker was surprisingly generous in his praise as was Andrew Brewin speaking for the NDP. The Americans grumbled privately and, in testimony by Dean Rusk before the Senate, publicly about the Canadian attitude. Other Americans, notably Harlan Cleveland, the United States Permanent Representative to NATO, saw the advantages of gaining time. The time was valuable. By the time of the December ministerial meetings, NATO had begun its long overdue reassessment.³⁴

The defence ministers met on 25-26 July in Paris and Hellyer announced Canada would commit two battalions to the NATO Allied Command Mobile Force to join the two battalions already committed. This meeting made provisions for several studies which led to revision of NATO military procedures. In the fall the decision to move the Council from Paris to Brussels came quietly, and there was neither confrontation nor recrimination. The "Committee of fourteen" reached the basis for an understanding on the problem of nuclear sharing that had so long troubled the alliance. A Nuclear Planning Group made up of the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy and three rotating members was established. The 1964 proposal for a study of the alliance's future tasks was revived and widely endorsed at the December 1966 ministerial meeting. Although Canada was not included among the permanent members of the Nuclear Planning Group and was, against its wishes, grouped with the United States for purposes of the so-called Harmel Review (after Belgian foreign minister Pierre Harmel), the Canadian government was pleased with the course events had taken. As Martin later wrote, "the prospects for reinvigorating NATO had never looked better."³⁵

To many Canadians, however, reduction in or elimination of Canada's NATO commitment was preferred to Canadian involvement in NATO reinvigoration. The differences that surfaced in 1966 now brought forth acrimonious debate in the Commons and in the Cabinet. The Conservatives began to press the government to keep Canada's military commitment to NATO while the New Democrats began to argue that unification of the armed forces made the NATO military commitment impossible. Hellyer and Martin did not indicate that they planned to make changes, although the latter held out hope that some change might come because of the Harmel review. But that review went badly from Canada's point of view. Its chairman, Paul-Henri Spaak, favoured a European-North American orientation, the "dumbbell" concept Canada had opposed since NATO's inauguration. De Gaulle also opposed this and managed to refocus the study upon the question of NATO's place in detente. Even NATO's supporters in Canada began to speak of NATO's military and political future as being in "some doubt."³⁶

Others who had long harboured doubts now became vocal. As a private member, Walter Gordon had expressed his doubts about Canadian foreign policy in 1966. The Liberal party annual meeting in 1966 had not followed him in his urgings that Canada seek more independence. By early 1967 his warnings were being more widely heeded as the Vietnam war's unpopularity grew and as Canadians became more resentful of American and, indeed, European slights towards their one hundred year old nation. In January 1967 Gordon returned to the Cabinet and in April he became President of the Privy Council. Pearson's decision to bring Gordon into the Cabinet troubled many of his colleagues. Gordon's congenial personality could not remove the distrust of Gordon many felt. The causes of distrust need not concern us; its existence appears whenever Gordon's name is raised with most of his former cabinet colleagues.³⁷ Gordon's popularity with academic critics of the government, his personal links with the increasingly nationalist *Toronto Star*, and his willingness to take independent stands were distrusted. His words, therefore, were carefully watched.

This atmosphere explains the strong reaction to two Gordon speeches on 12 and 13 May 1967. In the latter he criticized Canada's support of American policy in Vietnam. Clearly related to his concern about Vietnam was his call in his 12 May speech for a Canadian retreat from NATO and NORAD, both symbols of American domination in Gordon's mind. To a group of young businessmen Gordon openly "wondered" whether "Canada should continue to maintain air squadrons in Europe any longer." The question was merely rhetorical as Gordon's later remarks showed:

The French don't want us; the countries of Western Europe are now quite prosperous enough to maintain their own defence establishments if they wish to; both the U.S. and Britain have stated their intentions to withdraw

some of their troops from Europe. In these circumstances what is the sensible thing and the right thing to do?

After alluding to the ABM (Anti-ballistic missile) programme and its effect on Canada, Gordon concluded:

The alternative for a country of our size may be to opt out of the contest altogether on the grounds that if there should ever be a nuclear war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, there would be nothing effective we could do about it anyway. In circumstances such as these Canada, instead of stepping up her defence budget considerably, might decide to concentrate her efforts on the maintenance of mobile peace-keeping or peace-restoring units to be available to the U.N. on the shortest possible notice. This might make a lot of sense. Our new unified forces should be well suited to this task.³⁸

Gordon's remarks infuriated Martin and Hellyer who reacted quickly. Hellyer denied that Gordon spoke for the government. Martin threatened resignation, and demanded that Gordon be "chewed out" in cabinet and repudiated by the prime minister. Pearson agreed. In a 17 May cabinet meeting Pearson spoke strongly against Gordon's breach of cabinet solidarity, but was not so critical of the substance of Gordon's remarks, especially about Vietnam. This, Gordon later claimed, was explained by Pearson's own view which he had expressed to Gordon privately.³⁹

Pearson no doubt did seem to agree with Gordon in their private conversations. His congeniality so often camouflaged his disagreement or discomfort. In the case of NATO, however, Pearson's agreement was more than misunderstood amiability. On 4 May, eight days *before* Gordon spoke, Pearson had sent a letter to Martin and Hellyer which expressed his concern about the inflexibility of the Canadian military commitment to NATO. Although his officials had told him that the reductions in British and American troops meant little in real military terms, recent announcements suggested that information was untrue. Canada, Pearson argued, should reassess its own position, especially the air squadrons.

Pearson's comments are remarkably similar to Gordon's eight days later. Martin's reaction, which came after extensive departmental discussion, was not sympathetic to Pearson's complaints. Prior to meeting Pearson personally, Martin, in a written memorandum, rejected Pearson's statement that Canada's NATO contribution was inflexible. He pointed to the disbanding of two air squadrons in 1966 which was a reduction, not simply a redeployment as the United States and Great Britain were currently proposing for their own forces. Redeployment along American or British lines was out of the question for Canada because facilities in Canada were unavailable. Moreover, there would

be no other role for the F-104s if they were withdrawn from NATO. Martin therefore proposed that Canada maintain its military commitments to NATO in order to retain Canada's influence in NATO and in international negotiations. He nevertheless agreed that so far as possible Canada should try to make its future military contribution from Canadian bases.

This did not satisfy Pearson. When Martin and Hellyer reported to cabinet on 31 May 1967, they presented a "five year plan" for Canada's NATO commitment. The F-104 squadrons were to be reduced from six to four by 1969. Canada would also seek to strengthen this Command Mobile Force which would permit Canadian forces to remain in Canada. The commitment would remain at the same level until changes could be negotiated. The cabinet reacted badly to these proposals. In the notoriously gossipy Pearson cabinet, the prime minister's discontent with NATO was probably well known. There had been relatively little foreign policy discussion in the cabinet before this time. Now foreign policy in many guises – Vietnam, de Gaulle, the Middle East – was having political effects. The politicians reacted predictably. The French-Canadian ministers, notably Marchand and Trudeau, questioned the five year commitment. Others seized upon the Mobile Command Force as an instrument to reduce Canadian commitment. This was scarcely what Martin and Hellyer wanted. The debate ended without agreement, except on the reduction of the air squadrons. Martin and Hellyer would try again in the fall.

In the meantime Pearson persuaded Martin to take NATO's strong critic, Walter Gordon, to the NATO meetings in Luxembourg in June. (Gordon's belief that Martin "invited" him is incorrect. Martin did not believe it would accomplish anything.) At the meetings Martin brought up Vietnam and urged that the United States halt the bombing. It was, Gordon commented, "an excellent presentation and took courage." Rusk, again in Gordon's words, "replied somewhat superciliously and proceeded to slap Paul down." The others kept their silence. Not surprisingly, Gordon's faith in NATO was not renewed.⁴⁰

The faith of others was also waning as France proved obstreperous in the discussions on NATO's future and others, including the United States, were ready to force France out of the alliance. This was politically difficult for the Canadian government. So was the direction the Harmel Report was moving. Harmel sought to avoid consideration of NATO's role in fostering detente because such consideration would be politically harmful in Europe. In Canada, declaring NATO's usefulness in detente was politically helpful. Thus, the summer of 1967 brought no relief to Martin and Hellyer.

In early September, the Department of External Affairs presented two lengthy memoranda to the cabinet. The first discussed, in rather didactic fashion, Canada and collective security. The concept of collective security was defined, and the accomplishments of post-war collective security enumerated. The tone betrays its authors, and more particularly, Paul Martin's belief that many readers of the memorandum had lost sight of the purposes of collective

security. The second memorandum discussed Canada and NATO. NATO, the memorandum declared, had provided psychological and military sustenance to a troubled West in the late 1940s. The Soviets could not attain their European goals through force, and the momentum the Soviets had in the late 1940s had disappeared. Western Europe had regained its vigour, but the Soviet Army was stronger than ever and still nearby. NATO remained an essential component of European confidence. There were other advantages that came from the consultation that NATO councils offered. Old rivalries had been soothed, and NATO provided a means by which Germany could have nuclear protection without possessing nuclear weapons itself. Surely some Europeans slept more soundly knowing this. Finally, the memorandum argued, NATO was the best vehicle to negotiate a European settlement.

In External's view, NATO troop reductions had to parallel Soviet force reductions in Eastern Europe. Any unilateral reduction would be interpreted as an indication of weakness. The American, British, and German reductions were unfortunate but they were not as militarily significant as many had alleged. Certainly these slight reductions did not justify any Canadian move to reduce its NATO military commitment. This commitment, External argued, brought Canada great benefits, quite apart from its intrinsic military value. For a relatively small military contribution Canada obtained much political advantage. The existing Canadian brigade and the four air squadrons were, in External's and, presumably the Defence Department's, view the minimum size for the commitment to be meaningful. If there were to be further reductions, they should be carefully co-ordinated with American and European actions and should be used as bargaining chips in the negotiations with the Soviets. The Canadian forces in Europe should remain sufficiently large to be autonomous. Autonomy for our forces was a cherished goal in the past that must be maintained in the future.⁴¹

Martin tried to convince the public as well as his colleagues and on several occasions, notably at the Canadian National Exhibition, on 25 August 1967, he stressed the continuing military importance of NATO and, especially, NATO's significance in the negotiations accompanying detente.⁴² Detente was then so fashionable, but NATO, so long heralded for its military accomplishments, could not quickly change to the new fashion. In September the cabinet once again bickered over Martin and new Defence Minister Leo Cadieux's recommendations for the five year forecast of military resources required by NATO. Some time passed before Cabinet agreed to replace the commitment to reinforce the mechanized brigade with a continuing commitment to increase the level of the Canadian-based forces at the disposal of the Allied Command Mobile Force for use on NATO's northern flank in times of crisis. More important was the decision to allow the Air Division to become obsolescent by not replacing the CF-104. In time, Canada's nuclear strike role would disappear.⁴³

In time, the debate over NATO's future passed as well. The events of 1966-67 were the prologue to the more searching and more public evaluation of NATO's purposes which occurred in the early years of Pierre Trudeau's prime ministership. That evaluation left bitter memories. Leo Cadieux, Paul Hellyer, and many others blamed Trudeau for abandoning the spirit of Pearsonian diplomacy and for questioning the European commitment which had been a centrepiece of that diplomacy.⁴⁴ But Pearson himself had questioned the nature of that commitment, privately to Martin and Hellyer in May 1967 and publicly on "Face the Nation" just after he left office in April 1968.⁴⁵ By 1968 NATO was losing its best Canadian friendships.

Friendship is always a bargain. Peyton Lyon wrote of NATO:⁴⁶

For smaller members, NATO represents a diplomatic bargain: the ability at modest cost to be well informed about global developments, contingency planning, and East-West negotiations and the opportunity to inject opinions in time to be relevant.

In the mid-sixties, the bargain no longer seemed so obvious. When Canada sought information and offered opinions about the major global development, the Southeast Asian War, it received only rebuffs. There had been little planning for new contingencies, and what had occurred often left little place for Canadians. And finally, alliance members could not agree what part NATO should play in East-West negotiations. Canada's feelings were bruised, and its confidence in NATO's value shaken, and its commitment weakened. For many Canadians it became time to shop around for a better bargain.⁴⁷ In the end they could find none, but they were never so pleased with NATO's wares as they had been when the shop first opened in the Cold War's early years.

Endnotes

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- 1 L.B. Pearson, *Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1975), 3:117.
- 2 Transcript of Special Meeting of NATO Council, 17 January 1964, Pearson Papers (National Archives, Ottawa).
- 3 John Holmes, "Is There a Future for Middlepowermanship?" in J. King Gordon, ed., *Canada's Role as a Middle Power* (Toronto: C.I.I.A., 1966), 27. This article is an excellent summary of the problems Canada faced and the changes she was undergoing.
- 4 Pierre Trudeau, "The Relation of Defence Policy to Foreign Policy," 12 April 1969, Calgary. External Affairs, *Statements and Speeches* (SS) 69/8.
- 5 Dean Acheson, "Canada: 'Stern Daughter of the Voice of God,'" in L.T. Merchant, ed., *Neighbors Taken for Granted* (Toronto: Burns and MacEachern, 1966), 141.

- 6 Escott Reid, *Time of Fear and Hope: The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977), 138. An excellent account of Article 2's failure is found in Jerome D. Davis, *To the NATO Review: Constancy and Change in Canadian NATO Policy, 1949-1959* (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Johns Hopkins, 1973), 65-79. Not all Canadians thought so highly of Article 2. Brooke Claxton, for example, thought NATO was and should be solely a military alliance.
- 7 Henry Kissinger, *The Troubled Partnership: A Re-appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance* (New York: McGraw-Hill 1965), 7 and *passim*. Other useful contemporary assessments of the alliance include Albert Legault, *Deterrence and the Atlantic Alliance* (Toronto: C.I.I.A., 1966); Francis A. Beer, *Integration and Disintegration in NATO* (Columbus: Ohio State University, 1969); Robert Osgood, *NATO: The Entangling Alliance* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1962); and James Richardson, *Germany and the Atlantic Alliance: The Interaction of Strategy and Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966). On American strategic planning, see John Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982). See also, Nils Orvik, ed., *Canada and NATO* (Kingston, Ont.: Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, 1982), and Paul Buteux, *The Politics of Nuclear Consultation in NATO, 1965-1980* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
- 8 Pearson, *Mike*, 3:71.
- 9 Dept. of National Defence, *White Paper on Defence, 1964* (Queen's Printer, 1964). Davis, *To the NATO Review*, IV; Vernon Kronenberg, *All Together Now: The Organization of the Department of National Defence in Canada 1964-1972* (Toronto: C.I.I.A., 1973); J.L. Granatstein, *Canada 1957-1967* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986), 222-7; and Marilyn D. Eustace, *Canada's European Force 1964-1971: Canada's Commitment to Europe* rev. ed. (Kingston, Ont.: Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, 1982).
- 10 Canadian Land Forces Europe, *Armed Forces Review*, 3, No. 1 (Jan.-Feb. 1969), cited in Davis, *ibid.*, 137. Davis gives an excellent account of the problems in Chapter IV, *ibid.*
- 11 General Charles Foulkes pointed out many of these dangers in the Special Committee on Defence, *Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1963), 497.
- 12 Alastair Buchan, "Is This NATO Crisis Necessary?" *The New Republic*, 151, Nos. 6-7 (8 August 1964), 19-21.
- 13 Others saw Canada's sensitivity to the French. According to Paul Martin, Paul-Henri Spaak thought Canada "was overly concerned to cater to French sensibilities." Paul Martin, *A Very Public Life. Volume II: So Many Worlds* (Toronto: Deneau, 1985), 468.
- 14 External Affairs, *Statements and Speeches*, 65/3. "Extracts from an Address by the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson to the Canadian Club of Ottawa, February 10, 1965". Martin interviews, May 1976. Confidential sources.
- 15 *Ibid.*, 65/7. "Canada and the Atlantic Community," Cleveland 4 March 1965. See also Alan Harvey, "Canada Prefers Talks held within NATO," *The Globe and Mail*, 16 December 1964.
- 16 The British had their own reasons - the need to be included in the special category - for supporting those initiatives. See Harold Wilson, *A Personal Record: The Labour Government* (Boston: Little Brown, 1971), 50-1; and Martin, *So Many Worlds*, 472-3.
- 17 *Commons Debates*, 3 June 1965. For a good account of the reaction, see John Saywell, ed. *Canadian Annual Review for 1965* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966), 238.
- 18 Martin, *So Many Worlds*, 473.
- 19 *The Globe and Mail*, 16 December 1965. External Affairs Papers. See also, Blair Fraser, "NATO: Divided Its Stands," *Maclean's* 65 (5 February 1966): 16, 27, 30; *External Affairs*, 58 (January 1966): 7-10; and Saul Silverman, "Canada and NATO Revision," *Canadian Dimension*, 3 (March 1966): 34-6. This discussion is not mentioned in Martin's memoirs.
- 20 *Canadian Annual Review for 1965*, 286.
- 21 Cohen to Pearson, 2 October 1965. Pearson Papers (National Archives, Ottawa).
- 22 *Commons Debates*, 3-8 February 1966.

- 23 The two memoranda are quoted in Gellner, *Canada in NATO* (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1970) 84-5. The translation here is Gellner's.
- 24 Pearson, *Mike*, 3:265.
- 25 "France, Canada and NATO," External Affairs, *Statements and Speeches* 66/12.
- 26 Especially in Martin's speech to the House on 4 April 1966. *Commons Debates*, 4 August 1966.
- 27 "The Western World in Search of a Vision," 11 June 1966 External Affairs, *Statements and Speeches* 66/27. See also Martin's 1 June 1966 press conference, *Ibid.*, 66/25.
- 28 Abraham Rotstein, "Pearson's Choice," *Canadian Forum* (July 1966), 76; Stephen Clarkson, "Gaulism: Prospect for Canada," *Ibid.*, (June 1966), 52.
- 29 Jerome Davis, *To the NATO Review*, 110; J.L. Granatstein, "How Canada Bombed Out on World War Three," *Quest* (May 1980), 33-34B. Granatstein in this article regrets his call for Canada to get out of NATO and NORAD. With remarkable candour, he declares "Mea culpa, mea maxima culpa."
- 30 Cited in Davis, *Ibid.*, 169. In 1960, 41% had said no.
- 31 R.B. Byers, "Canadian Foreign Policy and Selected Attentive Publics," 8 December 1967 (Prepared for the Dept. of External Affairs), 54. Byers described NATO support by newspapers in the following table (p. 41):

Consistently	Generally or Increasingly	Generally or Increasingly	Consistently
Anti-NATO	Anti-NATO	Pro-NATO	Pro-NATO
L'action Cath.	Edmonton Jnl.	Le Droit	Ottawa Citizen
Montreal Star	Halifax Chr.	Le Soleil	St. John Tele.
	La Presse	Ottawa Journal	Toronto Tele.
	Le Devoir	Montreal Gaz.	Winnipeg Free Pr.
	Globe & Mail	Regina Ldr. Pst.	
	Toronto Star	Windsor Star	
	Vancouver Sun		

Note: Those in the "Generally or Increasingly Pro-NATO" or "Consistently pro-NATO" did favour a reassessment of NATO. There were no satisfactory Canadian Institute of Public Opinion polls on NATO during this period.

- 32 On Gordon's doubts, see Walter Gordon, *A Political Memoir* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977), 242, 286.
- 33 Martin, *So Many Worlds*, 474-5. Interview with Josef Luns, February 1984.
- 34 Paul Martin, *At the Right Hand* (draft manuscript) and *So Many Worlds*, 476ff.; *The Globe and Mail* 10-11 June 1966; C.I.I.A. *Monthly Report on External Relations* v, Nos. 7-8 (June 1966), 69-72; *Canadian Annual Review for 1966*, 224-5.
- 35 For a full discussion of the Canadian position, see Martin, *So Many Worlds*, 476-8. On NATO renewal, see Davis, *To the NATO Review*, chs. VII-VIII; Buteux, *Politics of Nuclear Consultation in NATO*; and Francis Beer, *Integration and Disintegration in NATO* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1969). Other nations were also having NATO problems, even Belgium to which the Council was moving. See Paul-Henri Spaak, *The Continuing Battle: Memoirs of a European* (Boston: Little Brown, 1971), 492-5.
- 36 Maxwell Cohen, "A Middle Power that is Guided by its Tensions," *The Globe and Mail*, 29 April 1967.
- 37 This conclusion is based upon numerous interviews with several, but not all, of Gordon's colleagues. For Gordon's own views on his position, see his *A Political Memoir*, ch. 15. Of course Gordon did have cabinet friends, such as Judy LaMarsh, but Miss LaMarsh in her book on the period complains that "Walter" was wrongly ignored by Pearson who relied "on the old-style politicians." Judy LaMarsh, *Memoirs of a Bird in a Gilded Cage* (Toronto: Pocketbook edition, 1970), 65, 67-8, and *passim*. Also, Peter Stursberg, *Lester Pearson and the American Dilemma* (Toronto: Doubleday, 1980).

- 38 C.I.I.A. *Monthly Report on External Affairs*, 6, No. 5 (May 1967), 65. Gordon, *Memoirs*, 285-6.
- 39 Gordon, *Memoirs*, 284.
- 40 *Ibid.*, 286-7. Martin, *So Many Worlds*, 480. Confidential sources.
- 41 Confidential sources.
- 42 See "Contributions to International Peace and Development," External Affairs, *Statements and Speeches* 67/27, 25 August 1967; and "Canada and Collective Security," *ibid.* 67/35, 13 November 1967; and *Canadian Annual Review for 1967*, 267-8.
- 43 These agreements were eventually approved by the NATO defence planning group.
- 44 See the interviews in chapter 12 of Peter Stursberg, *Lester Pearson and the American Dilemma*.
- 45 See Davis, *To the NATO Review*, 215.
- 46 Peyton Lyon. *NATO as a Diplomatic Instrument* (Toronto: Atlantic Council of Canada, 1970), 33.
- 47 Byers shows that "peacekeeping" and a stronger aid policy were then thought to be good alternatives. See Canadian Foreign Policy, Part 3. Canadian support for NATO as measured by public opinion polls returned to high levels in the 1980s. See David Cox and Mary Taylor, eds., *A Guide to Canadian Policies on Arms Control, Disarmament, Defence and Conflict Resolution, 1986-7* (Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, 1987).

II

NATO in a Changing World: the Canadian Perspective

Canadian Military Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany*

David S. Sorenson

In NATO matters Canada is sometimes referred to as “the odd man out” – a description which indicates the distinction that Canada holds with respect to other NATO powers. Canada is one of only two North American nations in NATO, and yet as a mid-sized nation it makes a relatively small contribution to the overall size of NATO forces, particularly in the critical central region of Europe. The Canadian role in NATO, moreover, has been the subject of considerable debate and criticism both from within Canada and from other NATO allies. Consequently, Canadian participation in NATO in general, and in Germany in particular, has been buffeted about by controversy, as several contributions to this volume attest. In this chapter the background and present postures and roles of Canadian forces in the Federal Republic of Germany will be examined, and proposals for changing and maintaining the roles of this force will be considered.

Canadian Forces in Germany – The Background

Canada entered the post-World War II world with a certain amount of ambivalence – concerned with the rising power of the USSR, yet reluctant to enter into international commitments.¹ This ambivalence was reflected by Prime Minister Mackenzie King’s speech in 1948 calling for an Atlantic defence pact while choosing not to participate in the Berlin airlift in the same year.² Canada was probably also influenced by the greater role the U.S. was playing – after all, Canadian interests had been tied to U.S. interests since the Ogdensburg Agreement and the Permanent Joint Board on Defence of 1940.³

So in 1949 Canada ratified the NATO Treaty, and in November 1951 the first 1500 Canadian troops arrived in Europe.⁴ Canada has remained committed to NATO since that time, and its initial effort was demonstrated by a 2 1/2 fold increase in military manpower, a defence budget increase of almost five-fold during the 1950-1953 period. The official justification was given in the 1964 *White Paper on Defence*:

... Communist countries can be expected to continue to promote expansionist aims by measures short of all-out war. ... This does not mean that the Canadian government considers a genuine relaxation in international affairs impossible ... there are trends within the U.S.S.R. and other Eastern European countries which give different and potentially more lasting motives for detente and accommodation with the non-communist world. ... It would, however, be naïve not to recognize that many Communist leaders frankly regard the policy of detente as essentially tactical and designed to buy time.⁵

During this time Canada sent one brigade group of approximately 6000 troops to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), and one air division (roughly 2000 troops) was stationed in France and Germany, with 8 squadrons total. The Canadian NATO buildup reached its peak in conventional forces by 1954, with around 12 squadrons of aircraft in France under U.S. Air Force command, and infantry forces of about 1/3 division in association with the United Kingdom's forces in Germany.

Canadian conventional force levels in Europe leveled off during the early 1950's – this was, after all, the time of the "New Look" of the Eisenhower Administration, where nuclear weapons picked up the slack brought about by NATO's collective failure to meet the 1952 Lisbon goals of 90 divisions. It was during this time period that Canada tended more to accept and follow American leadership than is the case now with respect to the size and quality of Canadian forces.⁶ It was also a time when the addition of the Federal Republic of Germany to NATO in 1955 placed German military units into alliance totals and thus allowed other members to keep their forces at either constant or reduced levels.

France's withdrawal from the NATO military command in 1966 served as a stimulus for debate on NATO in Canada, as it further called into question the value of the Canadian role in Europe. After all, why should Canadian forces remain in Europe when one of the major European powers pulls out? The French departure also brought about a shift of Canadian forces in France to the Federal Republic of Germany.

Other developments followed, sometimes in contradictory directions. NATO published the Harmel Report in 1968, which continued to endorse deterrence of Soviet military power, yet gave new emphasis to East/West detente as a major goal for NATO. Yet the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in same year renewed fears in Canada and elsewhere of the ongoing military dangers in Europe.⁷ But despite these fears, a year later the Trudeau government reduced the Canadian forces to one-half of their previous strength. The stated reasons for this reduction in force vary slightly. The 1971 *White Paper on Defence* suggested that the reduction was related to a change from the initial purpose for placing those forces in Germany in the first place, as a "quick

fix" for the inability of war-weakened western European nations to defend themselves against the Soviet Union. But, the 1971 *White Paper* argued, "The European members of NATO are now able to assume a greater share of the collective Alliance defence, particularly with respect to their own continent."⁸ On the other hand, a later report issued by the Canadian Senate claimed that reductions to the Canadian force in Germany were due to the Trudeau government's "relatively optimistic view on East-West relations rather than any visible reduction in the Soviet military threat to Europe."⁹ The Trudeau government has since been criticized for that reduction, by Canadians who argued that it reduced Canadian political influence in Europe, and by other NATO allies who complained that Canada was not carrying its fair share of the NATO burden. It is useful to remember, though, that "optimistic" views of East-West relations were beginning to develop in the Federal Republic itself under the "Ostpolitik" rubric, and that such views would later form the basis for American rationale for the "detente" period of the 1970's.

Canadian Military Force Today

Today Canada is served by a military force of 84,600 active personnel and primary reserve forces numbering 23,700, supported by a defence budget of \$C11.20 billion (US\$ 8.83 billion) for fiscal 1988-1989. The force is expected to grow to 90,000 actives and 40,000 total reservists by 1990.¹⁰ The portion of this force in the Federal Republic of Germany presently consists of one mechanized brigade group, presently at 4,400 and assigned to the Central Army Group (CENTAG) within the NATO command. The force is equipped with 77 Leopard I main battle tanks, 349 armoured personnel carriers, 26 M-109 155mm howitzers, and 44 TOW anti-tank missiles. Also stationed in Germany is an air division, consisting of 2,700 personnel operating 3 fighter squadrons with 34 CF-18 fighter/interceptors and 5 small transport aircraft.¹¹ 13 helicopters are also in service. The force is stationed at Lahr and Baden-Soellingen in the Black Forest region of southwestern Germany, located as follows:

Table 1

Location of Canadian Forces in Germany

LAHR	BADEN-SOELLINGEN
HQ Canadian Forces Europe	421th Tactical Fighter Squadron
HQ Canadian Air Group	439th Tactical Fighter Squadron
HQ 4 Canadian Mech Brg. Grp.	441th Tactical Fighter Squadron
444th Tactical Helicopter Sqd.	

Source: U. S. World Military and Government Installation Director Service, Page 5-H-9

The cost of this force to Canada is roughly \$1 billion Canadian annually, about 10 percent of the total military budget and approximately .23 percent of Canadian gross domestic product.¹² The percentage of Canadian defence spending devoted to NATO is considerably smaller than for the U.S., which has been estimated to be as high as 40 percent of the total U.S. defence budget.

The Canadian contribution to total NATO forces is unarguably small compared to a number of other NATO members, relative to population. For example, Great Britain, with a population of around 56 million, stations over 55,000 troops in the Army of the Rhine, while Canada, with a population of slightly less than half that of Britain (around 25 million), has a force in Germany about one/seventeenth of that of Britain.¹³ In 1986 the Canadian defence-to-GNP ratio (one measure of defence burden) was below 10 NATO nations, tied with two others, and greater than only two NATO members. Another measure of burden, defence spending per capita, shows Canada ranking sixth among NATO nations. Canada also today bears 6.4 percent of NATO infrastructure costs for 1985-1990 – a portion which ranks Canada fifth among NATO members bearing a share of such costs.¹⁴ It is worth noting, though, that Canada was one of only four NATO nations to meet the 1978 agreement to sustain a three percent annual defence growth rate for ten years.¹⁵

The multitude of missions for Canadian forces in Germany seems to compare with the larger Canadian military problem – there are too many missions and not enough forces or resources to perform all of them effectively. In addition to Canada's European commitment, it must protect the world's longest seacoast and second largest national territory. Resources will only become scarcer, as evidenced by the latest defence budget cutbacks, which will trim around \$2 billion over the coming five years. Included in the cutback package was the cancellation of 10-12 nuclear-powered submarines, 6 maritime patrol aircraft and, particularly important for the NATO commitment, 13-28 CF-18 aircraft.¹⁶

Herein lies the dilemma that has faced both Canadian and NATO decision-makers for some time now; how to respond to both internal and external criticism of the Canadian role in NATO Germany in the face of serious constraints on military resources. Such a response, of course, will be affected by the expectations that Canada attaches to their presence in Germany.

Reasons for the Canadian Military Presence in Germany

To this point there is no suggestion that Canadian forces make anything more than a very marginal contribution to NATO missions. Surely, if deterrence is one of those missions, it is hard to argue that Canadian forces in Germany prevent the Soviets from attempting to change the European status quo. Of course that point can be made about the contribution of most European nations as well, but the more important point is that no Canadian is really prepared to make such an argument. In fact, what Canada gets from the force presence in

Germany is influence in NATO in particular, and in Europe in general. The Canadians probably appreciated the special needs that European connections could address in 1949 when they pushed for and got the provisions in Article 2 of the NATO Treaty (known as the "Canadian Article") which connected membership in NATO with economic cooperation between Treaty members.¹⁷ There are, though, questions about how much influence Canada has within NATO. Canada does have a representative on all the important NATO committees (how influential the committees are is another matter), and thus Canada has some say in NATO policy-making. Such influence may be more important for Canada, though, than for NATO. It has been noted, for example, that Canada has agreed with every major NATO policy and thus NATO policy would be no different if Canada were not present.¹⁸ Jockel and Sokolsky have gone so far as to claim that "Canada owes whatever influence it has within NATO to the skills of its diplomats rather than to its military contributions to collective defence."¹⁹ Still, from a Canadian perspective, the presence of even a token force in Germany can be seen as a legitimization of its claim to representation in NATO collective decision-making, and so one option for Canada is to do nothing to change this contribution, however token its contribution to collective defence may be. One Senator stated this case in 1968 in words that are still telling today:

... if Canada wants to maintain more or less its present posture in world affairs and its present relationship with the United States, then it is already at the minimum of what must be done in the military field abroad. On the other hand, we have the alternative of withdrawal, losing whatever influence we may now have, particularly in maintaining a U.S. commitment in Europe and in the process becoming a gigantic Sweden or Iceland in a politic-military sense.²⁰

It might be added that Canada probably lost some influence in European NATO with the formation of the Eurogroup in 1968, and while the Canadians did not formally protest the formation of the group, they have occasionally complained that it not only isolates Canada from European politics, but also forces Canada into a closer relationship with the United States.²¹

The Present Military Contribution to Germany

Canada's role in Germany is markedly different from that of the United States, and the differences go beyond the obvious size and capability comparison. Canadian Forces Europe (CFE) does not link Canada to some greatly larger force commitment in the event of a war, as in the United States' case. In fact, Canada would have a difficult time reinforcing the CFE in wartime, given both its limited air and sealift capacity and the demands elsewhere for that capacity. Canada now maintains a total of 92 transport aircraft, but with the exception of

its 28 "Hercules" and 5 military versions of the Boeing 707, the planes are small and, in some cases, incapable of trans-Atlantic ranges. Of course the Canadian government could requisition some or all of the 54 trans-oceanic civilian transports – in fact two 747 flights a day for a month to Europe could transport over 15,000 persons.²² This of course assumes that a war in Europe would last that long without going nuclear, and, moreover, that a ready force of that size would be available. In 1982, Canadian plans called for a reinforcement of only 2400 troops for the 4CMBG, with the bulk of both manpower and airlift reserved for the Canadian Air-Sea Transportable (CAST) brigade, which was dedicated to the defence of Norway.²³ Now that the CAST commitment has been dropped from the latest White Paper, airlift assignments will change, in part because while Canada is supposed to provide one battalion to northern Norway as a part of NATO combined forces, much of the equipment is to be prepositioned.²⁴ Moreover, the personnel lift capacity potential provided by civilian transports is limited to personnel only – the floors of the aircraft are not strengthened for the heavy cargo requirements of even a small reinforcement.²⁵

Surface transportation is also inadequate for sustained reinforcement and resupply. In 1987 there were only 49 vessels over 5000 deadweight tons registered under the Canadian flag and some 47 others which operate under flags of convenience, though these numbers may be misleading. Peter Haydon states that the number of Canadian vessels "truly involved in deep sea trade is very limited", and noted further that the capacity to enlarge this capacity is limited by a shrinking ship yard capacity, which has declined by around 45 percent since 1982, with a loss of over 7000 jobs.²⁶ Canada will not be able to turn to the United States, either, for new ships, as U.S. shipyard capacity has also declined dramatically.²⁷

The commitment to Germany as it is now structured depends upon the capacity to reinforce a variety of missions (armour, airpower, artillery, etc.), stretching the logistical capacity quickly should war break out – and even the peacetime presence of this force demands complicated preparation.

Should Canada choose to remain committed to a military role in the FRG it might be useful to consider what the alternatives might be, particularly in terms of specialization. There are several choices.

a) Concentration on SLOC Maintainance

Most NATO authorities agree that the task for NATO war preparation is two-fold: to have a force-in-place to respond quickly to a military threat, and to be able to reinforce that force to permit it to sustain combat over a prolonged period – probably a few months at least. NATO reinforcement will have to rely largely on supplies and personnel from the United States as well as from Canada. Should Canada desire a place in the direct defence of the FRG, it might want to concentrate on specializing in protection of the sea lines of

communication (SLOC) that will be vital to NATO in sustaining any protracted conventional combat in Germany. Such a task, though, would be quite expensive given the relative decline in Canadian naval power since World War II.

Without an aircraft carrier capacity, ASW would be limited to the frigate and destroyer force currently available, and that force would most likely in wartime be preoccupied with more pressing requirements. Most urgent would be the need to protect Canada's contiguous ocean areas from submarine penetrations that could threaten both Canada and the United States. The surface force presently consists of 4 DD-280 class destroyers (down from 10 ships ten years ago), 19 frigates of varying age, and 3 old submarines. Even with the 6 new frigates²⁸ this force is not capable of extended operations in blue water areas, because it lacks deep water resupply capacity. Canada could also draw on its submarine force for ASW operations but the force is old and replacements are not forthcoming now that Canada has decided to cancel the planned purchase of 10-12 SSNs.²⁹ Canada probably cannot afford to make a SLOC commitment across the Atlantic and might instead plan to rely on air transportation to resupply her NATO commitment in the event of war.

b) Withdraw the Force from Germany

One of the more recent works on Canadian defence policy concluded with the recommendation that Canadian forces redeploy from Germany altogether. The reasons, of course, are not new, and represent long-standing criticisms of Canada's minuscule force there. But Jockel and Sokolsky, drawing on the criticisms noted above, claim that "... a withdrawal of Canadian forces from West Germany would not result in any significant gaps (in force capacity), for those forces make but an insignificant contribution."³⁰ This argument was also made by Colin Gray more than fifteen years ago, arguing that Canadian forces in Europe as a whole are unnecessary, and that the Canadian Government should phase out both the Central and Northern Flank missions.³¹ Byers does not go this far, but does suggest that *both* the Central Front and Northern Flank tasks should be consolidated into one task, though he seems to favor the Central Front over the CAST-supported northern mission.³²

The argument is a compelling one. Canada could pull this force back to Canadian territory to provide more of a homeland defence, concentrating, in part, on areas previously neglected, including the Arctic north and the Pacific. The rising influence of British Columbia has pushed the nation more towards a role as a Pacific player, and forces will be necessary to do this – a fact noted by an Atlantic Council study as early as 1981.³³ This need is more recently reflected by the decline in Pacific-based anti-submarine aircraft from 12 in 1966 to 4 today, and by a total absence of either submarines or surface craft capable of carrying ASW-capable helicopters.³⁴ Canada, moreover, has no counter-mine capacity in the Pacific, nor are there adequate aircraft to perform counter-shipping missions – a role ideal for the CF-18.³⁵ Canadian forces

drawn from Europe (particularly the CF-18 squadrons) could be a part of the solutions to the Pacific weaknesses. The Arctic areas also pose new security requirements, not only from the potential need for increased ASW³⁶ and the need for additional surface patrols to insure Canadian sovereignty claims in passage areas, but also for the likely need to increase air defence capacity against Soviet bombers and long-range advanced cruise missiles. The CF-18 force now in Germany could perhaps be used more efficiently for a homeland anti-bomber, anti-cruise missile force.³⁷ Indeed, as Byers observes, Canada has only 24 CF-18's based in Canada for the direct mission of air defence – another 24 were assigned to the CAST mission and 34 are stationed in Germany.³⁸ The two squadrons once devoted to CAST are now to be allocated to the Central Front mission, which will bolster that area even in the face of CF-18 cutbacks noted above.³⁹

The call for withdrawal from Germany will undoubtedly become even stronger as the political tensions between East and West appear to decline. With the announcement by the Soviets that the "Cold War" is over, with serious discussions underway on both strategic and conventional arms control, and with 85% of the West German population claiming not to feel threatened by a Soviet attack, the underpinnings for the Canadian commitment (and indeed for NATO itself) are clearly weakened.

It seems clear that real and important political changes are taking place between the Soviet Union and the West, and the need for military force as a primary instrument in East-West relations is less obvious, both in the face of reduced tensions, as well as competing economic and financial priorities. It might be noted, though, that the value of Canada's commitment of forces to NATO Europe lies more in whatever influence that commitment brings to Canada than in the limited military capacity that Canadian forces provide, so a reduced military requirement may not be justification to reduce or eliminate the force. This is not to negate the military worth of the CFE, however, even in the face of East-West political changes. The danger of a Soviet Union covetous of Western Europe is no longer taken as serious in most political quarters in the West. But this is not to say that dangers do not remain, though they may be different in kind. Tensions are clearly brewing within the USSR over ethnic and nationalist aspirations, and the breakup of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) may at some point make the West seem threatening as the Soviet Union decays. Gorbachev may not last, though he seems to be an able survivor to this point. Should he be replaced, or should more conservative leaders become more influential, it may not be clear how long Soviet leaders can allow these developments to continue without a return to repressive measures. The possibility of a militarized response that could spread outside the Soviet sphere may be enough to remind Western leaders that prudent military measures to continue in support for deterrence in Europe may continue to be necessary.

c) Increase the Force in Germany

In 1982 a Canadian Senate sub-committee recommended an increase of the force in Germany initially to 7,800 and ultimately to around 10,000, to be accomplished in part by transferring the augmentation force in Canada to Germany.⁴⁰ This would basically restore the force levels to their pre-1969 size. The Senate sub-committee did not consider, however, whether the land forces might be re-integrated into NATO front-line forces, or if they should be retained as a reserve force. If the force remains a reserve unit, then modernization of its equipment might be less important than would be the case if the force should be moved to a position in Europe where action would be almost immediate in the event of war. In the latter case, some rather significant modernization would be required, particularly with respect to the replacement of Canada's old tanks. The obvious problem here is the high cost of doing this. David Cox has suggested that capital expenditures in the order of \$10 billion over the next decade will be required simply to maintain an armoured role for the 4CMBG.⁴¹ Such a figure must, of course, be considered in conjunction with other major Canadian military needs in coming years. The Canadian government has identified a need for 8 to 12 new submarines and 30 to 50 shipborne helicopters⁴² and American Arctic provocations have renewed calls in Canada to modernize its Arctic forces – yet if even one "Polar 8" icebreaker is built, it could cost half a billion dollars.⁴³

These other demands upon Canadian military resources are one limitation on possible increases – and make even more appropriate the related question: what should the size of the increase to Canadian forces be? Presumably enough additional force to be able to sustain casualties and continue in a protracted Central Front battle for some time. If so, then the next question becomes; how many casualties can a military force sustain and be able to continue in battle? Such a question is difficult to answer from the differing historical experiences of armies in war, but one estimate suggests that any combat unit of 5,000 could not stand up for even ten days in a Central Front conventional campaign without total replacement. Moreover, the Canadians, in particular, could lose between 15,000 and 20,000 troops in a month of heavy fighting – thus depleting both the Canadian forces now in Germany and, in addition, all of the reinforcements in Canada that could be conceivably sent to Europe over that month.⁴⁴ Given such a prospect, hypothetical as it may be, a simple enlargement of the Canadian NATO mission might well be an exercise in futility. An alternative is to consider a reconceptualization of the Canadian military role in the Central Front region.

d) Change the Task of the Forces in Germany

Given simply the cost of armour modernization, Canadian front-line forces might be assigned some other tasks more in conjunction with both Canadian economic reality and with changing NATO doctrine. One such task could be

air defence concentration – a role which could integrate Canadian air power around a single objective – and upgraded to include cruise missile defence.

Canada already has, or is getting, excellent equipment for this role, including the CF-18 aircraft, the Oerlikon-Buhle twin 35mm anti-aircraft gun, the Martin-Marietta/Oerlikon ground-based air defence missile system, and the Contraves "skyguard" air defence radar.⁴⁵

The CF-18 is now operated as a dual-purpose aircraft for both air defence and ground attack. The aircraft could, though, be specifically dedicated to an air defence mission, which would not only require simple ammunition procurement, but also put less demand on scarce training time and facilities. Canadian experience in upgrading the CF-18 aircraft for cruise missile defence of the homeland could be put to use in Europe as well. This task has grown ever more important with respect to NATO needs due to the growth of Soviet aviation and missile threats from both cruise and ballistic types. It is presently complicated by the fact that a number of nations have responsibility for it, making coordination very difficult under tight time-urgent conditions. Canadian forces might be given sole responsibility for at least a sector of NATO-defended space commensurate with their abilities instead of having to share the broad task of air defence with other NATO nations. Such an idea would, of course, require reconfiguration of the entire NATO air defence mission, with individual nations becoming responsible for management of the air defence within their own selected areas, and receiving and handing off threats as they pass into and through the defence sectors. This way the coordination management problems would be concentrated more in terms of identification and communication of threat, rather than the additional task of joint fighting operations in a single space. Such a redesign might not only make the overall coordination of NATO missions more effective, but increase the importance of smaller NATO powers like Canada.

To make a specific air defence task possible, Canada would have to bring in more CF-18s, and the recent defence budget decisions will make that difficult. However 45-50 CF-18s in readiness condition and perhaps 10 more to compensate for peacetime losses might make a very effective fighting force in a small sector of NATO sky.

Another task which might be appropriate for Canadian forces would be re-configuration into small, mobile units, along the model that the British have adopted, which emphasizes defence-in-depth, mobility, and penetration of enemy forces.⁴⁶ Such a role, particularly appropriate to a NATO doctrine stressing flexibility and manoeuvre, would be important to such operations as countering the possible threat of Soviet operational manoeuvre groups or smaller "SPETSNAZ" groups trying to accomplish penetration behind NATO prepared defences in the early period of a war. Here emphasis would be on lightly equipped troops whose skills would emphasize speed and counter-surprise over firepower – again consistent with the cost constraints noted

above. Moreover, counter-SPETSNAZ operations would also probably include air defences against infiltration aircraft carrying these units – an important task since it is easier to intercept SPETSNAZ forces while they are still airborne. And because they do not have special aircraft for this purpose, the air defence operations would most likely be against unarmed transports.⁴⁷ Again, Canadian CF-18's combined with ground-based air defence around some likely SPETSNAZ targets is another possible special task appropriate for Canadian forces, as the number of aircraft needed for such a mission would not be that large compared to the air superiority tasks facing NATO forces after a war begins.

Small unit operations might also be effective against the larger Soviet military units crossing into NATO territory. Such units could be harassed by small units which could strike at their choosing on the flanks of a larger force and escape before the victim could respond effectively. Such actions might be especially useful in areas of Europe where mechanized forces might be especially hampered in areas which are probably unsuitable for tank warfare. The Soviets, expected to depend quite heavily on armoured forces, could find themselves quite vulnerable to small unit operations in areas where armour operations are not possible.⁴⁸

There are drawbacks to small unit operations, though, that must be considered. The area of the Central Front might be too small for the manoeuvre space required for small unit operations, where surprise and retreat are integral to tactics.⁴⁹ Such a limit might be less restrictive should Canadian units become specialized around the task of countering the threat posed by Soviet Operational Manoeuvre Groups (OMG's). These are division-sized units which are designed to reconfigure quickly into mobile groups capable of quick penetration of enemy lines and independent operations behind those lines once they are through. It might well be that the best counter to such a mobile group would be another mobile group, which at worse could harass an OMG to try and prevent it from achieving its original mission. All this suggests that NATO in general might benefit in terms of specialization across participating nations. Such specialization might be of particular benefit to nations like Canada, which ordinarily has simply duplicated tasks of the larger members of NATO with a much smaller force level. Even if Canadian personnel strength in Germany is back to around 10,000, this force is still going to appear insignificant unless it is given special and vital tasks.⁵⁰

There could well be concern about such specialization, however. Given NATO's voluntary status, members who may choose to avoid commitment in a conflict may not jeopardize NATO's overall effectiveness if fence-sitters are few in number, small in size, and insignificant in contribution. NATO, in other words, could continue to fight a Central Front war if Canada chooses to forgo commitment of forces. But should Canada become specialized in some military task, its contribution could become more valuable – and other NATO

nations might thus be hesitant to delegate such specialization, since, if the nations responsible for a given role pulls out, the role will much harder to perform. On the other hand, most of NATO's members are industrial nations which maintain similar military forces, and have similar military structures (many tanks, destroyers, fighter aircraft, etc.). This in turn can, and usually does, lead to such problems as duplication of functions to excess, non-standardization of weapons and equipment.⁵¹ As Holst notes, "... economic necessity may force nations of the Atlantic Alliance towards specialization based on comparative advantage and a division of labor. The rising costs and complexity of military equipment create greater interdependence among allies."⁵² In fact, a trend towards specialization may already underway, with a proposals from Britain to create an anti-tank brigade, Spain's proposal to create a helicopter-supported airborne unit, and Belgium's proposal to offer fighter pilot training.⁵³

Should Canada choose to reconfigure its forces in Germany for such a role, decisions would have to be made on the size and capacity of forces. One relatively easy decision to maximize flexibility and mobility would be to abandon the tank operations and thus dispose of the 59 Leopard A-2 medium tanks presently operating in Europe and cancel the order for the 128 Leopard I tanks – with considerable savings.⁵⁴ Canada might also choose to eliminate the obsolete U.S.-made M-113 APCs, a move that would also reduce Canadian fuel and maintenance requirements.⁵⁵ Instead, armoured cars – of which Canada has 810 – would be much more appropriate for such a role. There is also, of course, a cost to such a decision. Since a mobile force would be most useful in the first few days of battle, much more of it would have to be stationed permanently in Europe, unlike the current stationing which depends on reserves being sent to Europe after hostilities break out. They would also have to be put in forward positions close to where a WTO breakthrough might be expected, and if this breakthrough is accomplished by either SPETZNATZ or OMG forces the area of attack is going to be very difficult to predict in advance. This is because such forces do not have to depend on the "normal" corridors of attack (i.e. the North German Plain, the Fulda Gap, etc.) since they do not rely on armour and equipment needing relatively open entrances to their targets. Rather, they can be expected to attack through forests and mountains, using the long border between eastern and western Europe to their advantage to stretch out defending forces. Canadian forces would also have to know the land they fight on better than the attacking forces, to take advantage of geographical features. Such a demand might suggest that West German forces would be better suited for counter-special operations, but, given certain sensitivities in Europe to "special" German forces, a Canadian special forces group might be more politically acceptable, even if it might be less efficient compared to Germans.

A final proposed change in the Canadian role in the FGR is to move the forces out of their present locations to a more strategically important area,

perhaps in northern Germany or, more specifically, to Schleswig-Holstein.⁵⁶ Until recently, this area was short on NATO forces, but now a U.S. brigade has been brought to the northern sector, and the Canadian forces might once again wind up as reserves for the Americans, except with much less warning time. The Canadian CF-18s, though, might play an important area in the Schleswig-Holstein area, in providing both close air support for expected operations against both the North German Plain area and against Denmark. An anti-ship role (one the U.S. Navy designed the U.S. F/A-18s for) would be especially important, given expected Soviet amphibious operations from the Baltic Fleet against northern Germany and Denmark.

Maintain the Present Roles

There is also an argument to be made in favor of no change at all in terms of Canadian forces in Germany. They currently perform a reserve mission for front-line NATO forces – a role that is likely to increase in importance as NATO prepares more for a sustained conventional conflict on the Central Front. The present deployment policy calls for them to reinforce the III and II West German Corps and the V and VII United States Corps in the Central Army Group.⁵⁷ For the German forces, the importance of reserves is articulated clearly by the most recent German *White Paper* of 1985, which states:

A third critical phase of defence is to be expected when during their attack the forces of the Warsaw Pact's second strategic echelon meet the already weakened NATO forces before the arrival of the U.S. reinforcement forces in Central Europe. It will then be necessary to increase the combat power and sustainability of the friendly forces in forward defence, to delay the projection of the enemy forces already in the depth of the area, and thus to weaken them at an early stage.⁵⁸

Of course such a task calls directly for more troops (presumably from the FRG and US) on the front lines. But given that such stationing is seen as provocative, Canadian forces could be moved from their rear areas in the Black Forest and closer to the front, in order to provide some support to front-line forces in the event of attack.

Conclusions

Canada has played a long-term role in her contribution to NATO, albeit at levels lower than most of the other members who contribute forces. The obvious must be recognized – Canada can never raise her military contribution in Germany to levels that will make more than a marginal difference at the most. This is, of course, true of most of the other members of NATO, and will remain so. But even the most marginal contributions can aggregate into something

significant. NATO itself is made up largely of small nations whose power counts only in the aggregate. Each of them receives something from NATO membership in addition to the collective security the Alliance is to provide. Each of them gets some degree of influence in European politics, and while Canada gets no more than any other small nation, her contribution to NATO may count more after 1992. For as other NATO members who are also EEC members close their economic ranks, Canada may be able to preserve some of its access into European markets through its NATO contacts, although nothing is guaranteed.

Canada must, of course, weigh its own national interests first, and it can be argued that a number of those interests outweigh the value of keeping Canadian forces in Germany. But by how much? Clearly, as noted above, there is a growing concern in Canada about territorial defence – against air threats, against submarine threats, and against the possibility of the U.S. continuing what Canadians consider as provocative tests of Canadian sovereignty. Yet it is not clear that these concerns are replacing the concerns that led originally to the Canadian commitment to Germany. With respect to the public preference, Munton has noted that “The Canadian public ... accepted membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Approval in principle has remained more or less consistent for three decades.”⁵⁹ Of course this could change, particularly in the face of the INF Treaty and the real prospects for a real reduction in Soviet conventional forces. If Canadian opinion comes to see this reduction as making conventional war more possible, then questions may be asked about how even improvements to the CFE will render it effective as a partner in the general conventional defence of Western Europe. On the other hand, conventional forces, no matter how small, may become relatively more important in the defence of NATO as the nuclear deterrent becomes progressively less important – rendering Canada’s contribution to the NATO alliance even more important that it has traditionally been.

Finally, it is not easy to link political influence to a military commitment. Is Canada better off as a player in European politics with a force commitment to Germany? One point seems clear, though. Europe has been central to East-West relations since 1945, and is likely to become even more important relative to the decline in perceived importance of the Third World by both superpowers. In this sense, Canada’s voice in European politics may not be large, but the only way it will remain at all is if the forces remain, for Canada has no alternative policy instruments for a European political role.

Endnotes

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- 4 David J. Bercuson, “The Return of the Canadians to Europe: Britannia Rules the Rhine”, *supra*, 67.
- 5 *White Paper on Defence* (Canada: Department of National Defence, March 1964), 11.
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- 7 See, for example, statements made by Members of the Canadian Senate recorded in the Senate Debates of 10 October 1968, (pp. 253-257), 17 October 1968, (p. 313), 17 December 1968, (pp. 782-783), *Debates of the Senate Official Report* (Hansard), 1968-69, 1st Sess., 28th Parliament 17-18 Elizabeth II, v. I.
- 8 *Defence in the 70s White Paper on Defence* (August 1971), 5.
- 9 *Manpower in Canada's Armed Forces* First Report of the Sub-Committee on National Defence of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, January 1982), 11. This point has also been made by Michael E. Sherman, “A Single Service for Canada?” *Adelphi Papers*, No. 39 (July 1967), 1.
- 10 All data on the Canadian military capacity comes from the *Defence and Foreign Affairs Handbook* (1986), 119-120, and *The Military Balance, 1988-1989* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1988), 60-62.
- 11 The CF-18 force stood at 36 until April 1990, when two CF-18s were lost in a midair crash over southwestern Germany.
- 12 David Cox, “Mixed Signals from the North: Canada’s Defence Debate,” *World Policy Journal*, V (Summer 1988), 474.
- 13 Canada’s contribution to NATO expenditures has never exceeded 3% of total NATO expenditures. See “Documentation,” *NATO Review*, XXXIII, no. 6 (December 1985), 30. A more precise measure of this relative contribution is the “extractive burden”, where cost is standardized to account for relative nation sizes. Canada’s “cumulative extractive burden” for 1982 was .33, compared to a NATO mean (without the U.S.) of .41. See Daniel N. Nelson and Joseph Leppgold, “Alliances and Burden-sharing: A NATO-Warsaw Pact Comparison,” *Defense Analysis*, II, no. 3 (1986), 208.
- 14 *The German Contribution to the Common Defense* (Bonn: Press and Information Officer of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1986), 20. This figure may overstate the real value of this contribution since only three NATO nations, the U.S., the FRG and the UK contribute 67% of these costs.
- 15 John R. Oneal and Mark A. Elrod, “NATO Burden Sharing and the Forces of Change,” *International Studies Quarterly*, XXXIII (December 1989), 437.

- 16 David Pugliese, "No Sacred Cows Escape Canadian Defense Budget Ax," *Armed Forces Journal International* (June 1989), 44.
- 17 The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, has more recently restated this argument. See Joe Clark, "Canada and NATO in the 1990's," *NATO Review*, XXXIV, no. 3 (June 1986), 1-6. It is noteworthy that Clark, a member of a party which claimed to be committed on paper to enlarging the Canadian military, does not mention enlarging the Canadian forces in Germany.
- 18 *Defence in the 70s* White Paper on Defence (August 1971), 5. This is not to imply that Canada has not criticized the implementation of NATO policy or complained about the lack of consultation, especially by the U.S.
- 19 Joseph T. Jockel and Joel J. Sokolsky, *Canada and Collective Security: Odd Man Out*. The Washington Papers, XIV, no. 121, (Washington, D.C.: Praeger Special Studies, 1986), 51.
- 20 The Honourable Daniel A. Lang, "North Atlantic Assembly," *Debates of the Senate, Official Report* (Hansard) 1968-1969, 1st. Sess., 28th Parliament 17-18 Elizabeth II, I, 1 October 1968, 163.
- 21 Bernard Burrows and Geoffrey Edwards, *The Defence of Western Europe* (London: Butterworth Scientific, 1982), 47.
- 22 *Military Air Transport* Report of the Special Committee of the Senate on National Defence, (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, February 1986), 7, 40.
- 23 *Manpower in Canada's Armed Forces* First Report of the Subcommittee on National Defence of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, (Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1982), 13.
- 24 Guy Willis and Heinz Schulte, "Will the Maple Leaf Wither?: Canadian Forces Europe," *International Defense Review*, XXII (July 1989), 927.
- 25 Proceedings of the Special Committee of the Senate on National Defence, Senate of Canada, 1st. Sess., 33rd Parliament, 1984-85, 2 May 1985, 2:16.
- 26 Peter Haydon, "Canada, Merchant Shipping, and International Emergencies," *Maritime Affairs Bulletin*, no. 1/89 (Ottawa: The Navy League of Canada, 1989), 9-10.
- 27 "The Relationship Between Price Competition and Mobilization Capability in Naval Shipbuilding and Repair," A Report to the U.S. Congress, Committees on Armed Services on the Industrial Base for Construction, Overhaul, and Repair of Naval Vessels, United States Navy (January 1986); "National Defense Shipyard Study" (NADES), presentation copy, United States Navy, n.d.
- 28 *Canada Today*, VII, no. 3 (1986), 8.
- 29 David Pugliese, "Canada's Modernization Program," *National Defense*, LXXI, no. 426 (March 1987), 37. The cancellation of the submarine purchases was probably facilitated partially by a U.S. agreement to consult with Canada before any further Arctic incursions into Canadian waters, see *Arms Control Today* (May 1989), 24.
- 30 Jockel and Sokolosky, *Op. Cit.*, 9.
- 31 Colin Gray, *Canadian Defence Priorities: A Question of Relevance* (Toronto and Vancouver: Clarke, Irwin, and Co., 1972), 207.
- 32 R.B. Byers, "Canadian Security and Defence: The Legacy and the Challenges," *Adelphi Papers*, no. 214 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Winter 1986), 76-77.
- 33 *U.S. Policy Towards Canada: The Neighbor We Cannot Take for Granted* Report of the Atlantic Council's Working Group on the United States and Canada, (Washington, D.C., July 1981), 25.
- 34 P.J. Taggart, "Canada's Blind Spot," *Proceedings*, U.S. Naval Institute, CXII (March 1987), 145.
- 35 *Ibid.*, 148-149.
- 36 For an analysis of the growing threat posed by Soviet SLBM and cruise missile-carrying submarines in Canada's deep northern waters, see W. Harriet Critchley, "Polar Deployment of Soviet Submarines," *International Journal*, XXXIX, no. 4 (Autumn 1984), 828-865.

- 37 This need has been identified in the publication *Canada's Territorial Air Defense*, Report of the Special Committee of the Senate on National Defence (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, January 1985), 14-15. The problems involved in defending the North American territory against the advanced cruise missile are discussed in David S. Sorenson, "Defending against the Advanced Cruise Missile," in Stephen J. Cimbalá, *Strategic Air Defense* (Wilmington, DE; Scholarly Resources, 1989).
- 38 Byers, *Op. Cit.*, 75.
- 39 *Manpower in Canada's Armed Forces* *Op. Cit.*, 16.
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- 41 David Cox, "Defence Procurement, Defence Budgets and Canada's European Defence Commitments," (unpublished paper, 1983), 18.
- 42 *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 30 June 1986, 45.
- 43 "Canada Rethinks its Defense Posture," *Defense and Foreign Policy*, XIII, no. 11 (November 1985), 14. Several years ago, the U.S. challenged Canadian claims to Arctic sovereignty by sending ships through northern waters that Canada states are hers.
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- 45 Hew Strachan, "Conventional Defence in Europe," *International Journal*, LXI (Winter 1984-85), 31.
- 46 Willis and Schulte, *Op. Cit.*, 929.
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- 49 William P. Mako, *U.S. Ground Forces and the Defense of Central Europe* (Washington, D.C.: The Bookings Institution), 33.
- 50 A similar argument can be made of NATO's other medium and small members.
- 51 The best comprehensive treatment of this problem is Trevor Taylor's *Defence, Technology, and International Integration* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982).
- 52 Johan Jorgen Holst "Lilliputs and Gulliver: Small States in a Great-Power Alliance," in Gregory Flynn (ed.), *NATO's Northern Allies: The National Security Politics of Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway* (London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1985), 267.
- 53 Bruce A. Harris, "Trends in Alliance Conventional Defense Initiatives: Implications for North American and European Security," in David G. Haglund and Joel J. Sokolsky (eds.), *The U.S.-Canada Security Relationship: The Politics Strategy and Technology of Defense* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 59.
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- 55 Robert B. Killebrew, *Conventional Defense and Total Deterrence: Assessing NATO's Strategic Options* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1986), 45.
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The Soviet Navy, the North Atlantic, and Canada

Geoffrey Till

One of the clearest declarations that NATO is a fundamentally maritime organisation comes, rather unexpectedly, in the midst of the 1983 Defence White Paper of the Federal Republic of Germany:

NATO is an alliance of maritime orientation, much more so than seen in the Central European perspective. It is an alliance spanning the North Atlantic. Its leading power, the United States, is both an Atlantic and a Pacific power. Owing to the situation of the North American continent between two oceans, the weight and prestige of the United States depend on its determination and ability to bridge oceans and to protect its overseas allies.

This implies an essential geostrategic disadvantage for the West: Western Europe is separated from the strategic reserves of NATO's leading power, the United States by 6000 kilometers of Atlantic Ocean. *

But European NATO territory as such has also a strongly maritime orientation. West Europe is a heavily broken peninsula-like appendix to the Eurasian land mass, bordering on maritime areas in the North, West and South. In this general topography, numerous individual countries in turn are of peninsular character. In fact, almost all the European NATO countries border on seas, some of them having coastlines of considerable length. A number of these countries are by tradition, sea powers operating and recognized as such worldwide.¹

By the late 1980's it was clear to all that as a maritime alliance NATO was facing a most bewildering constellation of threat. Under President Gorbachev it seemed, the Soviet Union could be transformed into a country that was neither Soviet nor a Union. Eastern Europe was likewise developing in quite unpredictable directions, and amongst the electorates of the Western alliance, there has developed the suspicion that in the future the Soviet bloc may not represent the kind of threat that would justify continued heavy expenditure on defence. This feeling is reinforced by growing economic and demographic pressures on the alliance defence effort.

In this unsettled and unsettling world, more and more experts and politicians have argued that a realistic level of defence effort across the Western alliance will only be sustainable if planners can achieve better value for money. One of the most frequently touted methods of doing this is the notion of more efficient burden-sharing through increased specialisation. If, in a spirit of constructive cooperation, individual NATO countries shed some of their weaker roles in order to concentrate more on their strengths, the argument goes, they would considerably improve their collective defence efficiency.

As far as Canada is concerned, this argument has frequently come to revolve around a recommendation that the maritime dimensions of the country's contribution to NATO security should be given relatively more emphasis. In turn, this argument has focussed attention onto Canada's maritime security requirements, and more particularly, onto what might threaten them. At the head of the list of such threats, even in the era of *glasnost* and *perestroika*, must come the Soviet Navy. It is important then, in any consideration of the future thrust of Canadian defence and Canada's relations with NATO, to consider the influence the Soviet Navy might have on Canadian security. Soviet maritime power, however, cannot be disaggregated. At least to start with, the Soviet Navy and the threat it may pose has to be discussed as a whole. Only then can we turn to its possible consequences for Canadian security, and then, finally, to the question of how Canada might usefully respond.

The Soviet Navy: Situating the Threat

It would be hard to dispute the fact that the rise of the Soviet Navy over the past 25 years or so has been an important development which has helped turn the Soviet Union from a regional superpower into a global one. As a consequence, the sea is more central to Soviet strategy than ever it has been before. But for all that the deficiencies and limitations of Soviet naval power should be remembered too.

The Navy, like the other military services of the Soviet Union, reflects many of the structural and economic weaknesses of the state it helps to protect. Its fortunes will clearly depend on the direction and success of President Gorbachev's reform programme. But on top of this, however, geographic disadvantages bear much more heavily upon the Soviet Navy than they do upon any other of its sister services. The Navy has to maintain and operate four essentially self-contained fleets, not to mention a river flotilla or two, in a way which makes what Mahan called a concentration of naval force difficult. Moreover these fleets have to cope with adverse climatic conditions and difficult access to the high seas.

Perhaps, though, the Navy's biggest problem is its rather low status when compared to that of the other services. Western analysts usually put the Soviet Navy as 5th in the overall pecking order behind, that is, the Strategic Rocket Forces, the Ground Forces, the Aerospace Defence Forces and the Air Forces.

The wisdom of this order of precedence, moreover, would seem to Soviet analysts to be beyond dispute given their military experience since the Revolution. This problem of relative status, is reflected in everything from spending priorities to the positions the senior commanders take on the reviewing podium for parades on Red Square.

In the 1990's, therefore, the Navy will inevitably face great difficulties when it seeks to address the problem of replacing the large number of ships and submarines that by then will be approaching the end of their first-line operational lives. This problem of block obsolescence, paradoxically, is a consequence of the rapid increase of the Soviet fleet in the 1960's. Ship and submarine classes which largely completed in the 1960's would in the normal course of events need to be replaced or at least substantially refitted in the 1990's. A large tonnage falls into this category, including 10 *Kresta I*, *Kynda* and *MOD-Sverdlov* cruisers (and by the end of the decade a further 10 *Kresta-IIs* would be getting rather elderly), 13 *Kashin* destroyers, 38 *Kanin*, *Kildin* and *Kotlin* destroyers and the 20 *Krivak* frigates would be well past their best. The submarine situation is still worse, and would include 19 *Yankee Is*, 8 *Hotel IIs*, 20 *Golfs*, 17 *Charlies*, 34 *Echos*, 16 *Juliet*, 13 *November* and any of the very large number of *Whiskeys* and *Foxtrots* that survive that long. The replacement process of course would be well under way by now.

The problem for the Soviet Navy is exacerbated by the fact that the relentless march of naval technology, has made ships and submarines much larger, much more capable, and therefore much more expensive than their predecessors. A size comparison of fairly comparable warships of the 1960's and 1980's makes the point quite well:

Table 1
Comparison of Soviet Warships in 1960's and 1980's

Heavy Cruiser	<i>Sverdlov</i>	17,000 tons	(full load)
	<i>Kirov</i>	27,000	"
Cruisers	<i>Kresta I</i>	7,500	"
	<i>Slava</i>	12,500	"
Destroyers	<i>Kashin</i>	4,750	"
	<i>Udaloy</i>	8,000	"
Frigates	<i>Riga</i>	1,320	"
	<i>Krivak</i>	3,800	" ²

Even though there is likely to be growing pressure on the American defence budget in coming years with consequential cuts in the growth rates of the US Navy planned by President Reagan and the late Secretary of the US Navy, John Lehman, Soviet sailors of the 1990's will be facing an even more hostile operational environment than they do now.³ The United States is fundamentally a much more maritime nation than the Soviet Union, and when it chooses to bend its formidable organisational and technological talents in that direction, the likely result must seem depressing to Soviet admirals.

Taking the Soviet Navy Seriously

This brief review of the problems faced by Soviet naval leaders should not, however, obscure the extent to which the Soviet Navy needs to be taken seriously by those whose interests it might possibly threaten, particularly in the North Atlantic area. There are four reasons why this is so. We will look at each of them in turn.

Firstly, the Soviet Navy needs to be treated with respect, paradoxically because NATO is in essence a maritime alliance. Seapower was often represented by advocates such as Mahan and Corbett as a source of strength, and so, in many ways, it is. But it is also a source of great vulnerability, in that it implies high dependence, for example, on sea transport which could be gravely disputed by the much smaller sea denial forces of a landpower adversary. A glance at the disproportion between the Allies' efforts to defend their shipping in World War II and the Germans' efforts to attack it proves the point at least historically.

Like it or not, the NATO nations are fundamentally dependent on the sea, and this makes them acutely vulnerable even to inferior forces at sea. In a more general way, NATO is an alliance joined by the sea, and the alliance's inability to control that sea would lead to its ultimate fragmentation. Should that happen, Canada could very well become the meat in the superpowers' sandwich. It is therefore in the fundamental strategic interest of Canada to do all it can to service NATO's maritime connections.

Secondly, the Soviet Navy is the navy of a Superpower. While the Navy has a lower status than the other services in the military hierarchy, it still commands support in terms of the allocation of scarce resources that is very substantial indeed in Western terms. To take just one example, this is reflected in the tremendous infrastructure support warship construction receives from the Ministry of Ship-building. The Soviet Union has about 50 significant ship-yards, 30 of them very large indeed. The submarine-building yard at Severodvinsk on the White Sea, for instance, has a higher output (despite adverse weather conditions) than the rest of the world put together. Moreover, the Soviet Union takes about 70% of the ship-building output of Eastern Europe and Finland.⁴

The effort is reflected in quality as much as in quantity, and this in turn reflects the allocation of a great deal of scientific and technological expertise to the purposes of seapower. Let us take for an example the esoteric business of welding. Every year, for instance, the Soviet Union produces about 7000 naval architects, and about 2000 more at master's level. The accumulation of such expertise in organisations like the 1200 strong Institute of Electric Welding means that in many aspects of welding and the use of constructional materials, the Soviet Union is much better than the West. For example, the Ministry used titanium for the hull of the *Alpha* class of attack submarine, which first appeared in 1972. Being non-magnetic, titanium defeats many sensors and allows the submarine to operate at great depth, but is both expensive and extremely difficult to weld. This expertise has been carried through into the current *Sierra* class of attack submarine, and reflects a state of technology estimated to be at least 10 years in advance of the West's.⁵

Of course, this is not to deny that Soviet naval construction has many weaknesses as well. Its workforce often seems poorly motivated, and administratively chaotic. Significantly the Soviet Navy fares much better when its equipment needs are comparable to those of the other more prestigious services, than when they are not. For instance, it has more problems in uniquely naval areas like shock-hardened pumps, and fixed-wing carrier aircraft than it does for hull-welding techniques (which apply as much to tanks as they do to submarines). This may all help to explain paradoxes that seem strange to Western observers such as the often stark contrast between the constructional welding of Soviet warship hulls (which is usually excellent) and bulkhead welding (which is often not).⁶ This digression into the esoteric world of welding shows both the effort devoted by the Soviet Union to the construction of its fleet and the high level of achievement it is often capable of achieving, despite the Navy's low relatively low status in the Soviet military hierarchy. In the years to come it will be interesting to see how the policies of the Gorbachev regime affect the Navy overall. While on the one hand it may mean fewer resources will be made available, on the other it may mean those resources are better utilized. It is still too soon to predict what will happen to the Soviet Navy (and for that matter to the Soviet Union in general), for the signals are still confused.⁷ But it is worth repeating that the question matters because for all its faults the Soviet Navy is the navy of a superpower.

Thirdly, the Soviet Navy needs to be taken seriously because it is part of a combined arms team. Admiral Chernarvin, currently the Soviet Navy's Commander-in-Chief, put it like this:

"Today ... there is no purely specific realm of warfare. Victory is achieved by the combined efforts of (all branches of the armed forces) which brings about the need to integrate all knowledge of warfare within the framework of a united military science."⁸

The extent to which the Soviet Navy eschews pretensions for the kind of independent action occasionally manifested by the US Navy and instead engages in a kind of group-think with the other services is often interpreted by Western commentators as an indication of fundamental weakness. And so, in some ways, it is. But the fact that the Soviet Navy has to accommodate itself to the realities of the situation, knowing full well that in most particulars it can only hope to be a member of the chorus, rather than the prima donna, is a source of strength as well. The efficiency of their cooperation with equivalent forces in the other services, and the extent to which they can call upon such support, adds a good deal to the intrinsic capacity of Soviet naval forces.

Moreover, it should not be forgotten that in some areas, the Navy *can* entertain some ambitions at being the prima donna such as in the field of nuclear deterrence and/or diplomacy. However, although in these important areas the navy may be the chief performer, it is obviously not the director of proceedings.

The fourth and last reason why the Soviet Navy should be taken seriously is that its growth in capabilities offers Soviet leaders a range of options that they did not have a generation ago. This is not the place for the kind of detailed discussion of Soviet naval priorities available elsewhere,⁹ but most analysts agree that the Soviet Navy's mission structure looks, to us if not to them, something like this:

Table II

Structure of Soviet Naval Mission Structure

	Fleet V Fleet	Sea Dominance Homeland Defence Strategic Defence
War Tasks		
	Fleet V Shore	Strategic Strike Operations V Shore Maritime Interdiction
Peace Tasks		General Deterrence Naval Diplomacy Local War

Soviet naval thinkers tend to divide naval missions between peace and wartime tasks, although the division between the two is nothing as clear cut as is generally the case in Western formulations of this type. They further divide their war tasks into two categories; the most important of these is the Fleet v Shore category. Since Soviet writers stress the extent that wars are fought about, and basically won on, land, it follows that it is here that naval power

makes its real contribution to a successful outcome. The Fleet versus Fleet category is important in that it provides the necessary conditions in which the Navy can do this.

To the extent it is achieved, Sea Dominance allows the sea to be used, for Soviet purposes, thereby denying it to Western forces. The other two missions in the Fleet v Fleet category reflect the importance traditionally attached to the defence of Soviet territory from all forms of sea-based attack. Strategic Defence has to do with the defeat of Western forces of strategic strike, namely ballistic missile firing submarines.

The Fleet v Shore category comprises the way in which Soviet naval power can influence the outcome of events on land, respectively by the employment of forces of nuclear strike, by amphibious operations and by the disruption of the enemy's sea-supplies and reinforcements.

When Admiral Gorshkov was Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy he frequently pointed out the advantages that naval power conferred for the furtherance of state interests in times of peace, since such forces were uniquely flexible and mobile, and over the past 20 years or so the Soviet Navy has made substantial efforts in this area. It is pointless to try to derive a notional order of Soviet naval priorities (although the maintenance of strategic nuclear forces at sea is generally regarded as the most vital of the Navy's functions) because these are so dependent on particular circumstances. The real point, moreover, is that the Soviet Union has really for the first time developed a multi-purpose navy capable of a wide variety of tasks.

Soviet Naval Threats to Canadian Security

So far, the focus of the discussion has been on the nature⁸ of the Soviet naval threat to western security interests in general. In some ways, refining the question into an examination of what this general threat might mean for Canada in particular might be thought superfluous since Canadian security is so bound up with that of the NATO alliance generally. Nevertheless it is perhaps worth repeating the point that to the extent Canadians feel the need for collective security with their allies, rather than retreat into a kind of northern fastness of their own, then their strategic interest will be help keep their maritime connections in good order.

Soviet naval activities might threaten this requirement in several ways. Firstly, in peacetime the forward deployment of Soviet naval forces into the North Atlantic must be a cause for concern. In the mid-1980's, the pattern of Soviet naval deployments and exercises showed a noticeable tendency for geographic expansion into waters beyond the Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) gap. In the exercises of 1983-5, significant military activity took place right down to the waters to the South West of Ireland.¹⁰ These exercises reflect an adherence to the same kind of strategic imperatives that has also led the US Navy and its NATO allies to adopt a posture of forward deployment and forward defence at

sea. It suggests a clear Soviet determination for the forward defence of their strategic ballistic missile-firing submarines (SSBN) bastion areas from incoming Western anti-submarine warfare (ASW) forces. It suggests that the Soviet Navy would like to keep ships and submarines that might be carrying cruise-missiles and/or aircraft as far away from Soviet territory and areas where Soviet Ground Forces might be operating (such as Northern Norway) as possible. It suggests, finally, that some of the operation concepts animating the Soviet Ground Forces (such as the benefits derived from surprise and from seizing the operational initiative for example), have at last percolated through to the Navy.

It ought to be pointed out, however, that in more recent years Soviet naval deployments have been a little less forward than they were in the mid-1980's. In 1986, the Soviet Northern Fleet achieved 456 ship-days in the Norwegian Sea, in 1986 207 and in 1987 a mere 114. This was partly compensated for by a higher profile in the Barents Sea. Peaks and troughs in the incidence of ship-days in particular areas are no new phenomenon, and it would be dangerous to assume that the recent decline is irreversible.

The level of Soviet naval activity is a matter of concern even in peacetime because of its political consequences. Soviet thinkers are well aware of the benefits of demonstrated military superiority. Soviet admirals have tended to stress the particular value of the navy for this purpose. Admiral Gorshkov, for example, has pointed out that since navies have extensive reach, mobility, flexibility, high standards of readiness and a general controllability that the other services do not have, they are particularly good at defending state interests overseas. They can engage in a whole diversity of political tasks ranging from courtesy visits at one end of the scale to an evident readiness to fight wars at the other. They can be used as an instrument of friendship to the uncommitted, for the support of allies and for the deterrence of adversaries.

“Demonstrative actions by the fleet in many cases have made it possible to achieve political ends without resorting to armed struggle, merely by putting on pressure with one's own potential might and threatening to start military operations ... Thus the fleet has always been an instrument of the policy of states, an important aid to diplomacy in peacetime.”¹¹

Naval power then is something to be displayed in peacetime, and this may well have played a part in the sudden spate of large naval exercises of 1983-5 in which considerable numbers of surface ships, submarines and aircraft participated. These exercises demonstrated the strength of the Soviet Union's seapower towards all its putative foes and reminded them of some of their own vulnerabilities, not least their apparent susceptibility to sudden surges into the Norwegian sea, and to a campaign of maritime interdiction in this area.

This could have two consequences. At a general level it could contribute to the disaggregation of the alliance. The notion that a large Soviet peacetime presence in the North Atlantic could contribute to the political and strategic decoupling of North America from Europe has been a major concern amongst members of the alliance for well over a decade. It was, for example, pointed out in the 1975 British defence White Paper that an evident Soviet capacity to interfere with the processes of reinforcement would have the same effect

for if the balance of maritime power were to shift so far in favour of the Warsaw Pact that it had an evident ability ... to isolate Europe by sea, the effect on Allied confidence and cohesion would be profound.¹²

This defence of the Atlantic connection requires amongst other things a forward role in Europe's northern waters against the main centre of Soviet naval power, the European support of the all-important US Naval carrier component to the NATO striking fleet and the capacity to defend reinforcement shipping coming across from North America. By these means allies are assured and the possible adversary deterred.

Soviet naval activity could have political consequences at the lower, national level too. Smaller displays of Soviet power at sea are common for example in Scandinavian waters, and some Scandinavians suspect them to be part of a policy intended to alter the political geography of the area by habituating the locals to both the facts and the consequences of clear Soviet military superiority in the region. Such a correlation of force may win for them a *droit de regard* in the policies, for example, of their Scandinavian neighbours or at least a certain deference from them.¹³

The fact that, according to some accounts at least, one regularly used instrument for this kind of diplomacy of pressure has been the substantial Soviet submarine force¹⁴ highlights the issue of the protection of Canada's northern waters from covert intrusion. If Norway and Sweden have been subjected to this kind of illicit activity, is it inconceivable that Canada might too?

But what of wartime threats? While it is of course impossible to separate Canada's maritime interests entirely from those of the alliance, there are several types of Soviet naval threat likely to be of particular interest to Canadians. Firstly, the menace implied by Soviet naval forces operating freely in the North Atlantic would, no doubt, be so considerable that it would justify considerable early efforts being devoted to their removal. But if the patterns of both World Wars are anything to go by, this initial clearance operation could prove difficult, bearing in mind the West's possible initial unreadiness for military operations, the existence of other urgent naval commitments and the intrinsic quality of the Soviet forces in question. The 'sanitisation' of the North Atlantic and Canada's waters generally would not be easy.

Then there is the Soviet threat to the alliance's vital transatlantic shipping in times of war. Although most analysts would concede that Soviet writers in the main still do not accord this mission anything like the attention that their potential victims do, it seems hard to deny that some kind of campaign of maritime interdiction would be launched against NATO's sea lines of communication (SLOCs), at least in a conflict long enough to make that a worthwhile undertaking.

Partly this would reflect Soviet appreciation that this is a very cost-effective way for a smaller navy to proceed. Partly, no doubt, it would reflect the view long supported in the Soviet Ground Forces and Central Staff that, in the event of the failure of the initial Soviet attack to prove decisive, anything which undermines the West's capacity to reinforce and resupply troops in the battle area and to engage in the long war would be as sensible now as it was in the Great Patriotic War. An anti-SLOC campaign would also be a most effective way of distracting Western naval forces away from other areas and from other tasks, both of which could otherwise prove highly prejudicial to Soviet interests. For all these reasons, the Soviet threat to NATO's Atlantic SLOCs needs to be taken seriously.

It is interesting to see the emphasis given this mission in fact appears to be increasing rather than decreasing. Towards the end of the 1970's, the Soviet Union began thinking seriously about the prospects of a long conventional war with the West. However such a situation arose, it would clearly increase the importance of a sustained campaign of maritime interdiction. It is clearly no coincidence that in the early 1980's, the prospect began to attract a good deal more attention in the military journals that hitherto; it certainly figures largely in the remarkable new book by Rear Admiral N.P. V'yunenکو et al.¹⁵ The implications of this for a country like Canada whose strategy depends heavily on its capacity to transport supplies and reinforcements to the continent of Europe is obvious.

Given this constellation of threat to Western and Canadian security interests at sea, what role might Canadian maritime forces play in the defence of collective alliance and its own national interests? Firstly though we should see what assets Canada is likely to have at its disposal.

Canada's Naval Contribution

Canada's maritime forces are not easy to compare with the other navies of the NATO alliance. With a personnel strength of some 14,000 men,¹⁶ the Canadian navy comes about 10th in the NATO list, being slightly smaller than the Dutch navy, and slightly bigger than the Portuguese. But it has 23 major warships (4 Tribal class destroyers and 19 Frigates) and 3 recently souped-up diesel-powered submarines and so is plainly much more than a merely coastal navy, like most of the smaller NATO ones are. Indeed with a complete absence of mine counter-measures (MCM) ships and fast patrol boats, it is as though the

Canadian Navy has at some stage deliberately turned its back on that possibility.

It is a service which has traditionally had its ups and downs. From a trough in 1933, when it was almost scrapped altogether, it steadily expanded through World War II, reaching a peak of some 90,000 men. To the outsider, it looks as though since then it has been the victim of a steady decline, commissioning its last major warship as long ago as 1973. But again to the outsider, it looks as though the sun is beginning to shine again. 12 new frigates are under construction, with more likely to come and the replacement of its air and submarine forces is being actively progressed. Many existing units have been extensively modernized.¹⁷

Problems, however, remain. Even in the present political situation there is likely to continue to be pressure on defence spending, just as there is in the United States and Britain. Moreover the need to retool Canada's industry, in order to cope with the new construction programme has been clearly demonstrated by early difficulties at Saint John's Shipbuilding, with the new frigate programme. Moreover, there is the problem that, although it has a small navy, Canada has three oceans to deal with, the Atlantic, the Arctic and the Pacific. The necessary maintenance of a sizeable proportion of its forces in the Pacific, of course, means that fewer assets are available elsewhere. Most of the small navies of Europe do not have the problem of deciding where to concentrate their naval resources to anything like this extent.

As a result of all these factors, it seems fair to conclude that Canada has a medium-sized navy of greatly improving quality, but a superfluity of potential commitments. In the light of this, what can and should the Canadian navy do to help meet some of the problems posed by the extension of Soviet naval power into the North Atlantic? It seems to me that there are three main issues to address:

a) Collective Defence

Although there has always been some stress in Canadian defence perceptions on the fundamentally national issue of the defence of sovereignty (if necessary against allies as much as against adversaries!), like all the other NATO nations, Canada is perfectly clear that its resources are not such that it can defend itself on its own. From the start, therefore, Canada has been a 'good' member of the Alliance. In many ways, it has deliberately established a rather high level of political visibility for its maritime forces.

Canada commits one warship full-time to the Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT),¹⁸ and participates in NATO's operational exercises off Norway, off Gibraltar and in the Western Atlantic. Its long-range maritime patrol aircraft stage through NATO bases in Iceland, the Azores, the UK and Norway. Canada has a good record in participation in collaborative projects and helps staff major commands such as the Baltic Approaches and

the Northern Command. Its military personnel share in NATO's Command Post exercises and make themselves evident in NATO's staff colleges (not least, I must say, Greenwich).¹⁹ Canada, finally is one of the few countries permanently to maintain forces outside its own borders. Of course one rationale for all this activity is the strictly military one, that it significantly augments NATO's fighting power, and we shall return to this point shortly.

But there is clearly more to it than that in any case, for such efforts as these also do a good deal to increase that sense of common endeavour which is the basic cement of the NATO alliance. Even symbolic deployments could therefore be important if they seem likely to contribute to the deterrence of possible adversaries and the mutual reassurance of allies. The physical expansion of Soviet seapower has, as we have seen, brought with it an increased pressure on the psychological links that bind the NATO nations together, and so there is at least a *prime facie* case that there ought to be more demonstrations of naval togetherness in order simply to counteract this development.

For this reason, and also because of the growth in strategic importance of the Far North there has been talk of creating a new standing force for Northern waters, or at least of deploying STANAVFORLANT more regularly up there.²⁰ Because it adds another significant, non-European, and wholly respectable member to the cast, it would seem rather important for Canada to continue to participate in such visible manifestations of collective defence. More tendentially, the clear interest of the United States in such Forward Operations is generally welcomed within Europe, but there is some anxiety lest this have the appearance of a unilateral American endeavour. For this reason the notion of European and Canadian involvement in such activity is widely supported, even if in many cases that involvement would, in strictly military terms, be largely symbolic.

Many of these arguments could be made as well about the ground and air parts of the Canadian military establishment, but they have a particular salience in the maritime dimension because of the intrinsic significance of its military contribution (a point to be developed shortly) and because such maritime forces make at least as much sense in national terms as they do in alliance ones. Thus the maritime forces Canada maintains to symbolise its commitment to NATO are also of direct and obvious concern to the defence of Canadian national territory. In the recent deliberations about the relative importance of the CAST brigade and Canadian forces in Germany many of these issues were discussed.²¹

b) Sea Control

Although it is probably exaggerating the difference between national and collective interest to put it this way, Canada has a substantial national/collective interest in asserting control in local waters and in the Arctic and a collective/national interest in the North Atlantic. The economic importance of

coastal waters has risen, and so therefore has the need to exercise jurisdiction over them. In Canada's case the necessity to do so is increased by the fact of a degree of competition with the United States, and by the geographic fact of a very wide continental shelf. For this reason, the case for an increase in appropriate jurisdictional maritime forces is strong and there are indeed some modest moves in this direction.

Canada more or less abandoned its capacity to deal with mines in the mid-1960's. Again, there appears to be some momentum building up for the creation of a modest mine counter-measures capacity that could at least unblock Halifax and maybe help keep clear the important Strait of Juan de Fuca in the West. Since Canadian waters are an important terminus of transatlantic shipping routes, keeping them clear of mines is important for the collective, as well as the Canadian national, interest, but given the general shortage of MCM forces in NATO navies it would be unwise for the Canadians to expect much assistance from their allies in this respect. Accordingly, the case for an enhancement of the Canadian MCM effort seems quite strong.

Rather the same arguments apply to the defence of the Canadian Arctic. The Arctic is an increasingly important area for strategic as well as commercial reasons mainly because it looks likely to become a principal deployment area for ballistic and cruise missile-firing submarines, and for those submarines designed to hunt them. All the major navies are developing their capacity for under-ice operation and this means that the Canadian Arctic will increase in importance because submarines can hide there and because it offers access into the whole Arctic area. This is the background against which Canada actively considered the acquisition of anything from 4 to 10 nuclear-powered submarines.²²

Such submarines would most certainly have enhanced Canada's capacity to protect its own north, and allowed it to participate in some of the most demanding and most important aspects of NATO's maritime strategy. At the same time, a force of perhaps half-a-dozen modern SSNs would have been intrinsically a rather significant force. The acquisition of such submarines would clearly have reflected, and indeed determined, a significant enhancement in the perceived importance of the Canadian navy. For the time being, Canada will content itself with 3 modernised and perfectly effective *Oberon* class diesel submarines and is widely supposed to be investigating the possibility of acquiring perhaps up to 8 modern diesels, especially adapted for under-ice operation. Carefully placed minefields would also reduce the level of anticipated threat to Canada's northern borders.

The stress in the operation of Canada's surface ships is largely on ASW, and is therefore often chiefly considered in connection with the direct or indirect defence of transatlantic sea lines of communication, but of course an ASW capacity would be useful in controlling the activity of Soviet submarines more generally. To that extent the modernisation/replacement of Canada's surface

fleet would make an important general contribution to the whole strategic battle for sea control.

However, some qualifications have to be entered against the notion that Canada can make a substantial surface contribution to the battle for sea control in the Atlantic. In the first place, the arena for this battle is likely to be very far away in the Norwegian Sea, and other allies are closer. Secondly, the number of assets Canada is likely to be able to offer up is, relatively speaking, quite small. Thirdly, although it has been modernised, the air defence capacity of some of Canada's older ships could make their forward operation unacceptably hazardous. Finally, the increased Soviet interest in Canada's Pacific area, a function no doubt of the US Navy's construction of a *Trident* base at Bangor and operation of a Carrier Battle Group out of Bremerton, has in turn demanded a bigger slice of Canada's naval assets (currently up to 8 major warships) which reduces the number available in the Atlantic. It is worth making the point that by the year 2000, Canada's 'Pacific Tilt' is likely to lead to about half of its navy being stationed in Western seas.

c) The Protection of Transatlantic Shipping

For political as well as strategic reasons, Canada has always specialised in the protection of shipping going across the Atlantic and this was substantially the Navy's role in World War II, when at some points nearly half of escorts on the main North Atlantic convoys were RCN. But this task has often been a matter of some controversy and remains so. Just as in World War II there was some doubt about the efficiency of the RCN because of training problems and the fact that it was all too often saddled with the 'discarded sweepings' of the British Fleet,²³ so today, there has been much discussion about whether the task is either possible or necessary.²⁴ Much skepticism arose out of a view that attacking NATO's shipping in war would have had a low priority in Moscow, but as we have seen, there are suggestions that the Soviet Navy at any rate is taking the issue more seriously than it used to. Moreover, there is much to be said for the argument that possible negotiated nuclear and conventional force reductions on the Central Front could well increase the relative importance of the safe and timely arrival of reinforcements from across the Atlantic.

Assuming the requirement, the Canadian contribution to the defence of shipping and the general battle against Soviet submarines has tended to be split three ways. Firstly, there is the problem of securing the ocean termini in local waters. We have already addressed the problem of dealing with the mine threat but there is an analogous problem of dealing with submarines operating on the continental shelf and the approaches to ports such as Halifax, St. John's and the Gulf of St. Lawrence. Shallow-water ASW in the Canadian Atlantic area (CANLANT) area could be very difficult, but fortunately the long transit times would tend to reduce the number of Soviet submarines operating in such an

area. Clearing the area altogether would probably be too demanding an aspiration.

Much the same can be said of distant and indirect protection of merchant ships offered by support groups operating in forward positions between the submarine and the routes where their prey is likely to be. The expectation is that modernised Tribal class destroyers would operate as the Command ships of ASW task groups (analogous to forces envisaged in the British and Dutch navies) that would hunt submarines either independently or in conjunction with other NATO formations, mainly in the CANLANT area. Supported by AORs (Operational Support Ships) they would be capable of operations forward of the CANLANT area as well.

Such operations provide a rationale for the frigate and helicopter replacement programmes and enhance the need for effective maritime patrol aircraft, good command-and-control facilities and the towed array sonars for ASW. Even given likely budgetary restraints on the delivery dates of its 12 new City class ASW frigates, and associated packages of air defence frigates and maritime patrol aircraft, there seems no reason to doubt that the Canadian Navy would make an effective contribution to this task, if need be well into the next century.

But however successful the indirect protection of shipping might be either on the continental shelf or by means of independent support groups, there will surely remain a need for the direct protection of shipping through close escort. Some submarines, conventional wisdom asserts, will always get through. Close escort in technological rather than operational terms is not very demanding and, given NATO's perennial shortage of escort ships, provides a useful role with which, say, the old *St. Laurent* frigate class could see out their days.

Canada's ability to provide the necessary sea-lift capacity of course would be much limited by the small size of its merchant fleet, currently less than 100 ships of 5000 tons or more only half of which are Canadian registered and therefore easily controlled. This development has limited the extent of Canada's maritime power but is a phenomenon that is by no means unknown elsewhere in the alliance.

Conclusions

This paper has reviewed Soviet naval activity in the North Atlantic area and derived from this review a number of tasks the navy of Canada either does or could perform both in defence of Canada's own national interest and very often in the collective interest of the Western alliance as well. Although to the outsider the environment looks more benign as far as the navy is concerned than it has done for some time, economic and political realities suggest that any really substantial expansion of the naval role is likely to be at the cost of other Canadian military activity. If this is the case, it will be interesting to see how well Canada's integrated military structure copes with consequent problems in choice and resource-allocation.

Endnotes

Note: The opinions expressed in this paper are the author's own and should not be taken necessarily to reflect official views in the United Kingdom.

- 1 *Defence White Paper of the Federal Republic of Germany* (Bonn, 1983), 40.
- 2 These figures have been derived from such standard reference books as the *Military Balance of the IISS*, relevant editions of Weyer's *Flotten Taschenbuch*, Jane's *Fighting Ships*, etc.
- 3 "Flat Budgets Would Weaken Pentagon CBO Says," *The Washington Post*, 31 March 1989.
- 4 This and the figures which follow have been derived from Boris S. Butman, *Soviet Shipbuilding and Ship Repair - An Overview* (Arlington, Va: Spectrum Associates, 1986).
- 5 "Understanding Soviet Naval Developments," (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Department of the Navy, 1985), 79.
- 6 Butman, Op. Cit.
- 7 "Thatcher Warns that West Must Not Let Its Guard Drop," *The Guardian*, 23 September 1989.
- 8 Adm. V. Chernarvin, "On Naval Theory," *Morskoi Sbornik*, (Moscow, January 1982).
- 9 See B. Ranft and G. Till, *The Sea in Soviet Strategy* (second edition, London: Macmillan, 1989) especially chapter 7. See also Bruce W. and Susan M. Watson, *The Soviet Navy: Strengths and Liabilities* (Boulder, Col: Westview Press, 1986) and Norman Polmar, *Guide to the Soviet Navy* (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1986).
- 10 Robert van Tol, "Soviet Naval Exercises 1983-5," *Naval Forces*, I (1987) is a useful compilation. The Pentagon review of the 1983 exercise is also helpful.
- 11 S.G. Gorshkov, *The Sea Power of the State* (London: Pergamon, 1979), 248.
- 12 Statement on Defence Estimates 1975, Cmnd 5976 (London: HMSO, 1975), 9-10. See also Adm Sir James Eberle, "Defending the Atlantic Connection" in G. Till (ed.), *The Future of British Sea Power* (London: Macmillan, 1984), 146-151.
- 13 For example see Ingemar Dorfer, *Swedish Security Policy Facing the Future* (Stockholm: Swedish Parliamentary Defence Commission, 1984) and "Nordic Security Today in Sweden," *Cooperation and Conflict*, XVII (1982).
- 14 The best account of all this is Milton Leitenberg, *Soviet Submarine Operations in Swedish Waters, 1980-1986* (New York: Praeger, 1987).
- 15 N.P. V'yuneneko, B.N. Makeyev and V.D. Skugarev, *The Navy: Its Role, Prospects for Development and Employment* (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1988).
- 16 See note (2). The personnel figure is based on some 8700 uniformed support personnel being added to the front-line force of 5500. For European comparisons, see my "The Navies of Europe," *Naval Forces*, II (1987).
- 17 See Rear-Ad F.W. Crickard, "3 Oceans - 3 Challenges. The Future of Canada's Maritime Forces," *Naval Forces*, V (1985) and J.A. Rulton, "The Tasks of the Canadian Forces in the Atlantic Area" in *Naval Forces*, IV (1983). See also *Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy For Canada* (Ottawa: National Defence, 1987) and *Defence Update: 1988-89* (Ottawa: National Defence, 1988).
- 18 D.G. Meyer, "NATO's Fleet: A Symbol with Teeth Behind It," *Armed Forces Journal International*, (December 1985).
- 19 Amongst the Canadians in the Royal Naval Staff College at Greenwich is Commander Kim Beardmore, CF, for whose help in the preparation of this chapter I am very grateful.
- 20 See Geoffrey Till (ed.), *Britain and NATO's Northern Flank* (London: Macmillan, 1987), 177.
- 21 For policy on the CAST Brigade see, *Challenge and Commitment* Op. Cit., 61.
- 22 *The Times*, 28th April 1987.
- 23 Marc Milner, "Royal Canadian Participation in the Battle of the Atlantic Crisis of 1943," in James A. Boutillier, (ed.), *RCN in Retrospect* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1982).
- 24 See Geoffrey Till, *Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age* (second edition, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), 192-198.

U.S. Interests and Canadian Defence Policy in the 1990's: New Epoch, New Era; Old Agenda

Joseph T. Jockel

At the end of the December 1989 Malta superpower summit, President Gorbachev proclaimed "that the world leaves one epoch of cold war and enters another epoch." President Bush, for his part, concurred soon thereafter that "We stand at the threshold of a brand-new era of U.S.-Soviet relations," although he pointedly declined to agree that the cold war was over.

In the meantime, the Soviet Empire has been disintegrating, day by astonishing day. Who would have predicted a year or so ago that in 1989 there would be a non-communist government in Poland and free elections scheduled in a Hungary that had renounced communism as its official ideology? Who would have foreseen the crisis in stolid East Germany, precipitated by the hemorrhaging of its population, leading to the absolutely incredible, joyful scenes at the opening of the Berlin Wall and reunification? Who would have expected the swift collapse of the government of Czechoslovakia and the Warsaw Pact's condemnation of its own brutal invasion of that unfortunate country twenty-one years earlier? Who would have expected the Soviet Union to allow all these events to go so far, and most importantly, who can now say with certainty where the limits are to Soviet tolerance of the increasing autonomy of the former Eastern Bloc satellites?

It is hard not to gush with both astonishment and enthusiasm. Moreover, it now borders on the trite to state that a new East-West security constellation now almost certainly will emerge, centering on Europe, where there will be greater stability at far lower levels of armament - unless something goes catastrophically wrong.

What will the impact of these changes be on the U.S.-Canada defence relationship? From the perspective of the U.S., it appears that they will have surprisingly little effect. The U.S.-Canada defence agenda of the 1990's will, in all probability, highly resemble that of the late 1980's. As the noted American savant, Yogi Berra, once put it, "it looks like *deja vu* all over again."

For in the coming decade the U.S. will be interested in eliciting from Canada most of the same defence commitments it has wanted from Ottawa in

the recent past: 1) The U.S. will continue to urge Canada to keep token forces in Germany and will continue to face a Canadian government squirming to reduce or pull back. 2) It will encourage Canada to maintain North American air defence and naval forces not unlike those Canada has deployed for decades, and will attempt to dissuade Ottawa from a repeat of any Arctic naval adventurism. 3) It will nag Canada to keep up its defence spending and be faced in this area with no more success, and probably a lot less, than it has had from Ottawa in the recent past.

The U.S., as it cuts back on its armed forces, may very well enjoy what is being increasingly referred to as a "peace dividend." Canada, with its extremely low defence spending and very small defence effort, has been enjoying its dividend long before peace ever broke out. Accordingly, the U.S. will be interested in attempting, to the extent it can, to dissuade Canada from invoking peace as a justification for shirking the defence tasks that will still be necessary, from the U.S. perspective, in the 1990's. And Canada may find that any further cuts in its already gutted defence establishment would undermine its diplomatic interests and the protection of its sovereignty – even in a promising new era.

Canadian Commitments in Europe

NATO North American and NATO Europe

Ironically, peace in Europe poses a real dilemma for Canadian defence policy. Canada will probably face greater, not less pressure from the U.S. and the other allies to keep its forces in Germany. At the same time the traditional Canadian incentives to do so probably will be stronger than ever. Yet maintaining those forces will be very difficult in the wake of the Mulroney government's 1987 White Paper and the April 1989 defence cuts.

On the surface, it may seem illogical, not to mention hypocritical for the U.S. to exert such pressure on Canada. After all, the U.S. is itself hoping to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union in 1990 for "asymmetrical reductions" that would lead to the swift withdrawal of 30,000 American troops and open the door to still deeper cuts. Nonetheless, the U.S. is not contemplating a complete pull-back of conventional forces from Europe in the 1990's.

The remaining U.S. forces will play a critical role in coupling NATO North America to NATO Europe. The continuing existence of NATO itself as a trans-Atlantic alliance will probably be essential to stability in Europe, for three reasons. First, while the Soviet conventional threat has already declined and can be expected to decline further – even dramatically – the Soviet Union will also continue to dispose within its frontiers over substantial military forces. NATO will constitute the guarantee that the U.S. stands ready to supply whatever re-enforcements, and naval forces necessary to prevent any future Soviet coercion of Europe.

Second, through NATO the U.S. can continue to extend the umbrella of extensive nuclear deterrence over the European members. The emergence of extensive strategic nuclear forces in European hands is in no one's interest.

Third, the age-old NATO role of providing a useful framework for dealing with the German problem will take on far, far greater significance in the 1990's. Indeed, as East-West tensions ease in Europe, this may well become NATO's most important function. The stunning new fact of German reunification not only frightens many in both eastern and western Europe, (not to mention North America) but may pose new challenges to Western European unification. To the extent that the Federal Republic remains fully integrated in the western military alliance, these fears can be mitigated. For this reason the Soviets themselves will probably welcome a continued allied military presence in Western Europe, even if a future conventional forces in Europe agreement leads to the pullback of all Soviet troops to within the frontiers of the Soviet Union itself.

So the American watchwords for at least the early 1990's will be "NATO unity." It was thus no coincidence that President Bush emerged from his December 1989 Brussels meeting, following the Malta summit, with the NATO heads of government, (including Prime Minister Mulroney) saying "What we don't want to do is send the signal of decoupling, the decoupling of the United States and Canada from NATO, particularly at this sensitive time." (emphasis added).

While the U.S. cuts back its forces in Europe, it will, in all probability, urge Canada to join with it in keeping forces on the ground in Germany. In fact, U.S. forces in Europe, as they decrease in numbers, will come to resemble more than ever those of Canada in the roles they play as symbols and tokens of trans-Atlantic commitment and solidarity.

The Canadian government will feel additional incentives to stay in Germany, beyond wanting to contribute to European stability and responding to the urgings of the U.S. and the other allies. Ottawa has always believed, rightly or wrongly, that Canadian Forces Europe (CFE) provide a guarantee that Canada's voice would be heard in NATO councils.¹ The argument that forces on the ground in Germany mean influence in Brussels may resonate in Canada as it has never before. Canadians will want to be fully involved in the coming discussions of European security that may prove to be of even greater significance than those leading to the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949. They will also want to play a role in the political and security regime that emerges from those discussions. As John Halstead, distinguished former Canadian ambassador to NATO and to the Federal Republic recently observed, such a regime

... does not imply the disappearance of alliances. Indeed, the Western Alliance would become an essential *political* instrument under the new regime for the management of East-West relations. It is therefore of vital importance that we also develop a long-term strategy for a new, more reciprocal Western partnership. For it to be reciprocal there needs to be a concerted effort by the U.S.A., on the one hand, and its allies, on the other, to contribute more to each other's interests and needs. Beyond "burden sharing" we should be thinking of "decision sharing."²

Moreover, two European spectres haunt the Department of External Affairs. While one is political and military, and the other economic, the two are related. NATO may at long last reconfigure itself into the "two-pillar" or "dumbbell" alliance, always dreaded in Canada. Under such a configuration the United States would take responsibility for naval, conventional reinforcement and strategic nuclear forces while NATO Europe would provide whatever standing ground forces would be necessary. Canada would truly become odd man out in the North Atlantic area. This would especially be the case if a European defence entity is created or emerges out of the various candidate organizations (including the West European Union, and the NATO EUROGROUP). Decisions would then indeed be shared, but just between NATO Europe and the United States.

Second, the North Atlantic community may fissure into two protectionist trading blocks. Not so long ago, the talk was of "Euro-sclerosis" or even of "Euro-paralysis." Now, the "Europe 1992" project is well underway. With the removal of almost all major internal economic barriers in sight, the European Community will become the largest economy in the world, with a population of 350 million and a combined national income approaching that of the U.S. Most predictions are for fairly robust economic growth.

The North Atlantic region was once bound together by interlocking security and economic interests. "The role of the United States as security guarantor of the Western alliance provides the glue for the political and economic relationship among the Western countries."³ As the importance declines of the security guarantees the U.S. has provided Western Europe through the North Atlantic alliance, that glue will be at least partially dissolved. No doubt this accounts for the sometimes almost wistful remarks emanating from Washington recently about the good/bad old days of Soviet-American bipolarity, which at least provided for predictable assumptions and a large amount of North Atlantic cohesiveness.

Maintaining an open economic international economic system will be a challenging task. North American engagement will be nothing short of critical. While the European Community and Japan "both have an abiding interest in promoting a stable global economy, neither has taken the lead to ensure it."⁴ Obviously the U.S. must, in its own self-interest, bear the bulk of the responsi-

bility. For "while the U.S. no longer has the power to compel its major trading partners to act as it desires, it still is recognized as a leader and its ideas command attention. After all, the U.S. is the world's only superpower in both economic and military affairs."⁵ This is certainly not to imply, though, that the U.S. will not have problems of its own in dampening domestic protectionist pressures.

For Canada, a world trading system based on three protectionist blocks is an especially unhappy prospect. Canadians will want to keep the North Atlantic community as tightly knit as possible, at a time when the Europeans will be looking inward. History, in fact, may give Canada a second chance in attempting to make out of NATO much more than just a military alliance. The 1949 North Atlantic Treaty still bears the mark of the previous Canadian attempt in its "Canadian article" by which the allies pledged themselves to "eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and ... encourage economic collaboration."

Canadian Forces Europe

In short, under these circumstances, Ottawa may very well be tempted to act cautiously and keep Canadian forces in Europe during the 1990's as an enduring token of Canadian commitment. Yet keeping that commitment will be very difficult in the wake of the Mulroney government's 1987 defence White Paper, *Challenge and Commitment*, and more importantly, the draconian cuts in defence spending and programs the government announced in its April 1989 budget. (The budgetary details will be discussed below.)

For roughly two decades, the Canadian involvement in the defence of Europe has been divided between standing forces in Germany and reinforcement commitments to Norway. (This is in addition to Canadian naval forces, which will be considered below.) 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (4CMBG), is located at Canadian Forces Bases Lahr and Baden-Soellingen in southwestern Germany at the edge of the Black Forest, just a few miles from the French border. 4CMBG, a force of about 4400 personnel whose primary equipment is 77 Leopard tanks, is committed to the NATO Central Army Group Commander's tactical reserve. It shares the two bases with 1 Canadian Air Group, consisting of three squadrons of CF-18 aircraft.

The Canadian commitments to the reinforcement of Norway were three-fold: the 5 Groupe-brigade du Canada (5GBC) a force of about 4300 personnel, without heavy armour, was slated for air and sea deployment from Canada to north Norway. Two Canada-based CF-18 squadrons were to be flown over. Finally a battalion-group of about 1200 troops was dedicated to the Allied Mobile Force-Land, which is NATO's fire brigade: a relatively light, multinational, brigade sized, quick reaction unit. AMF-L deployment on the Northern Flank would be intended as a signal to the Soviet Union of allied solidarity and determination to defend the alliance's northern region.

Challenge and Commitment announced a consolidation of Canadian commitments to Europe, favoring Germany at the expense of Norway.⁶ The sole exception was the AMF-L commitment, which was retained. 5GBC's destination was switched from Norway to Germany, where it would join 4CMBG thereby "enabling the Canadian army to field a division-sized force in a crisis. The resulting combat power will be enhanced and made more effective than what could have been achieved by two separately deployed brigades."⁷

Over time, equipment for 5GBC was to be pre-positioned in Germany, additional airlift capability would be acquired, and logistic and medical resources enhanced. A division headquarters was to be established at Lahr for the "two-brigade posture."

To fight in Germany, the Canadian army would need a host of new equipment, including new tactical command, control and communications systems. At the top of the list of necessary equipment, though, are tanks. 5GBC has none; 4CMBG's Leopards are aging. Accordingly, the White Paper promised the acquisition of new main battle tanks for the two brigades, along with the other necessary equipment.

If Canadian reinforcements were indeed sent off in wartime to Norway and Germany, the Canadian army would face a severe personnel shortage. It would be left with very few regular soldiers in Canada to help civilian authorities maintain order, it would lack sufficient numbers of support personnel for combat forces, and it would find it extraordinarily difficult to sustain combat force levels in Europe in the face of battle casualties.⁸ In theory, the army's ranks would be filled by members of the Militia (army reserve). But their numbers are very small. Canada, in fact, is the only NATO country where regular forces outnumber reservists.⁹

Moreover, as a senior army official recently observed, "the Militia is simply not able to produce the necessary reinforcement and sustainment forces, regardless of their earnest desire to do so. This is attributable to the simple reality that over a long period of time Militia training support, equipment, and facilities have been inadequate for their needs."¹⁰

Challenge and Commitment promised to remedy this with a modernization program for the reserves. While all three services would be involved, the army would be the largest beneficiary. Not only was the army reserve to be expanded and re-equipped, but the army itself was to be reorganized according to a hybrid model that it called the "Total Force Concept," whereby reservists and reserve units could be rapidly incorporated into wartime forces.¹¹

Arguing that the two Canada-based CF-18 squadrons constituted "a small force which would be much more effectively employed as part of a concentrated air commitment in those locations where we have already made large investments in survivable support facilities tailored to the unique requirements of the CF-18," the White Paper similarly announced a switching of destinations for the aircraft from Norway to the Canadian bases in southern Germany

where, in a crisis, they would join the three squadrons located there to form a Canadian air division.¹²

The 1989 defence program cuts all but gutted the consolidation program announced in the 1987 White Paper, leaving many to ask, as Prof. Harriet Critchley has put it, "Does Canada have a defence policy?"¹³ The air force and the army were both hit hard. The Mulroney government shocked the air force with its announcement that replacements would not be purchased for CF-18 aircraft lost through normal peacetime attrition. This was to be the case despite the explicit pledge in *Challenge and Commitment* that "We will maintain the strength of our fleet of CF-18 aircraft and arm them effectively."¹⁴

Six CF-18 aircraft of the 138 Canada had in total have already been lost. Several can be expected to be lost every year, at a rate highly dependent on the number of flying hours the air force now extracts from its increasingly scarce inventory. As that inventory wears thinner and thinner, the air force will be obliged within the next several years to curtail the number of squadrons and abandon commitments.¹⁵ As will be discussed below, the air force has inescapable commitments at home to North American air defence, leaving its European roles in jeopardy.

But the 1989 cuts have been nothing short of devastating for the army. The increase in the size of the reserves will be cut back, although the government has not yet released the details. Funds for training and re-equipping the reserves are also to be cut. As the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies assessed the impact of the cuts on the reserves, "The punch-drunk Canadian militia was just beginning to recover from decades of neglect – just in time for a knockout blow. The coming tight fiscal policies may well nickel and dime many units to death."¹⁶

Yet it has been the out and out termination of the plans to re-equip 5GBC that has truly shocked the army. New tanks and a tactical command, control and communication system are *not* to be purchased for it, the government announced in April. Moreover, the tank buy for 4CMBG, while still authorized, has been put "on hold."¹⁷

Having cancelled the purchases necessary for 5GBC, the Mulroney government appeared to be on the verge of the cancellation, as well, of its commitment to Germany as a reinforcement unit. Indeed, the day after the budget announcement, the Chief of the Defence Staff informed the Canadian Armed Forces that "we will not proceed with the establishment of a land division for the central region."¹⁸

Yet, remarkably, the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff was dispatched two weeks later to appear before a Senate committee, where he made the public announcement that 5GBC would remain committed to Germany – despite its lack of armour and equipment, and the earlier statement by the Chief of the Defence Staff, notwithstanding. As the Vice Chief told the committee,

I should mention here that the original, and by the same token, the current plan to field the combined force ..., without new equipment *entails some risk*. However, it was considered that in the present circumstances of negotiations towards Force reductions in Europe, *this risk was acceptable in the short term*. Studies are now being conducted within the Department to examine the consequences of all the budgetary options. These consequences will be discussed, initially among ministers and subsequently with NATO through the usual consultation process (emphasis added).¹⁹

The "cancellation of the cancellation" as it is being called in Ottawa, seems to have been precipitated by the Mulroney Government's unwillingness to admit to a reduction in the Canadian commitment to Germany on the eve of a NATO heads of government meeting which the Prime Minister attended. Moreover, as the Vice Chief's statement indicated, the Government hopes to be able to keep the paper reinforcement brigade commitment on the books long enough to be able to offer it up as a Canadian contribution to conventional force reductions in Europe.

In short, the April defence program cuts point to Canadian cut backs in Europe. Yet, as argued above, Canada will feel strong incentives to remain committed to the defence of Europe. Assuming that the Mulroney Government is not prepared to reverse course and restore the defence budget, it seems to be faced with the following options in Europe:

- 1) Grimace, plead poverty, invoke peace in Europe, and pull out entirely from the defence of both Germany and Norway. While this cannot be excluded as a possibility because of the defence budget crunch, this is an unlikely course for Ottawa to follow, for the reasons cited above.
- 2) Pull out of Germany and concentrate on the reinforcement of Norway. This could also come at a political price. But it makes great military sense, especially as the North American military role in NATO shifts towards providing conventional reinforcements. Moreover, it would allow Canada to argue that it was still playing a significant military role in the alliance, in a European area where it brings special expertise to bear.²⁰ In 1985 defence minister Erik Nielsen quietly proposed to the allies just such a re-alignment and was firmly rebuffed.
- 3) Scrape something together in Germany. In all probability this would entail reducing or abandoning the air commitments as CF-18 attrition takes its toll. The reinforcement commitment of 5GBC is all but certainly doomed. 4CMBG would either be shorn of its armour and turned into a light force, or re-equipped with new tanks. The Department of National Defence has reportedly been exploring the possibility of acquiring U.S. tanks which the U.S. Army may no longer need as it reduces forces in Germany. This is the so-called "cascade" effect.

For its part, the U.S. will probably continue to urge Ottawa to pursue option 3.

North America

Canada's major military tasks at home will remain air defence and anti-submarine warfare. The U.S. will remain vitally interested in both.

North American Air Defence. The United States and the Soviet Union appear very close to reaching a strategic arms reduction treaty (START), which may very well be signed in 1990. Ironically, a successful agreement will probably make North American air defence efforts *more*, not less important. The central focus of the talks has been ballistic missiles, especially the "heavy" Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) which the U.S. has long seen as being especially threatening to its own land-based strategic arsenal. START, according to Paul Nitze, special assistant to the President and Secretary of State on arms control matters, "would require the Soviets to make substantial reductions in their strategic nuclear arms, and would focus reductions on those weapons best suited for conducting a surprise attack: ballistic missiles – in particular, large, fixed, multiple-warhead, land-based missiles."²¹

The effect of an agreement to reduce the number of ICBMs and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) in the arsenals of both countries would probably be to increase the relative importance of bombers and cruise missiles, although limits may be put on the number of long-range cruise missiles. Moreover, as Nitze went on,

In addition to the explicit reduction in Soviet ballistic missile forces, START would provide incentives for the Soviets to move away from ballistic missiles toward slower, less threatening delivery systems, such as bombers. Warheads carried on ballistic missiles would be counted under START using rules that reflected the actual number of warheads deployed on each missile type. In contrast, nuclear bombs and short-range missiles carried on bombers would be discounted, i.e. bombers could count as "1" warhead regardless of how many bombs and missiles a bomber actually carried – thereby providing an incentive to retain bomber forces better suited for a retaliatory rather than a pre-emptive role.²²

An increase in the relative importance of bombers would lend greater impetus to the development by the Soviets of stealth technology, thus, in the words of a Canadian analyst, "giving rise to difficult future questions about the adequacy of U.S. and Canadian surveillance capabilities against stealthy bombers and cruise missiles."²³ Nonetheless, as Nitze's comments indicate, this trend could be at least somewhat dampened by an agreement that placed a premium on bombers carrying gravity bombs and short-range air-launched

cruise missiles (ALCMs) and that created disincentives for carrying long-range ALCMs which could be used in a pre-emptive role.

Sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) pose difficult problems for arms control. The outlook, at the moment, for an agreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union concerning SLCMs is not good. Unhappily, U.S. naval interests and the interests of North American air defence are here at odds. Continental air defence would be simplified by strict numerical and qualitative limitations on Soviet SLCMs. But the U.S. Navy, supported by the Reagan and Bush administrations, places enormous emphasis on the deployment of both anti-ship and land-attack *Tomahawk* SLCMs in its ships. Eventually about 100 U.S. submarines and 100 surface ships will be capable of carrying the nuclear land-attack variant of the *Tomahawk*. Convinced that the U.S. has substantial advantages over the Soviets in deploying SLCMs, the U.S. Navy argues, (in the words of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations) that "the development of SLCMs represents a fundamental change in the nature of naval matters on the order of the advance from sail to steam" and that "the power projection capability represented by U.S. SLCMs is as important to our naval strength as were earlier developments of the aircraft carrier and nuclear submarine."²⁴

The Soviets have been slow to deploy their SS-N-21 land-attack SLCMs, and have sought within the context of the START negotiations to limit U.S. deployments. The U.S. rejected a Soviet proposal to ban all cruise missiles with ranges of over 600 kilometres, which would have required the removal from service of almost all *Tomahawks*.

Verification of SLCM restrictions could be very difficult. The missiles are small. Moreover, there are nuclear and non-nuclear variants of the *Tomahawk*. But the U.S. firmly rejects any inspection regime which would involve an abandonment of the Navy's longstanding policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons on specific ships.²⁵ The U.S. has also not accepted a Soviet proposal for a limit of 400 nuclear SLCMs, arguing that short of on board inspection (which is unacceptable to the U.S.), there is no adequate means of verification.²⁶

President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed at their December 1987 meeting in Washington to seek a mutually acceptable solution to the SLCM issue, *outside* the numerical limits the two sides are negotiating in the START talks on offensive delivery systems and warheads. This holds out the prospect of the SLCM issue remaining intractable, and of a final START accord that does not apply any restrictions on SLCMs. If such an accord ever materializes, "the Soviets might come to see that SLCMs could provide them with a substantial new strategic nuclear capability. If the agreement, for example, did little more than require the two sides to declare their intentions with regard to deployments, the Soviets would be tempted to put their current SLCM programs to use, especially in missions against North America that

would force the United States and Canada to face up to weaknesses in the continental air defence system."²⁷

That system is currently being modernized, as provided for in a 1985 agreement between the U.S. and Canada. Despite the modernization, it appears to be weak against the *current* generation of Soviet ALCMs and SLCMs and may prove to be unacceptably weak against any "stealthy" air-breathing missiles and bombers that may emerge in the Soviet inventory in the 1990's.

There are two elements to the modest modernization program. The first is to establish and where possible extend outward low and high altitude, ground-based radar coverage around the periphery of the North American continent. The second is to facilitate, also at the continent's perimeters, operations by airborne warning and control aircraft (AWACs) and by U.S. and Canadian fighter aircraft. To provide outward-looking radar coverage aimed at detecting aircraft approaching the continent out of the east, west, northwest and south, the U.S. Air Force has begun a \$2.5 billion program to build four over-the-horizon backscatter (OTH-B) radar systems. OTH-B radar embodies two considerable improvements over the conventional kind: it is capable of all-altitude aircraft detection, thereby overcoming the troubling absence of coverage at low altitudes, and its range is great, from roughly 500 to possibly 2000 nautical miles in a broad fan.²⁸ MDNM current radar coverage extends to only about 200-250 standard miles from the radar site.

Each OTH-B system is to consist of a transmitter site and several receiving sites. The transmitter bounces high-frequency radar waves off the ionosphere back towards the surface of the earth. "Reflections" from aircraft bounce "backward" again off the ionosphere and can be detected at the receiving sites, located 50 to 100 n.m. from the transmitter. The first transmit-receive system, with stations located in Maine, became partially operational in 1988. A west coast system is to be based on an Oregon transmitter and receiving stations in northern California. Two other systems are to be built, one in Alaska, and the other somewhere in the northern portion of the continental U.S. providing coverage southward – all pending Congressional approval of funding.

While the OTH-B systems are to be paid for and operated by the U.S., the 1985 air defence modernization agreement provides that stations "with coverage and command and control implications for the North American Air Defence mission in Canada", that is, the eastern and western systems, will be jointly manned by Canadian personnel. Thirty two Canadians, constituting about a fifth of the personnel are to be sent to each of these two stations, with their costs to be borne by the Canadian government.

Unfortunately, the aurora borealis causes disturbances in the ionosphere that preclude a northward-pointing OTH-B system. Coverage in the north, between the fans of the eastern, western, and Alaskan OTH-B systems, is to be provided by the North Warning System (NWS). The NWS, which relies on enhanced, conventional ground-based radar technology, is by and large to be

constructed on the location of the old DEW Line in Alaska and Canada, except that its eastern end will turn down the Baffin Island/Labrador coasts instead of running across southern Greenland as the DEW Line did. It is to consist of 15 minimally attended long-range radars (11 of which will be in Canada) and 39 unattended short-range sites (36 in Canada). The expected C\$1.6 billion capital acquisition costs, and annual operating costs of the NWS are to be shared 60/40 by the U.S. and Canada. Several coastal radars in both southeastern and southwestern Canada will also be necessary to complete peripheral coverage of the continent.

The North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) will also probably have at its disposal eight U.S. AWACS aircraft, co-manned by Canadian personnel. Canada has no AWACS aircraft of its own. In a crisis or during wartime these would play a critical role, for several reasons. The NWS and OTH-B systems are vulnerable to attack and electronic-countermeasures, whereas AWACS is more survivable and incorporates countermeasure resistant technologies.

Doubts persist as to the capabilities of OTH-B technology against cruise missiles, especially against SLCMs whose radar signatures can be obscured by sea-surface clutter. USAF officials have insisted that "OTH-B radars ... will map cruise missiles although not as well as they do aircraft." At minimum they are expected to be "accurate enough where you can vector in an F-15 close enough so that he can take over with his radar and shoot down whatever you have got out there."²⁹ But in the absence of operational experience, USAF officials also admit to a lack of certainty, and worry especially about OTH-B's nighttime abilities against cruise missiles. And a former scientific adviser to the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations warns "that reliable day/night detection of cruise missile targets will, at minimum, require significant technological improvements over the already impressive capabilities of current OTH systems, adding, however, "that even very substantial improvements in OTH technology may not ultimately provide us with the kind of reliable early warning required for high-confidence warning of cruise missile attack."³⁰ The presence of powerful AWACS look-down radars can significantly alleviate this cruise missile detection problem. In addition, with a combination of AWACS and fighter aircraft operating under AWACS control the air defence battle can be pushed outward in order to "go after the platform," that is, attempt to detect and if possible destroy Soviet bombers before the release of ALCMs compounds the problem by multiplying the number of targets, which are themselves more difficult to detect. Air bases located on the east and west coasts of the United States, and in Alaska facilitate AWACS and fighter deployment.

In northern Canada, an interrelated set of problems surrounds both detecting cruise missiles and "going after the platform." First, the NWS is located to the south of several release points for the AS-15, that is, the missile's 3000 mile range would allow bombers, from points to the north of where they would

de detected by NWS radar, to launch AS-15s towards some targets in Canada and the northern U.S. SS-N-21's could similarly be launched from some locations in the Canadian Arctic, while their platforms, Soviet submarines, could not be detected by radar. Second, the technical capability of the NWS fully to detect low-flying cruise missiles is also open to question, and its tracking capability and time are limited. Third, immediately to the south of the NWS, and unlike the case with the projected outward-pointing OTH-B fans in the U.S., there is an enormous "hole" with no ground-based military radar coverage. The long-range radars of the NWS will provide coverage out to 200 nautical miles. Unless AWACS were operating in the region, attacking bombers and cruise missiles could pass swiftly through NWS coverage into the radar "hole," offering limited time to vector a fighter interceptor towards target on the basis of information provided by the NWS.

Fourth, CF-18s have less powerful radars than F-15s, which would have helped compensate for the absence of ground-based radar in the "hole." Finally, the normal CF-18 operating bases in Cold Lake and Bagotville are too far south to permit ground-based aircraft flying immediately out of those locations readily to go after the platform or from those bases to "chase" cruise missiles or bombers detected by the NWS over far northern Canada.

Compensating for these northward weaknesses is an important element of the 1985 agreement. The five Forward Operating Locations (FOLs) being built on the basis of "minimum essential upgrades" at Inuvik, Yellowknife, Rankin Inlet, Iqaluit (Frobisher Bay) in the Northwest Territories and Kuujjuag (Fort Chimo) in Quebec, will permit the emergency northern deployment of CF-18s (and U.S. F-15s). In addition to small airfields, each FOL will include alert hangars and storage for ammunition, fuel and air-to-air missiles. Each will be capable of supporting operations of up to six fighter aircraft and associated personnel for up to 30 days. FOL costs are to be split between the two countries. No armed forces personnel of either country will be permanently stationed at FOLs; nor will aircraft be permanently located there.

From the FOLs, fighter aircraft can attempt immediately to pursue bombers or cruise missiles detected by the NWS just to the north, or optimally in a crisis, they can operate forward, well to the north of the NWS, in conjunction with USAF AWACS operating out of Alaska. The 1985 agreement also provides for the construction of Dispersed Operating Bases (DOBs) for AWACS in Canada. One will be at Bagotville, the other at CFB Edmonton, Alberta, thus not far from Cold Lake. The ability of fighter aircraft to operate northward can be enhanced through in-flight refueling. Arrangements therefore also exist to refuel CF-18s either from the very small numbers of Canadian aircraft capable of being outfitted as tankers or from American tankers. In a crisis, relatively sustained U.S. and Canadian air defence operations could be undertaken as far forward as the North Pole.

If these enhanced efforts at North American air defence prove too porous – especially if “stealthy” cruise missiles enter the Soviet inventory – , the U.S. will encourage Canada to join with it in further enhancement.³¹ The technology which could be put to use is currently being developed under the aegis of the U.S. Air Defense Initiative (ADI) in which Canada is participating.³² ADI's research and development programme centres on surveillance technology, engagement systems, and system architecture. Given the weakness of current radar technology, its self-described “number one priority” is “the development of wide area surveillance systems that can detect carriers at long ranges and track them with sufficient accuracy to allow engagement systems to be employed.”³³ Most prominent among the very-long range candidate technologies are those which are space-based.

The space-based elements would hand-off surveillance and tracking responsibilities to other advanced sensors, although these might very well operate alone if space-based radar is not found feasible and affordable. For long-range operations, ADI is investigating an airborne Advanced Surveillance and Tracking System (ASTS) based on phased-array radar technology which could significantly enhance detection ranges and which would render obsolete AWACS aircraft and the North Warning System. Such phased-array radars are big. One possibility would be to deploy them aboard the frames of very large cargo aircraft, specially equipped with either auxiliary fuel tanks or refueling capability, which would permit extended operations and reliance on remote northern airfields. Another is to deploy them aboard pilotless airships or pilotless aircraft, “drones”, in other words. ADI is also investigating improvements in ground based radars to be used in conjunction with point defences.

To engage attacking bombers and cruise missiles at very long, long, and shorter ranges a host of weapons systems are under research or development. Several new air-to-air missiles with longer ranges, higher speeds, greater accuracies and possibly with multi-kill capabilities could soon be available to replace the ones currently carried in North American air defence aircraft. By the 1990's the aircraft themselves could be replaced with supersonic Advanced Tactical Fighters (ATF) being developed by the USAF, and, by the turn of the century with the National Aerospace Plane, which could permit intercepts at very long distances and hypersonic speeds. An enhanced version of the U.S. Army's Patriot surface-to-air missile could provide point defence in the 1990's, and could thereafter be complemented or replaced by a hypersonic, very long range, (1000-2000 miles) surface or air launched missile. The final element of the research program is devoted to battle management and command, control and communications (BM/C3) systems, in order to tie together the possible surveillance and engagement systems.

A U.S. decision to enhance North American air defence would once again confront Canada with the eternal dilemma: undertake the tasks necessary in Canada itself, or let the U.S. do it, at a cost to Canadian sovereignty. At

minimum, the continuing attrition of CF-18 aircraft will make it difficult for Canada to maintain a full range of air force commitments in North America and Europe. The enhancement of North American air defence would only compound the problem.

A word needs to be said, finally, about the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) or “Star Wars” program to research ballistic missile defence (BMD). Fear of being dragged into SDI has figured prominently in recent Canadian defence debates.³⁴

In launching SDI in 1983 President Reagan asked “What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies.” He therefore called upon the scientific community “to give us the means of rendering ... nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.” Whether defences of such robustness to be, in effect, “leakproof” could ever be developed, while doubtful, remains an open question. But the U.S. faces the more immediate decision in the 1990's whether to deploy not the perfect or near-perfect defence, but a more limited system capable of destroying only a portion of attacking missiles, possibly as a first step towards a more robust system.

At the moment, three alternative systems have emerged as principal candidates for potential deployment by the end of the 1990's.³⁵ It is impossible to predict whether the U.S. will opt for deployment of any of them. However, it is clear that none of the three would require Canadian territory for operation. All would rely on space-based deployments, U.S. territory, and possibly sea-basing. While this will eliminate the greatest Canadian concern, a decision to deploy would inevitably raise questions about the relationship between U.S. ballistic missile defences and Canadian air defence forces in NORAD.

Canadian naval forces

With discussions well underway concerning strategic arms reductions and the reduction of conventional forces in Europe, the next item on the East-West arms control agenda may well be naval forces. Certainly the Canadian government has been pressing the U.S. to agree to such a step.

NATO naval forces, especially those of the U.S., will retain for years, however, the critical roles of keeping the sea lines of communication open between North America and Europe. As the U.S. role in NATO shifts towards providing conventional reinforcements for Europe, this role will be essential. The U.S. Navy will also retain its strategic anti-submarine warfare (ASW) tasks.

The U.S. Navy has rarely been enthusiastic about the development of naval power by America's allies, tending to “consider itself as the sole adversary of the Soviet navy.”³⁶

Nonetheless, there is a long history of fairly close cooperation between the Canadian and American navies; "the overwhelming NATO/Atlantic orientation of the Canadian navy has meshed well with Canada-U.S. bilateral maritime cooperation."³⁷

Canada's commitment of ASW forces to the North Atlantic, (and to a far lesser extent to the Pacific) has tended to free U.S. naval resources for other commitments. Maritime Command (MARCOM) undertakes peacetime surveillance of Soviet submarines, and in wartime would engage in strategic ASW in defence of North America, as well as ASW operations intended to protect the sea lines of communication between North America and NATO Europe. The U.S. Navy has also approved of the traditional Canadian policy of limiting the Canadian navy to smaller, less expensive vessels, namely destroyers and now patrol frigates, while leaving the aircraft carriers and nuclear-powered submarines to the U.S.

Thus the U.S. can be expected to continue to urge Canada to continue building its inventory of City-class patrol frigates for duties in the Atlantic and Pacific, and to acquire several conventionally-powered submarines to replace MARCOM's obsolete Oberon-class boats.

The U.S. government, especially the U.S. Navy, was deeply opposed to the Mulroney Government's plans, announced in *Challenge and Commitment*, to equip MARCOM with ten to twelve nuclear-powered (but, of course, not nuclear-armed) attack submarines (SSNs) capable of Arctic, Atlantic, and Pacific operations. U.S. officials were thus delighted when the acquisition program was cancelled in the April 1989 Canadian defence cuts.³⁸ Pentagon officials doubted Ottawa's cost estimates for the SSNs, as well as MARCOM's ability to operate the boats effectively.³⁹

Above all, though, the U.S. Navy was upset about the potential impact on its own under-ice operations of Canadian SSNs. Few secrets are as closely held by the U.S. defence establishment as the location of U.S. SSNs and SSBNs. Within NATO, there is an extensive system of "water space management" to coordinate peacetime submarine movements. The system is largely operated by the USN, which garners information from allies on the planned movements of their boats and from the bewilderingly extensive, global array of sensors operated by U.S. and allied (including Canadian) forces to detect the movement of Soviet subs. The USN parcels out exceedingly sparing information to its allies concerning U.S. movements, preferring instead to simply guarantee, having heard from them where their submarines are to be, that American boats will not be in the way.

Obliging the U.S. Navy to provide such information was an important motivation behind the Canadian SSN program. As the Department of National Defence explained:

Increasing the number of Canadian submarines will increase the need to coordinate sub-surface waterspace management among NATO countries and to exchange timely information on transits and exercises involving sub-surface vessels. Thus far, Canada has had relatively little influence on NATO waterspace management because we have had so few assets. With the introduction of submarines capable of patrolling the Arctic, Canada will become a full partner under the sea as well as above.⁴⁰

The death of the Canadian SSN program does not necessarily mean that there will be no more conflict between Washington and Ottawa over Arctic naval operations. There is a chance that the Canadian government will pursue in the 1990's the development of air-independent propulsion (AIP) or "hybrid" submarines which could operate in the Arctic.

There are several hybrid technologies under development. Each is intended to allow a conventional submarine to be fitted with an air independent propulsion system, eliminating the need for snorkling and permitting under-ice operations. Hybrids cannot match the speeds and endurance of SSNs, and are thus not suited for open-ocean and distant water operations. However, they are expected to share the quietness of SSKs and thus could be "highly effective operating in or near oceanic straits and other restricted areas where enemy submarines ... might be expected to pass."⁴¹ In other words, if the technology proves to be effective, they could be ideal for operations in the narrow passages of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago.

From the U.S. perspective, the development of such hybrid boats by Canada would be unfortunate. It would be far better for MARCOM (again, from the U.S. perspective) to avoid launching out on the development of Arctic capabilities based on what are still uncertain technologies – and which would re-open the thorny question of Canadian access to information on the passage of U.S. submarines through Canadian Arctic waters. Rather, U.S. and NATO needs would be met if Canada continued to build upon its traditional ASW roles in the Atlantic and the Pacific.

Canadian Defence Spending

It will take money for Canada to continue playing a military role in Europe, maintain (and perhaps enhance) air defence forces and continue to rebuild its navy – all of which the U.S. will probably urge Canada to do in the 1990's. Yet even before the changes in Europe accelerated in late 1989, the Mulroney government backtracked on its pledges to spend the money necessary to rebuild the Canadian armed forces. In *Challenge and Commitment* the government promised to overcome "the results of decades of neglect" with what it called "a long-term solution: a steady, predictable and honest funding program based on consistent political leadership."⁴²

The White Paper thus outlined a fifteen year program to provide the armed forces with the necessary equipment and personnel to fulfill commitments in Canada and in Europe. To pay for this program, the government promised that it would increase defence spending by at least 2 per cent annually, in real terms. Further increases, it admitted, would "be necessary in some years as major projects forecast in this White Paper are introduced."⁴³

So few Canadians or allied officials were expecting the Progressive Conservatives to treat the Canadian Armed Forces more harshly than the Liberals had in the Trudeau years. For this reason, the Mulroney Government's April 1989 budget, in which it attempted to come to grips with the country's fiscal deficit years before the next general election must be held, was a bitter shock to the Canadian defence establishment. The Chief of the Defence Staff, General Paul Manson, loyally put on a brave face, calling for it to be "clearly understood" by the members of the Canadian Armed Forces that they had a "solemn obligation" to join in the attack on the deficit. "The problem is so serious," he went on, "that unless something is done, Canadian society as we know it would be at risk in a few short years. It is clearly in our own interest, and in the interest of Canada's national security, to reduce the enormous budget of debt."⁴⁴

But the armed forces are still reeling from the announcement that planned defence spending would be cut C\$2.74 over the next five years, meaning that there will be no real growth in the defence budget. Indeed, the 1989-90 defence budget of C\$11.3 billion, released at the same time included an increase of 1.2 per cent in nominal terms over the previous year. With inflation running at above 4 per cent in Canada the budget obviously meant a significant cut in purchasing power for the Department of National Defence. According to estimates made by the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, the GDP share of defence spending will soon fall to as low as 1.7 per cent.⁴⁵

Canadian officials have pointed out that U.S. defence spending under the Bush Administration is also set at zero real growth for fiscal 1990 and expected to grow at only 1% and 2% in the following two years. Of course comparisons in growth are irrelevant in the face of the enormous disparities between the two countries in GDP shares devoted to defence.

The U.S. will continue to gently nag Canada in the 1990's to spend more. But U.S. officials have never been under any illusion that they had much leverage over Canada in this area. Moreover, the Mulroney Government can be counted on in the early 1990's to point to the cuts in U.S. defence spending already being implemented, and the impending cuts in the defence budgets of the European allies. Of course, this will overlook the enormous disparities between Canada and its allies in per cent age of GDP devoted to defence that will remain even after the cuts in all the allied countries. Pointing to rates of growth or decrease rather than the measurement that really counts is an old Canadian tactic, perfected by the Trudeau government. So here, too, the Canada-U.S. defence relationship in the 1990's will resemble the relationship of the recent past.

Endnotes

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- 3 David Leyton-Brown and John Gerard Ruggie, "The North American political economy in the global context: an analytical framework," *International Journal* (Winter 1986/87), XLII, no. 1, 7.
- 4 C. Michael Aho and Marc Levinson, "The Economy After Reagan," *Foreign Affairs*, LXVII, no. 2 (Winter 1988/89), 21.
- 5 *Ibid.*, 21.
- 6 Canada, Department of National Defence, *Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada* (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1987).
- 7 *Challenge and Commitment*, 62.
- 8 To meet its wartime commitments, the army estimates it would need 88,000 personnel, whereas it has only about 41,000. Brigadier-General Gordon J. O'Connor (Project Director, Army Structure Implementation, National Defence Headquarters), "Effective Reserves: The Challenge of the Total Force Army," *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, XVIII, no. 5 (April 1989), 19.
- 9 In 1987 the army's regular force personnel strength was 22,500; while the militia strength was 15,500.
- 10 *Ibid.*, 9.
- 11 See *Ibid.*, and Colonel Brian S. MacDonald, "The White Paper, the Army Reserve and Army Reform, 1987-2002," *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, XVII, no. 4, 9.
- 12 *Challenge and Commitment*, 60.
- 13 W. Harriet Critchley, "Does Canada Have a Defence Policy?" *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, XIX, no. 2 (Autumn 1989), 7.
- 14 *Challenge and Commitment*, 56.
- 15 Because of the political sensitivity of the issue, the air force declines to estimate the rate at which it will have to curtail squadron numbers.
- 16 "The 1989 Federal Budget: The Death of Defence?" Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, *Strategic Datalink*, no. 12 (May 1989).
- 17 Unclassified telex, National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa/Chief of the Defence Staff to Canadian Forces, 27 April 1989.
- 18 *Ibid.*
- 19 Notes for VCDS Presentation to the Special Committee of the Senate, 16 May 1989; text courtesy Department of National Defence.
- 20 For arguments in favor of this course of action see Joseph T. Jockel and Joel J. Sokolsky, "Defence White Paper Lives Again," *International Perspectives* (July/August 1989), 5.
- 21 Paul H. Nitze, "The Case for Cutting Strategic Arms," *Washington Post*, 21 June 1988, p. A 19.
- 22 *Ibid.*, p. A 19.
- 23 David Cox, *Trends in Continental Defence: A Canadian Perspective* (Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, 1987), 16.
- 24 Vice Admiral Henry C. Mustin, "The Sea-Launched Cruise Missile: More than a Bargaining Chip," *International Security*, XII, no. 3 (Winter 1988/1989), 184-185.
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Canada, NATO and the Public Mood

Geoffrey Pearson

How much of foreign policy is governed by public opinion? The answer is: probably not much, except in times of crisis or when a new government with different policies takes office. In Parliamentary democracies, however, the liberal belief has always been that the key to change is an enlightened public opinion. The causes of war, it is still argued, were and are classes and governments that stand to profit from war, or believe that the best way to prevent war is "peace through strength", implying large armed forces. The answer, it is said, is a system of collective security that would remove the sovereign right of states to resort to force as and when they pleased. If enough people come to understand this, it will be done. Peace, Kant said, must be established by popular will. It is not a natural order of things.

The peace movements of today represent these views. But they have not had much success. The UN was never able to establish a system of collective security and balance of power or deterrence doctrines still govern policy. Regional security organizations have had little impact in Africa, Latin America or the Middle East. Nuclear weapons have not much altered traditional policies, even though most Americans, for example, believed until recently that there was a one in three chance they would die in a nuclear war, and three quarters of Americans were once claimed to support a mutual freeze on the production of nuclear weapons.¹ On the other hand, the super powers are now negotiating drastic cuts in strategic nuclear weapons and may agree to their eventual abolition. Perhaps governments are beginning to reflect the common sense view that it is wise to be ready to defend oneself if no police force is available to help, but that the use of nuclear weapons is unlikely to ensure survival.

Certainly, there is evidence that Canadians are skeptical that defence against nuclear weapons makes sense. Comparing public opinion polls in the early sixties and the early eighties, one finds that the chief threat to peace had moved from the USSR to the arms race itself. According to a report of November 1986, concern over the dangers of war had been growing since 1980, with the USA and the USSR being blamed about equally; as a result perhaps of this concern, 60% of Canadians wanted Canada to follow a more independent foreign policy.²

These results were confirmed in polls done for the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security in 1987 and 1988.³ When asked about the greatest threat to world peace, over half the respondents pointed to the arms race and to the spread of nuclear weapons, and about a quarter to the situation in the Middle East. Only some five percent agreed that Soviet actions posed the greatest threat, while eleven percent singled out US actions (Mr. Gorbachev was apparently winning the public relations race). In the same vein, respondents by a majority of six to four thought that a nuclear war was most likely to begin by accident rather than by deliberate attack, and over eighty percent thought it unlikely that the Soviet Union would deliberately attack North America in the next ten years. More than two thirds of respondents also thought it unlikely that a nuclear war would happen in any event, no doubt reflecting the optimism of the super-power summits, but about the same number preferred the elimination of all nuclear weapons to the more limited goal of substantial reductions. In general these polls showed that Canadians are "peaceniks" when it comes to disarmament – almost eighty percent agreed that "military force is no longer an appropriate way for countries to pursue their interests" – and inclined to blame the super-powers about equally for proceeding in the opposite direction. In addition, Canadians, like citizens elsewhere, have been growing more concerned about economic and environmental issues in the late 1980's. A recent poll showed that 83% found military threats to be less serious than previously.⁴

Given these attitudes, it is hardly surprising that the respondents rejected by six to four the proposal that Canada spend significantly more on defence, although about the same number said they would spend more if this meant reducing NATO's dependence on nuclear weapons, for which Canadians have a special phobia. In general, the public appears to be satisfied with the governments' current defence policies. A Gallup poll released on September 14, 1989 shows a considerable shift in public attitudes to defence spending; only 23% of the respondents found defence spending too low, compared to 40% in 1985. The proposals made in 1987 to buy new equipment for the armed forces, including nuclear submarines, were greeted with mixed reactions, and when they were withdrawn or postponed for budgetary reasons in 1989 there was little complaint. According to the 1989 poll done by the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security Public Opinion Survey 52% of the respondents opposed the plan to buy nuclear-powered submarines. Opinion was divided equally for and against on the question of the purchase of conventionally powered submarines.⁵

It is perhaps paradoxical that at the same time there is no significant opposition to keeping Canadian forces in Europe at about their present level, as long as this is not perceived as weakening Canada's capacity to do her proper share of the defence of North America. There has been no decline in support since 1987 for the Canadian presence. When respondents were asked what

should happen if an agreement were reached between East and West on reducing conventional forces in Europe, 41% felt that Canadian forces should still be stationed there and 58% were willing to see those forces being used if Western Europe were invaded.⁶ There is a striking regional difference on the issue, however; a Gallup poll released on February 26, 1990 showed that, while support for the Canadian presence was highest in the prairie provinces (at 72%), it was lowest in Quebec (at 34%).

Canadian opinion on these matters is not much different from that of her European allies, if one is to believe the results of similar polls taken in the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany.⁷ Cold war perspectives in all three countries are diminishing, and there is strong support for substantial reductions in the stockpiles of nuclear weapons (although, in the case of the UK, a nuclear weapons power, there is less opposition to the stationing of nuclear weapons on home ground than in the other two, as the Labour Party has discovered). On the other hand, a majority of the public in these countries (and no doubt in all NATO countries) appears to support policies based on the concept that a balance of conventional forces (at the least) is a sensible way to prevent war.

What then is different about the public mood on defence issues in Canada? There is first of all a growing sense of multiple identities, based not only on a three-ocean environment, with the Pacific assuming more importance as East Asia develops strong commercial attractions, but also the impact of immigrants and refugees from around the world who retain close ties with their countries of origin. This lends to Canadian foreign policy a kind of roller coaster quality, as events in one region of the world after another command the attention of significant groups of mostly new Canadians and in consequence compel the government to react. Unlike the European allies, whose natural focus of attention is the future of Europe (both East and West), and unlike the USA, a nation with both global responsibilities and capacities, Canada finds it difficult to set priorities for its foreign relations, or if it does, to keep to them (except in the sense of having "to sleep with an elephant", as Mr. Trudeau put it to the US Congress in 1970). Defence policies in particular tend to lack coherence – commitments in Europe impose quite different requirements than do those for the defence of Canada, or for UN peacekeeping, and are not in addition regarded with any great interest by the many Canadians who do not originally come from Europe. Secondly, and partly in response to the new directions of Soviet foreign policy, there are signs of a new kind of Arctic nationalism. Both opposition Parties have called for de-militarization of the Arctic and oppose the testing of cruise missiles in the North. The Canadian journalist, Gwynne Dyer, did much to stimulate this orientation with a television series in 1986 that questioned the logic of Canada's alliances at a time when the United States seemed bent on regaining a form of strategic superiority. He suggested that Canada look more closely at the neutrality models of

Sweden and Finland, the purpose being "to pry the entire northern hemisphere away from nuclear confrontation and to begin the dismantling of the alliances."⁸ While Canadian officials were not impressed by the analogy, sensitivity to the issue of Canadian sovereignty in the North is widespread. The acquisition of nuclear submarines was defended on such grounds, and while these have been abandoned because of costs the sovereignty issue remains very much alive. Pollution of the environment is an equally sensitive issue and will reinforce the case for de-militarization, and especially for the placing of limits on the deployment of submarines in Arctic waters.

The outcome of the START negotiations is therefore of peculiar importance to Canada, threatened as we are by long-range missile attack rather than by short-range or conventional forms of warfare. If these negotiations appear to be failing because of US reluctance to restrain SDI research or to limit cruise missiles, Canadian opinion is bound to react adversely. Indeed most Canadians would probably prefer to abolish cruise missiles, the testing of which in Canadian airspace is a controversial issue.

On the other hand, nervousness about US policies for continental defence does not extend to Canada's commitment to NATO, which was entered into in 1949 precisely in order to escape the isolationist attitudes which had dominated public opinion in both the USA and Canada in the thirties. A significant majority of Canadians (80%) oppose any reduction of the Canadian role in NATO, according to the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security's poll.⁹ The report of a Parliamentary Committee in 1986 on Canada's international relations concluded that "membership in NATO, per se, was not a major issue. People wanted to use that organization *to best advantage* ..." The future of NATO was in fact not mentioned in the Committee's recommendations, an indication that Canadians regard NATO as a fact of life having little relevance to the more general goals of Canadian foreign policy.¹⁰ As with other issues in Canada, there are regional differences; a Gallup poll released on October 26, 1989 showed that, while 78% of Canadians supported NATO, only 72% of Quebecers did.

It may be concluded that the public mood in Canada is both distracted and hopeful – distracted by looming threats to the natural environment and by rebellion and violence in many countries from which Canadians come, but hopeful that relations between East and West will continue to improve, allowing our powerful neighbour to relax its vigilant oversight of the approaches to North America. But this mood is not really a new phenomenon.

There has always existed a certain ambivalence in Canada about foreign policy priorities. I served on the NATO Secretariat from 1958-61 under the impressive leadership of the Belgian statesman, Paul-Henri Spaak. He used to refer to Canada in private as a kind of North American Yugoslavia and wondered about our loyalties. He had little regard for the sentiments about disarmament voiced by the then Canadian Secretary of State, Mr. Howard Green, at

NATO meetings. At the least, he said, the Yugoslavs understood the importance of strong armed forces.

I explained to him at the time that the Canadian public's approach to world affairs has been governed in the twentieth century by four main factors: a special relationship with the United States; membership in the Commonwealth; the commitment to Atlantic defence, and the possibilities for middle power leadership in the UN. Until the 1960's the second of these factors centered on Canada's relationship with the UK. Having special ties both with the UK and the USA Canadians have always been concerned that these should not conflict. They therefore welcomed NATO not only for what it was, but as a means of furthering unity between the three nations, as they saw it, of the North Atlantic triangle. Moreover, Canadians saw in NATO the beginnings of an Atlantic community which would respond to their deepest aspirations as a new world nation with strong old world ties. They hoped that Canada could call on the old world to redress the balance of the new.¹¹

The fact that Canada is a new nation (relatively speaking) and that the Commonwealth has ceased to mean special ties with the UK so much as special ties with the members of the "new Commonwealth", has also been significant. For Canadians have tended to sympathize instinctively with the new nations; large, undeveloped resources, a small population, a giant as a neighbour, the child of an empire – these factors have given to Canada a national psychology not unlike that of the new countries. Moreover, the latter have often looked to Canada for support, both material and political, and this increases the Canadian sense of "mission" in regard to them. Active missionary and aid programmes of Canada's largest churches have played an important part in increasing the awareness of Canadians of the developing world.

The United Nations has proved to be the forum where Canada can exercise most successfully this role of honest broker between the new nations and the old. With equally good contacts in New Delhi and Washington, London and Lagos, she has aspired to and often achieved the status of the useful go-between. This has in turn affected Canadian attitudes towards NATO. Canadians have felt uncomfortable with the idea that NATO nations must speak with only one voice (particularly when that voice has had the accents of the Cold War). If NATO nations spoke with only one voice on global issues, not only would NATO be the poorer but the advantages which Canada has would be lost.

Given this view of Canada's role, Canadians have traditionally wanted to avoid too close an identification between NATO and the "free world" and have resisted attempts to work out "global" policies in NATO which might compromise Canada's ties with others. The tradition of internationalism in foreign policy is often associated with naivete. Certainly the hopes of 1945 have been disappointed. As Michael Howard has put it, "war has been throughout history a normal way of conducting disputes between political groups".¹² The liberals

of the past were mainly citizens of Western states. They have succeeded in somewhat reducing the element of sovereignty in Western statesmanship, and therefore the disposition to use force to protect national interests. This was the other side of the NATO coin and it remains an attribute of the Alliance. But in general the fiction of national sovereignty continues to dominate international politics. The "peace movement" is right to question this, as well as to stress the need for accommodation with the Soviet Union; only in such circumstances, I believe, can the Western allies give to the tasks of global reconstruction and conciliation the priority which Canadians have felt they deserved.

Endnotes

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- 4 Michael Driedger and Don Munton, "Security, Arms Control and Defence: Public Attitudes in Canada," *The 1989 Canadian Institute for Peace and Security Public Opinion Survey* (Ottawa: The Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, December 1989), 8.
- 5 *Ibid.*, 19.
- 6 *Ibid.*
- 7 See *Peace and Security*, (Winter 1988/89).
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- 10 "Independence and Internationalism," *Report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's International Relations* (1986), 11.
- 11 See Geoffrey Pearson, "The Canadian Attitude to Global Consultation in NATO," (unpublished memorandum, 1960).
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NATO and the Peripheries

Charles F. Doran

A number of issues confront assessment of the role of NATO outside the Central Front. They can perhaps best be analysed in the form of a series of questions. The United States and Canada will respond to these questions concerning the NATO role on the peripheries in different ways. But in the end I believe both Canada and the United States will come to some common conclusions regarding what the principal role should be and how NATO can do that role best.

In the broadest context, the international system is undergoing major transformation from a system that is bipolar in political and military terms, to a system that is more diffuse. These structural changes have affected policy options and responses, and in turn have resulted in other perceived changes in threat capability and in the focus of the threat. Regarding NATO, the broadest issue is what all of these structural, policy, and perceptual changes mean for its short- and long-term policy options.

Some of the structural changes were already apparent in the 1970's, and their implications for Canada-U.S. relations and for NATO, *vis-à-vis* the perception of threat at that time, were argued in "A Dynamic View of U.S. Foreign Policy," an article written for the special issue of *International Journal* devoted to "Superpower Diplomacy" (Summer 1980). Behind such a dynamic analysis lies a concept or theory of international relations known as the "power cycle." Nothing more, nor less, than the state's political development as a major power, involving a variety of leadership functions, the "power cycle" traces *post hoc* a state's changing performance and size relative to other members of the central system over long time periods.

During the 1980's, continued changes on the power cycles of the major powers reinforced that analysis of how structural changes among the Western countries are impacting the operation and strategy of NATO. Whereas aspects of systems change regarding NATO countries were widely noted and even became somewhat commonplace in the analysis of U.S. foreign policy and NATO by the middle of the decade, the nature and the implications of the Soviet power cycle were in general ignored or misinterpreted. At a series of conferences dealing with NATO and/or with North American defence between 1980 and 1987, I argued that the key to understanding and planning the future

of NATO must also rest on the changing structural conditions confronting the Soviet Union and how it is able to meet these "structural crises."

These arguments, developed at length in the paper presented at the conference, have been published elsewhere and will be assumed here. Hence we will devote our full attention here to NATO's response given the current structural setting, and the current policy responses, *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union as well as NATO members. Financial constraints symbolized by the dual deficits and perestroika are driving the superpowers to adjust their economies. Military spending is bound to be affected, but where, and in what ways, is now not certain. Gorbachev's efforts to reinvigorate the Soviet economy have led him to put at risk long-held assumptions about the nature of the society, and have created a sense of hope in the West that the Soviet Union will turn ever more fully towards a benign foreign policy.

But two other possibilities must not be masked by our hopes. On the one hand, if Gorbachev's efforts to revitalize the Soviet economy succeed, it is possible that the Soviet Union may want to express its new-found economic strength via a new adventurism. Alternatively, if Gorbachev's efforts to continue the ascendancy of the Soviet state fail, the system must be prepared to deal with the Soviet response to what I call the "trauma of expectations foregone" – the trauma of sudden change from a rising state to a state entering decline in relative power and, hence, in likely future foreign policy role.

The issues of threat perception, threat capability, and the focus of threat thus become paramount for NATO decision-making. These, then, are the basis for our questions guiding this analysis of NATO and the peripheries.

(1) Our first question is "*Which peripheries?*" Sometimes the notion of "peripheries" is taken to mean the perimeters of NATO along the Northern Flank in the Baltic and the Norwegian Seas on the one hand, and along the Southern Flank involving Greece and Turkey, on the other. This meaning does not suggest that security in these areas is regarded as "peripheral" to that of the Federal Republic of Germany, for example. Instead, the term is used solely to describe certain geographic areas of the alliance that demand individual strategic treatment. But in fact these areas are, and always were, regarded as integral to the alliance as a whole. In the early years of NATO, Greece, for example, was thought of as being more vulnerable than certain other NATO arenas closer to the geographic centre of the alliance. Each member is as vital as any other in an alliance and none should be considered "on the periphery."

A better use of the term periphery in the NATO context, made more compelling by the demise of CENTO and SEATO, is the meaning associated with "outlying areas" or areas that abut or extend outward from the direct line of NATO strategic responsibility. In particular these areas involve countries that extend through the Middle East downwards and eastward along the southern border of the Soviet Union and that touch the shores of the Mediterranean. Some of these concerns involve "problems" for NATO, as does Cyprus,

without involving direct claims on its attention as an organization. By this definition of periphery, the role of NATO may indeed be regarded as subordinate to its region of principal responsibility but still relevant to that responsibility and to the interests of the individual NATO members. It is in these outlying areas where the greatest controversy exists with respect to strategy.

(2) *What is the nature of the threat?* For any military alliance, the definition of commonly perceived external threat is central to its purpose. How large the threat is, and how shared the perceptions are about it, will determine not only the nature of the possible deterrent or defensive response, but also the degree of cohesion among alliance members. The degree of cohesion underpins the credibility and support for a response. The larger, the more heterogeneous, and the less hierarchic a multilateral alliance, the more these norms regarding threat are likely to circumscribe the actions of the alliance.

NATO is large, heterogeneous as to membership, but also quite hierarchic. These mixed characteristics give NATO some considerable flexibility in how it may wish to deal with problems along its peripheries. Yet the definition of threat remains paramount to the long-term durability of the alliance and to its mission.

Canada and the United States probably see the nature of the threat along the peripheries in somewhat different ways. Overall, Canada probably weighs nationalism, sectarianism such as Shiite Fundamentalism inside politics, and local border disputes as a greater source of regional instability than does the United States. Overall the United States probably sees Marxist-Leninist movements, particularly those that have been externally supported, as a greater threat to the survival of regional governments, and certainly to the general strategic balance, than does Canada.

Canada tends to think of threats as more often political than military and more often isolated instead of as part of a concerted series of events than does the United States. Thus for Canada most occurrences of instability such as the Lebanese civil war must be managed or quarantined not intervened against with military force. Part of the reason for this difference of views is grounded in the capability that is at the disposal of each government, and in their respective roles within the international system. This causal explanation for a different perception of external threat should not be underestimated. But also true is that the tradition of how to deal with political dispute and confrontation, internal or external, is quite at odds on each side of the 49th parallel. It is this different perceptual screen about proper management of diversity having cultural or political roots that is often not comprehended by American analysts in particular.

Regarding the NATO peripheries Canada would be more reluctant than the United States to characterize threats as large and serious enough to warrant a defensive response. Similarly, there would be great skepticism in Ottawa about the capacity of NATO qua organization to act as a deterrent to most of

the disputes that are likely to arise in these regions over the next decade. According to this view, the disputes are too idiosyncratic, localized, and often communal, to render them susceptible to deterrence by NATO.

Two partial qualifications to these statements of outlook are as follows. First, if Israel were attacked directly with overwhelming regional force, public opinion in Canada would drive Ottawa to look for an alliance position of support for the beleaguered government. However, awareness of the internal military strength of Israel, its professed interest in military self-reliance, its probable nuclear defence capability, and the possibility that the responsibility for the outbreak of war might be ambiguous all would tend to mitigate the enthusiasm of Canadian support for any actions involving NATO equipment or forces.

A second situation in which Canada might regard NATO forces as relevant for a defence of Western interests on the periphery might be an attack on the oil fields of the Gulf states, from whatever quarter such an attack could originate. Such an attack would have to be massive, involving conventional force that imperiled the operation of the fields, and that could not be turned back by other means. This threat might be viewed as sufficiently damaging to the interests of all members of the alliance to warrant a collective response for several reasons.

More than half of the petroleum used in the United States as of August 1989 was imported. Of that fraction a very high and growing proportion comes from the Persian Gulf. Japan and some of the other allies import as much as eighty per cent of their *total* petroleum needs from Gulf countries alone. By the end of the 1990's the world energy market could be very tight, with prices high, and excess production capacity limited. According to rules developed through cooperation among consumers within the International Energy Agency, reserve stocks of up to six months have been established, and, under certain circumstances of supply limitation, would be shared. But if the conditions described above came together abruptly, threatening Western economies with inadequate petroleum supplies over a potentially prolonged interval, attitudes among many NATO countries would certainly support a defence of the fields or an attempt to free the fields from a hostile occupation. In many respects the interests of the producer governments and of the consumer governments would coalesce around such an objective of a return to the status quo ante.

In theory, the United States would support NATO action with respect to these two sources of threat and perhaps others as well. NATO legitimization of the strike against terrorist operations in Libya, for instance, would have been welcomed by Washington. Access to aircraft dedicated to certain missions inside the sphere of NATO operations more narrowly conceived, and overflight rights, would have been extremely helpful.

On the other hand, in the absence of clear agreement among America's NATO allies about the nature and severity of a commonly perceived threat, and agreement about the appropriateness of a response, the United States might not be so enthusiastic about the NATO option. The necessity of having to gain NATO approval, that is, including the possibility, according to the NATO charter, of having to obtain the parliamentary approval of each of the member states, does have its disadvantages. If an operation must be kept secret, such approval becomes virtually impossible to obtain. If time is short for a decision, and if political concurrence is not immediate, NATO procedural rigidity could imperil a military operation. None of this suggests that NATO ought to alter its Charter or its administrative procedures, since they conform to the requirements of multilateral decision-making in an organization composed of democratic governments. But these constraints reveal why the United States and some of the other NATO members would prefer that NATO itself not be the chosen vehicle of a defensive military action, especially a small-scale and incisive strike, even when all of the interests of the members are quite clearly at stake.

Thus threats do exist along the NATO peripheries where a NATO response of some sort is at least a subject of consideration. Canada and the United States may view many of these threats in different ways because of their own respective political optics. Severity of threat, high stakes, and suddenness, all probably are necessary to garner the kind of support necessary in NATO counsels for some type of joint military action. These conditions conform also to the definition of severe international crisis.

(3) *Is NATO the best instrument?* Even if Canada, the United States, and other NATO members agree on the nature of the threats along the peripheries, there is considerable room for disagreement regarding the character of the response and regarding whether NATO itself is the correct instrument. In general, in my opinion, Canada and the United States are likely to split preferences along the following lines. This split by no means indicates that the two countries could not come to a common position favoring one or other of these preferences in individual circumstances. The split only reveals the abstract preferences of how to proceed in general terms.

Canada prefers use of U.N. peace-keeping forces wherever possible. It backs up this preference with willingness, when requested, to devote its own resources and military personnel to the task of policing a war-zone in the aftermath of hostilities. This preference is based not only on the prestige of the United Nations as a universal organization and its considerable experience in peace-keeping activity. Canada's preference for a U.N. role probably would extend, for example, to enthusiasm for a U.N.-sponsored naval force contributed by individual governments to a Persian Gulf patrol in the wake of the Iraq-Iran War. The thinking here is that such a U.N. peace-keeping force would be more acceptable to the Gulf states than one sponsored by NATO, even when

the participating governments were exactly the same. U.N. auspices is likely in the Canadian view to be thought of as more legitimate for these purposes than NATO auspices. The wine may be the same, but the bottles are different. The shape of the bottle is, in the Canadian view, quite important both for the supplier of the wine and for the consumer, especially the latter.

American preferences tend to follow a different path. American thinking favours actions by individual states with the requisite capability, knowledge, and experience when carried out in the interests of the larger community on behalf of a common interest in order-maintenance. Whether U.S. force is involved is often not relevant. For example, it is quite unlikely that the United States would have favoured NATO involvement in the dispute between Chad and Libya. French involvement, on the other hand, seemed quite appropriate to the American mind because of long French experience in the area and a complementarity of interests with other Western states. The effort was ultimately a success only because of its timeliness, efficiency, and tenacity. A more multiple effort could easily have failed. French and U.S. perspectives coincided with those of many other members of NATO as well as other African states, both Black-African and Arab. While the U.N. could still have a role, and the Organization of African States had an interest (but no capability), the specific outcome could probably only have been achieved through a fairly large provision of sophisticated French support and training that came in time to provide a proper defence.

From the American view, U.N.-sponsored forces are useful in the aftermath of a crisis, deployed to police an outcome that has already been determined. But U.N. forces are seldom available to create a favorable outcome. There is a crucial difference here between these two functions of force use. Policing an outcome that is "sub-optimal" is hardly the choice that Washington favours, nor in the long-run that it believes will conduce to a stable world order. Thus individual state action that is coordinated, perhaps informally, remains crucial in the American view.

Similarly, the United States believed that it had to respond directly to the Kuwait request to convoy oil tankers in the Persian Gulf. It could not do this task alone. It needed the support of its NATO allies, especially with respect to mine-sweepers. It appreciated the naval deployments ultimately made available by Britain (some had already been in place prior to the American decision), France, Italy, the Netherlands, and others. It acknowledged the quiet restraint of the Soviet naval force in the area. But it was the American naval capability that ultimately took casualties, revised Iranian thinking about the naval war (and in part about the war itself), and steered the outcome to a stalemate that was reasonably favourable to both sides. Only the American deployment with very sophisticated anti-missile capability, combined with a capacity to operate in the constrictive conditions of the Gulf, despite accident and mistakes, could have carried out this type of mission as compellingly. Once again,

from the operational perspective, individual government activity, backed up by support from sympathetic allies on an ad hoc basis, is the way the United States prefers to deal with most situations of order-maintenance on the NATO periphery.

Over time, regional peace-keeping, not now advocated by either Canada or the United States, may come into its own. At present such efforts are still very much in question. Whether Lebanon has benefitted from either the Israeli incursion or the Syrian occupation is quite doubtful. Perhaps the Arab League or some alternative regional grouping will provide a peace-keeping vehicle that can do better. But so far the evidence on behalf of progress is slim. Some combination of superpower, regional, and U.N.-sponsored activity may work. Neither U.N. peace-keeping alone, nor single-state intervention, is likely to succeed in this exceedingly complex problem of civil war on the NATO periphery.

Canada and the United States may favor different alternate modes of dispute settlement as an alternative or as an adjunct to any arrangement that emerges from NATO. However, in specific situations, each government has demonstrated willingness to use any of the solutions discussed provided that it has a reasonable prospect of success.

(4) *When can NATO be helpful?* NATO by its very existence is helpful on the peripheries as a deterrent and as a reminder of stable political order. NATO can be helpful as a symbol of united support for a policy of order-maintenance backed by such a large number of the world's advanced-industrial democracies. NATO countries have deployed a huge storehouse of equipment and weaponry for NATO use that in theory could be drawn upon for purposes of defence or deterrence in the outlying areas. This policy not only raises again the question of parliamentary support for such actions, but also the question of the thinning of defences in Europe during a possible crisis interval. Yet the idea of being able to pre-position troops and equipment is important if the nature of the threat begins to shift away from the European theatre.

Without doubt the largest purpose to which NATO may be put along the peripheries is its original primary purpose. NATO is most appropriately designed to meet a single, primary threat, namely a possible attack by Warsaw Pact forces. Following the reforms of Gorbachev, proposed as much as real, a sense in many of the Western democracies is that the "Cold War is dead." This sense arises as much out of an exaggerated fear of confrontation in the prior era as from a promise of immediate rapprochement in the present era. Yet an improvement in the atmosphere of East-West relations is nonetheless undeniable and very welcome. That the same level and quality of military capability for the most part still exists among the Warsaw Pact forces is offset by the fact that the two sides "are talking." However, the overwhelming military force of the Soviet Union on the ground remains in place, as before, notwithstanding proposed reductions along the Chinese border. Welcome changes of strategy

and tactics from "offensive" to "defensive" will take years to implement. Meanwhile strategic planners must concentrate on the implications of these changes for overall Soviet strategy in Europe as well as on the peripheries.

It is this notion of primary threat to which we now turning analytically.

(5) *Has the nature of the primary threat changed on the peripheries?* For the most part, in terms of direct territorial aggression, the Soviet Union has had no worse record of international relations conduct than most states in the system, and a much better record than some similarly authoritarian or totalitarian states in the past. Surely the strength and determination of the West has contributed to this model behavior. Regarding indirect support for "wars of liberation," subversion, and Communist take-over, the Soviet record, however, has not been good. Indeed, in the 1970's, Soviet, and Soviet-Cuban activity in South Yemen, Mozambique, Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and South-East Asia precipitated an intensification of the Cold War that led to the much harsher line in Soviet Affairs pursued by the early Reagan Administration. It is beside the point here to argue whether the internal challenges to authority in societies often experiencing corrupt and ineffective government preceded Soviet penetration, or whether Soviet infiltration came first. The net result is what is important, and the net result is that a number of polities in the 1970's, beset by domestic social, economic, and political problems, turned to the Soviet Union for assistance and, having done so, found, as South Yemen repeatedly discovered, that the fox had swallowed the goose. A reversal of association (a la Egypt) or a change in style of government became extremely difficult.

One of the ironies of the change in Third World affiliations in the 1970's is that the governments befriended by the Soviet Union for the most part could not remain in power without the occupation of their territories by Cuban troops and Soviet "advisors." Large sections of each country openly challenged the legitimacy of the central government, propped up by outside military support. Instead of promoting and provoking revolutionary change, the Soviet Union found itself supporting corrupt and badly organized governments that were opposing revolutionary change. Instead of thinking of itself on the forefront of radical change, on the offensive in the countryside, it found itself on the defensive in the central cities. By projecting its power far abroad, the Soviet Union discovered that that power had to be supplied and reinforced, and that new vulnerabilities emerged, which would be subject in the Kremlin to the criticism of "over-extension."

Yet the Soviet Union, in an interval of an *expanding* power base, will probably learn to cope with the new vulnerabilities, partly through the further development of a "blue-water" navy capable of operating out of an anchorage such as that of Aden, partly through other Cuba-like arrangements with client states capable of extending the Soviet imperial reach. Surely, the Soviet Union will find the support of "wars of national liberation" in the Third World

difficult to disavow even though the two crises of Soviet foreign policy caused by abrupt changes in position on the Soviet power cycle will tend to call into question some of the material basis of support for such endeavors. But what can be said more generally of the political targets of opportunity that may appear attractive to a Soviet Union, beset by internal leadership challenges, external problems of imperial coordination within Eastern Europe, and in extended relations further afield among Third World clients, all provoked by the *eventual collapse* of the Soviet foreign policy position on the power cycle? What patterns, if any, are evident in Soviet foreign policy conduct and in the changing structure of the international system that would make possible an understanding of future likely trends during the international crises of adjustment that the Soviet Union most assuredly will at some point have to face *when its power base is clearly no longer expanding?*

One might argue that Gorbachev's perestroika and retrenchment are signs that the Soviet Union has already adjusted to its slowed growth, and hence that it will no longer be a threat. But Gorbachev's policies are aimed at reinvigorating the Soviet economy, at giving it a new momentum. His policies are in no sense acknowledging Soviet decline on the power cycle; they are designed to prevent such decline from setting in. In this sense, the foreign policy initiatives may be only temporary efforts to limit costs and to create a respite for domestic economic development to be followed at a later date by a renewal of Soviet activism. The real test of future Soviet foreign policy intentions will come when the Soviet Union must confront the fact that it can no longer consider itself a rising power, whenever that may occur.

Perhaps the best way to answer these questions about possible outlets of Soviet challenge is to first think about the types of problems that close assessment reveals are *least* likely. By the process of elimination, one can then proceed to a tighter focus on the genuine problems of world order which have a higher probability of confronting the international system as the Soviet Union suddenly discovers that it must adjust its foreign policy interests to its declining relative capability.

While analysts obligated to use a "worst-case scenario" may raise doubts about the following proposition, my own theoretical and historical assessment based on familiarity with foreign policy data and materials, suggests that the Soviet Union is not likely to expand its control into Western Europe even during the stresses and strains of foreign policy crisis. This proposition is founded upon several assumptions each of which must be valid for the overall proposition of West European security as a whole to be valid.

First, the Federal Republic of Germany must continue its stable course of economic and political development, not sinking into the conditions that led in the 1930's to the rise of fascism, not tearing itself apart in some unforeseen civil war that would invite external intervention by worried neighbours. Second is the assumption that the level of European integration will remain

about the same or will increase but will not collapse. Third, the United States and Canada, despite increasing difficulties with formulae of burden-sharing, will continue to lend their support to the Atlantic Alliance. Fourth, not only is the U.S. nuclear commitment, solid but the will and financial muscle necessary to sustain the strength of the deterrent is present. Arms control may occur, if the cuts are balanced, deep, and shared, but these cuts will not alter the commitment to preserve a viable defensive shield. According to these premises, Europe appears impregnable, either to direct Soviet attack or to "finlandization."

Now let us turn to the East. Soviet border disputes with China abound. Involvement in South-East Asia, first with the Vietnam War, then with the political fate of Kampuchea, have drawn the Soviet Union into confrontation with the United States and subsequently with China. Without a Soviet nod of approval, the North Korean invasion of South Korea could not have occurred. Rivalries among China, India, and Pakistan create opportunities for Soviet mischief. Disagreement with Japan over the Kurile Islands and over navigation and other rights in the Sea of Japan tend to keep relations between Moscow and Tokyo cool, if not actually hostile. Perhaps the future of world order is to be written on the Asian Continent.

For a number of reasons, despite the history of the post-1945 conflict experience, a far-reaching Soviet challenge to the Asian region does not appear to be among the more probable events affecting world order during an interval of foreign policy crisis for the Soviet Union.

Border disputes between China and the Soviet Union could flare up at any time as they did in the 1969 Ussuri River incidents. But what seem most evident about this tension and bad feeling is that the two communist giants do not allow the disputes to escalate, or even for the most part to become more than verbal. An explanation is not hard to come by. Neither is strong enough in conventional terms to take territory away from the other, largely because the Soviet Union is weaker in Asia than it is in Europe, and China is not willing to invest the resources necessary to modernize its huge army. No territorial objective other than its own territorial status quo is worth to the Soviet Union the losses it would have to sustain in a nuclear war with China, especially since some nuclear missiles could reach the major western cities of the Soviet Union. Likewise, China would be very unwise, as the Ussuri River incident was meant to convey, to press its territorial grievances too far.

A rich garden of opportunity for the Soviet Union might seem to emerge out of the shifting regional balance of power among India, China, and Pakistan. The Soviet Union does indeed have a stake in this balance, traditionally siding with India against the rising power of China and the now divided Moslem states of Pakistan and Bangladesh. But unless Pakistan and India, or India and China, renew their squabbles through the use of force, the Soviet Union has no real opportunity to intervene with much weight to shape the

outcome. Each of these polities is large and otherwise resistant to challenge. Despite their multilingual and multi-ethnic composition, each of these polities has a strong sense of nation-state identity. Despite their poverty, they have skimmed enough off of their large GNPs to man and equip significant armies even to the point of acquiring or attempting to acquire nuclear weapons and a comparatively primitive but nonetheless regionally effective delivery capability. Despite their need of economic aid, and their differential receptivity to assistance from the Soviet Union, they all have outlets to the West which in many instances are more important because of the potential for transference of technology than any economic contact with the Soviet Union. The upshot is that the Soviet Union can and will affect the local balance of power in the region. But the Soviet Union has no real foot-hold from which to expand its influence or control among the big powers along its border unless one or other of these polities should collapse into civil war, thus inviting intervention.

Some analysts envision an eventual renewal of confrontation between the Soviet Union and Japan, among other things, for control of the Northern Pacific. The first confrontation of the twentieth century (1904-05) ended badly for Russia, yielding Korea. The Second World War ended badly for Japan, giving the Soviet Union control of the Kurile Islands. Is a third major armed confrontation in the offing?

From the Soviet perspective, the single most determinative change in Asian relations would follow from a decision by the Japanese military to "go nuclear." The reason such a decision would be so arresting is not so much found in the history of Soviet-Japanese relations as in the consequences of rapid Japanese acquisition of sophisticated nuclear weapons. But while Japan has the capacity to enter the strategic competition in space and to adopt nuclear weapons, it does not have the current desire.

In sum, as the Soviet Union looks to the future, it faces an emerging geopolitical reality. Regardless of the fate of the Western policy of containment and regardless of the Soviet dislike of perceived encirclement, the Soviet Union is confronted by the wealth and determination of Western Europe to remain free on one border, and the rising power of the Oriental giants on the other. To the east, these constraints are symbolized by the Great Wall of China with the far greater actual economic power of Japan standing behind. To the west, the constraints are symbolized by the conventional and nuclear strength of NATO guarding the huge economic base of Western Europe. The Soviet Union is not likely to be able either to manipulate or to subvert, far less directly to aggrandize, polities either to the East or to the West. Although for a very long time, U.S. power military and economic will remain crucial to the security of the states on both flanks, it is the indigenous resolve and potential within each region which is chiefly responsible for the inability of the Soviet Union to extend its influence in any meaningful way either eastward or westward.

Foreclosed from expansion of influence to the East and to the West, the Soviet Union enjoys only one feasible direction for enhancement of control, the South. Despite the military withdrawal from Afghanistan, the Soviet Union has opportunity and incentive for hegemony from northern Africa, through the Middle East, to the shores of the Indian Ocean. A number of reasons support speculation that Soviet government, consciously or subconsciously, finds access to the regions below its southern border an attractive realm for the acquisition of influence.

First, no large regional government stands in the way of expanded influence along the southern Soviet border. The very fragmentation of these regions in political terms opens up opportunities that reinforce the small size and weakness of the polities. Desire for arms to be used for internal security purposes, increases the vulnerability of the recipient. Absence of powerful regional actors means that the Soviet Union does not have to contend with any nearby polities for regional influence, thus creating for the Soviet Union a local balance of military capability in its favor.

Second, despite U.S. affinity for Israel and the commitment to open oil lines through the Persian/Arab Gulf, the United States increasingly finds the defence of countries in Africa and the Middle East costly and problematic. Reliance upon France for order-maintenance in northern Africa *vis-à-vis* local threats such as that posed by Libya in Chad is a means of countering over-extension. But opposition to direct or indirect Soviet expansion is not so easily delegated, requiring both greater subtlety through internal contact with governing elites, and a greater naval and conventional military presence than that commanded by most allies. Since logistical capability and the capacity to deploy troops quickly are hallmarks of a successful presence, the climate, configuration of political tensions, and distance from major military facilities (despite bases in Diego Garcia, Somalia, Israel, and the Azores) complicate order-maintenance activity for the United States.

Third, Russian interest in "warm water ports" predates the contemporary pressure for growing influence to the south. To some extent the fate of the Ottoman Empire, the proverbial "sick man of Europe," the outcome of the Crimean War of 1853, and the treaties governing access to the Black Sea via the Dardenelles, all were bellweathers of late twentieth century Soviet policy.

While the object of Soviet expansion into the Middle East and Africa is to squeeze Saudi Arabia and the oil-rich countries of the Arab world in a vise built of ideologically compatible and strategically dependent regimes on the outskirts of the core area, the Soviet Union has experienced two severe setbacks in this strategy. The first set-back was Sadat's Egypt. Egypt is the key to entry both to North and East Africa and to the Middle East proper. Egypt is the continental bridge. He who controls Egypt controls the movement of commerce and the establishment of an air and naval presence in the region. Loss of Egypt meant not only that the Soviet Union sacrificed an important entry point

into Arab politics, because regardless of how different Egypt is from the rest of the Arab-speaking world, without Egypt the Arab world cannot coalesce around a single strategy or policy. The other set-back is Afghanistan, although it is only a partial setback and reveals the brilliance of Gorbachev's tactical timing and capacity to retain position while appearing in total retreat.

A further medium of Soviet strategic outreach is the effort to establish a sphere of influence arrangement through bargaining with the other superpower. Russia has long favoured sphere of influence politics. Not just contemporary desire for ideological and territorial buffers in Eastern Europe, for example, drives Soviet thinking regarding the sphere of influence notion. Spheres of influence are cheap to create and, because they are exclusive, safe to maintain. Russia sought spheres of influence in Poland in the 1790's, in Persia at the turn of the twentieth century, and with Hitler in 1939. So also the Soviet Union under Brezhnev sought a sphere of influence in the contemporary Middle East frustrated only by the Carter Administration's idealism about such matters. Brezhnev proposed, and Carter rejected, a strategem whereby the Soviet Union would administer a sphere of influence in the northern tier of states, namely involving Syria, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan while the United States would have primary responsibility for the security of the next tier of states southward. According to the Soviet way of thinking, such a plan would put order into the Middle East and would stabilize East-West relations as well. Presumably the four Arab-Israeli wars including the nuclear alert in 1973 were prominent in Moscow's thought. But such a sphere of influence scheme would virtually guarantee Soviet domination of all the Middle East by taking away the tier of governments separating the Gulf and the oceans from the disparate and vulnerable southern group of polities.

Rejected though the Brezhnev scheme for sphere of influence demarcation was, it revealed the unity of Soviet thought concerning geopolitical aims in the region. From Syria to Afghanistan, the Soviet Union would like to create a buffer of friendly states much like it has done in Eastern Europe and in Manchuria, states dependent upon the Soviet Union for direction and foreign policy initiative.

Iran is situated on the Gulf and permits a diffusion of influence in many directions. Comparatively large, rich, and populous, and although Moslem, only slightly Arabic in population makeup, Iran is a counterweight to the rest of the Middle East. Despite its impenetrability in geographic terms because of the alternation of mountain ranges and valley, and because of the fissaporousness of this tribal and ethnic group composition, Iran could nonetheless be subordinated to Russian dominance at some future time if the events that led to the initial subversion of Afghanistan could somehow be imitated in Iran.

Not only is Iran attractive as an extension of the Soviet imperial reach; Iran, with its Moslem population in Azerbaidzhan, is almost a natural extension of territory and peoples now integral to the Soviet Union. Iran would be

dismantled and reorganized under Soviet tutelage, making the appendage added to the Soviet Union more manageable, and the remainder outside direct Soviet control more dependent, psychologically and politically, upon leadership from the North.

The problem for NATO is that the focus of primary threat, namely sections of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, is not where NATO is located. And where NATO is located, the sense of threat seems somewhat in abeyance.

On the one hand, the reforms introduced by Gorbachev, including those that facilitate a looser configuration in Eastern Europe, pull-backs from Afghanistan, Angola, and South-East Asia, and additional proposals for arms control as well as suggestions of unilateral reductions in the Soviet defence budget, all suggest a Soviet Union with a very different foreign policy focus than in the past. Yet many issues confront this interpretation of Soviet attitudes and behavior that go beyond the orbit of this article.

To those who anticipate utopia around the corner, NATO will have little purpose. The same could be said concerning the nature of the primary threat associated with NATO peripheries. But for those with a longer view and a sense of the continuing reality of military bipolarity (if not of the Cold War *per se*), a sense of quiet caution will replace the desire for utopia.

In the latter view, NATO will continue to have a role on the periphery to some extent as a guarantor that the primary threat will never have to be experienced. The difficulty with deterrence, of course, is that its success can never be demonstrated. But just as many believe that NATO has enjoyed success in Europe, so NATO may have had a long-standing positive impact on the primary threat to sections of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Just imagine the situation in the Middle East if the Soviet Union did not have to contemplate a cohesive alliance on its European border.

Conclusions

Whether Canadians and Americans can agree on the nature of secondary threats on the peripheries, and the role that NATO could play in offsetting or managing these disputes, they have found greater agreement historically about the nature of the primary threat and the place of NATO in deterring that threat.

Secondary vulnerabilities may eventually become greater on the peripheries than are the primary vulnerabilities in Europe. Likewise, perceptions of the primary threat to Europe may eventually so dissipate that the NATO rationale may all but disappear. So far, however, neither of these considerations has emerged to overshadow the logic of NATO, and its deterrent responsibilities in Europe, nor to negate the lesser but still significant NATO role on the peripheries.

Canada and NATO Looking to the 90's

John Halstead

1989 was a year of more than one anniversary. Not only was NATO 40 years old, but it was also 50 years since the beginning of World War II and 75 years since the outbreak of World War I. More important still, 1989 will go down in history as the year when the "iron curtain" of the cold war finally came tumbling down – dismantled from within – a new European order began to take shape. Never since 1945 had Europe been in such flux: never since 1848 had popular discontent erupted with such force. It is therefore a good time for Canada and the Alliance to which we belong to take stock of where we are now, how we got here and where we want to go in the 90's.

For the past four decades NATO has done the job for which it was created. It has kept the peace in freedom by being strong and united enough to ensure that aggression would not pay. In doing so it has applied three important lessons drawn from the painful experience of the first half of the century: that it costs infinitely more to fight a war than it does to prevent one; that wars prevention requires defence preparedness; and that the security of Europe and that of North America are inextricably linked and can be separated only at the peril of both.

In addition, NATO has developed an important new concept of stability, which depends as much on political as on military means. Hence the Alliance's two-track policy of defence/deterrence and dialogue/detente, and the importance of its role in the management of East-West relations and the negotiation of arms control agreements. This has been no mean feat, and stands in contrast to the situation before World War I, when there was too much defence and not enough dialogue, and before World War II, where there was too much dialogue and not enough defence.

An essential element in NATO's success has undoubtedly been the role of nuclear weapons and their deterrent power. Indeed, it may well be the fear of nuclear holocaust, rather than any particular strategy, which has deterred war between nuclear powers to date. If this is so, then the so-called MAD (mutual assured destruction) doctrine and the "balance of terror" may not be inimical to the cause of peace, provided the deterrent remains mutual and balanced. Be that as it may, it is NATO's position that "no first use" should apply to all weapons, and not just to nuclear weapons, since it could be virtually impossible to restrict hostilities, once a shooting war broke out. And NATO continues

to insist that nuclear weapons are necessary for its strategy of "flexible response," whereby Soviet aggression would be met at whatever level and in whatever way required to repel the attack.

NATO's success should not blind us to the fact that throughout its history the Alliance has had to deal with problems arising out of differences of power, perception and policy. The disparity of power between the United States, a superpower with global commitments, and its allies, some with global interests but all with more limited commitments, is a basic difference which has coloured the whole relationship. There have also been important differences of perception. The Americans have wanted a Europe which is strong enough to carry a greater share of the defence burden, but not strong enough to challenge US leadership, while the Europeans have wanted a United States which is strong enough to continue protecting them but not strong enough to act unilaterally, particularly in its relations with the Soviet Union. And there have been differences of policy, particularly on trade and economic policy, and on such questions as the balance to be struck between defence and arms control.

There are three areas where past intra-Alliance differences are of particular significance for the future: how to manage the nuclear deterrent; how to adjust to the evolving relationship between the United States and an increasingly united European Community; and how to deal with the Soviet Union.

NATO has faced a nuclear dilemma for sometime. The attempt to deter conventional aggression in Europe with nuclear weapons controlled by a non-European power which is itself subject to nuclear retaliation has not only become less and less credible; it has also led to an implicit contradiction in NATO strategy. The Americans believe that, if deterrence fails, it will be better to fight a limited conventional war than an all-out nuclear war. They want therefore to maintain the conventional and theatre nuclear capabilities in Europe to make the link to the US strategic deterrent discretionary. The continental European allies, on the other hand, do not regard either nuclear or conventional war as an acceptable option. Consequently they want to make it as clear as possible that any aggression would lead to nuclear war, and for this purpose, to link NATO's defence in Europe as directly as possible to the US strategic deterrent. The dilemma, which was at the heart of the argument over the "modernization" of Lance missiles, may be eased but not resolved in the course of the CFE (conventional forces in Europe) and START (strategic arms reduction talks) negotiations.

There has always been a latent tension in the relationship between the United States and its European allies, arising out of the dichotomy between defence cooperation and economic competition. In the context of defence cooperation the United States has been a staunch supporter of closer European unity, but has reacted with growing irritation to the competitive challenge in the economic field posed by an increasingly integrated European Community. Instead of trying to resolve the dichotomy, there has in the past been a tacit

agreement among the allies to pursue defence cooperation and coordination of economic policies in more or less watertight compartments. Today there is renewed talk in Washington of "burden sharing" as the priority requirement of reducing the budget deficit produces growing pressures to contrast American global security commitments. At the same time Americans are unsure where the new European assertiveness is leading and whether European efforts to complete their internal market to intensify their defence cooperation will on balance strengthen or weaken broader NATO cooperation.

As for the question of how to deal with the Soviet Union, there have always been differences between the United States, whose policies have been dominated by the superpower rivalry as the main feature of the international scene, and the allies, who have tried to avoid deepening the division of Europe and have been nervous about the dangers of unwanted confrontation. This has led in the past to strains in the trans-Atlantic dialogue. Americans have accused the Europeans of failing to shoulder their share of the collective defence burden, of lacking resolve to stand up to the Soviet threat and of criticizing the United States unfairly. The Europeans have in turn accused the Americans of putting undue emphasis on military power, of seeing the world in black and white terms and of lacking political consistency. Now all the old benchmarks have been swept away as Gorbachev transforms the East-West context and the sudden prospect of German reunification adds a new, incalculable feature.

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As we stand on the threshold of the 90's we see a world where the old order is changing out of all recognition but the shape of the new order is far from clear. Growing global problems of population, poverty, pollution and weapons' proliferation are adding new dimensions to international security. The technological revolution in the field of communications, information and weaponry have accelerated the trend toward global interdependence but the institutional framework remains inadequate to deal with it.

Most dramatic of all the current events is the revolution from below which has swept Eastern Europe. There two main factors have been at work. One is the failure of the Communist system to deliver the goods (either physical or spiritual). The other is the germination of the seeds of freedom, sown years ago by the Helsinki Final Act, with its principles of peaceful change and freer movement of people and ideas, which have now sprouted with unimagined force. In Poland, free elections have produced a non-Communist government. In Hungary, the Communist Party has liquidated itself in preparation for elections there. In Czechoslovakia, the Communist Party has negotiated an end to its monopoly of power. In Romania, the oppressive Ceasescu regime has been toppled by a popular uprising. And even in Bulgaria, the ice has started to thaw.

It might have been otherwise if Gorbachev had not decided (wisely) not to intervene with force. In doing so he has opened a new chapter in the Soviet Union's relations with its Warsaw Pact Allies. And he has made it possible for change to take place remarkably peacefully so far (except for Romania). But the pace of change is breathtaking and could easily get out of hand. The trouble is that, while the old Communist regimes have lost both their legitimacy and their capacity to govern, the new popular movements have not yet gained either the authority or the experience to do so.

In the Soviet Union Gorbachev has sparked a second Communist revolution, but it is a revolution from above. And it is doubtful that, when he launched his campaign for "new thinking," he himself anticipated the magnitude of the challenge. The imperative of economic reform has led to political reform but Gorbachev faces an increasingly daunting task, because the effects of political reform are immediate, whereas economic reform will take years, if not generations, to achieve. Meanwhile pressures mount for more pluralism and democracy, while the obstacles to turning the faltering economy around pile up. Long suppressed minorities in the Baltic states, the Caucasus, Moldavia and even the Ukraine are calling for more autonomy, and in some cases outright independence.

The imperative of internal reform in the Soviet Union has also led to foreign policy initiatives designed to ensure a more stable and predictable international environment. The Soviet Union has withdrawn from Afghanistan, has announced substantial unilateral force reductions and has agreed to negotiate both conventional and strategic nuclear arms cuts on terms largely acceptable to the West. It has also taken a more pragmatic and less ideological approach to the resolution of regional conflicts and has shown a willingness to play a more constructive role in the United Nations. Encouraging opportunities for East-West cooperation are opening in both bilateral and multilateral situations.

Gorbachev will stand or fall by the success or failure of his economic reforms. For this I do not believe there is any precise time limit, but he must continue to demonstrate that he is in control of the process. One thing he cannot afford, however, is to preside over the dissolution of the Soviet Union as a superpower. Consequently his bottom line in the Soviet Union will probably be to hold the line at economic autonomy for the constituent republics, and in Eastern Europe, to maintain the Warsaw Pact in some form as a guarantee for the protection of Soviet security interests.

Less dramatic than events in the Communist world, but no less important for NATO, are the changes which have been taking place in the West as the post-war world of the two superpower has yielded to a more diffused multipolar pattern, with the rise of other power centres in Europe and Asia. In Western Europe the drive toward greater unity has led the members of the European Community to concert their defence efforts more closely, to articulate a European defence identity and to speak with one voice on foreign policy.

In Asia Japan has become an economic superpower and has started to play an international role more commensurate with that status. And the predominance of the Atlantic basin as the centre of economic and political gravity has been modified by the increasing importance of the Pacific Rim. This does not mean that Europe is no longer where the global balance of power is at stake but it does mean that the growing weight of Japan, and to a lesser extent China, and the mounting population pressures in Latin America, are drawing American attentions increasingly south and west.

At the same time the United States has passed from being the world's foremost creditor to the foremost debtor nation. Its economic weight has therefore been curtailed, while its political weight has been handicapped by the continuing lack of a foreign policy consensus and by the ongoing power struggle between the President and Congress. Internal pressures have thus been at work to limit US overseas commitments and the United States is no longer in a position to exercise the sort of dominant leadership it once did. The result is that there has been a shift of power within the Western world, not because the United States has declined but because others have grown stronger. Both Western Europe and Japan are able to deal with the United States on a footing of greater equality and there is a strong tendency toward consolidation and hence regionalism in Western Europe, North America and the Far East.

Seen in another way, the changes which have been taking place in both East and West amount to a turning of the tide of both American and Soviet power from the high water mark of the post-war period. The complete collapse of Germany at the end of World War II left a power vacuum in the centre of Europe which the two superpowers filled. The result was a rivalry which spawned the "cold war" and which, with ups and downs of tension and detente, has lasted to this day. Now both the United States and the Soviet Union, though for different reasons, are disposed to restrict their rivalry, to limit defence spending, to negotiate arms control agreements and to pull back from their confrontation in Central Europe.

German Chancellor Kohl's partners in the European Community and NATO, while approving the goal of German unity, have emphasized the importance of a peaceful, gradual process which would take place within the framework of European integration and in consultation with all concerned, including the four former allied powers, which still have responsibility for the eventual disposition of the German question.

There is no doubt that what we are witnessing is nothing less than the birth pangs of a new European order. The pressures for democratic freedoms have created a new dynamic in Central Europe, as the predominance of the two superpowers ebbs, the vacuum they once occupied will be filled more and more by the Germans and their European partners.

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It is obvious that this changing international environment will have far-reaching implications for NATO. For one thing there is a serious problem of public perceptions in the West, due to a diminishing sense of threat and increasing domestic pressures to reduce defence spending. Too many people in the West assume that, with the Cold War over, peace has broken out and NATO is therefore obsolete. Such a view is both premature and overoptimistic. While the East-West confrontation has mercifully declined, the risks of instability have mounted substantially both in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union. In the Soviet Union the future of reform is by no means sure. And in Eastern Europe the transition from communism to democracy may not be smooth. It is therefore with stability more than with security that NATO must now concern itself. The prospects are certainly better for setting East-West relations on a more positive course but the task of managing those relations is likely to become more complex rather than easier, if only because they will be complicated on both sides by the problems of West-West and East-East relations.

It is equally obvious that there will be far-reaching implications for the Warsaw Pact. Gorbachev's permissive attitude toward the democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe implies that he has dropped the ideological basis for the alliance but it does not mean that he is prepared to abandon the Soviet Union's security interests in Eastern Europe, which remain centered on Germany. He can therefore be expected to seek a new basis for a more pluralistic association, building on such factors as the shared interest in political stability and in economic development. Clearly he believes that his chances of achieving this will be enhanced if NATO is also maintained and North American forces remain in Europe, as Foreign Minister Shevarnadze signalled on the occasion of his symbolically significant recent visit to NATO Headquarters in Brussels. On the other hand, popular pressure may well develop in some of the East European countries not only for a substantial reduction of Soviet forces but for their complete removal.

In these circumstances it will be prudent to retain as many tools as we can, including NATO, to keep things on an even keel. But that does not mean standing pat. The "Soviet threat" is no longer a sufficient guarantee of alliance solidarity or of public support of NATO. It is no longer enough for the allies to know what they are against; they now have the far harder task of defining more clearly what they are for. Far from being obsolete, NATO may now be more relevant than ever, not so much in strictly military terms, but as a political instrument for coordinating Western policy and managing change in a stable manner. For this purpose the Alliance needs to develop well-articulated policies to deal with both East-West and West-West relations. The first requirement in the 90's will be to maintain NATO's unity of purpose. If Europe and North America are not to drift apart, statesmanship of a high order will be called for

to build a more reciprocal partnership across the Atlantic. For the partnership to be reciprocal, there needs to be a concerted effort by the United States, on the one hand, and its allies, on the other hand, to take greater account of each other's views and to contribute more to each other's interests. There must be a greater degree of burden sharing, certainly, but also of risk sharing and decision sharing. The Atlantic must become more of a two-way street in political, economic and technological terms as well as in terms of defence.

As Western Europe becomes less dependent on the United States militarily, it will be important to promote the strategic unity of NATO as an alliance for the security of North America as well as Western Europe. In that context it should be possible to envisage a phased reduction of U.S. forces in Western Europe along with a European contribution, if only symbolic, to the air defence of North America. It will also be important to strengthen NATO's role as the primary political instrument for the coordination of US, Canadian and Western European security policies, not only in Europe but also more widely, and for this purpose to improve the quality of political consultations in NATO. And finally it will be important, both for the cohesion of the Alliance and for the public support which NATO needs, to ensure that strategy and arms control do not work at cross-purposes, and that both are aimed at fostering stability.

If the atmosphere of East-West relations continues to improve and progress continues to be made in reducing the military confrontation in Europe, it is possible to foresee the emergence of a new European "architecture" built around three existing instruments adapted to the purpose. One would be an increasingly integrated European Community, with which would be associated in time, first, the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) countries, and then some, if not all, of the Eastern European countries. Another would be NATO, whose military component would gradually decline in relative importance while the political component would be significantly enhanced. Thus modified, it could serve as a mechanism for bolstering stability and helping to anchor Germany firmly in the West. And it could develop institutional links with a transformed Warsaw Pact, as the latter became increasingly divested of its military and ideological accessories. The third instrument would be a more institutionalized Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which could provide an overarching framework for cooperation among the NATO allies, the Warsaw Pact allies and the neutrals to reduce progressively the division of Europe. This might correspond to Gorbachev's "common European home," in which he has explicitly reserved a place for both the United States and Canada.

Ending the division of Germany would in this way go hand in hand with ending the division of Europe, and would be accomplished, not only abolishing the two alliances but by transforming them. But this can come about only if a new context of East-West relations can be created, in which peaceful competition and cooperation take the place of ideological antagonism and military

CORRECTION TO PAGE 149, LAST PARAGRAPH

Please substitute this correction for the first sentence:

Ending the division of Germany would in this way go hand in hand with ending the division of Europe, and would be accomplished, not by abolishing the two alliances, but by transforming them.

confrontation. Such a context is in fact implicit in the latest developments in Europe but we have not yet figured out how to get from here to there.

What we need, in my view, is to elaborate a new concept of "mutual security" – not, I hasten to add, "common security" because I believe we can not have common security unless we have common values, and we are far from that. The basic premise of "mutual security" would be that one party's security cannot be bought at the price of the other party's insecurity. It would thus reject the view that East-West relations have to be a "zero sum game" of winners and losers and would instead assume that it is possible to manage the relationship in such a way that both sides win. It would recognize that security has political, economic and socio-cultural as well as military dimensions. It would not insist on common values but would seek to build a mutually beneficial relationship on the basis of shared interests, backed by the proviso that neither party should seek or allow one-sided advantage. And it would aim ultimately at building mutual confidence, as a key ingredient of security, by developing balance, stability and predictability in the relationship, based on mutual reassurance, transparency and verification.

Another feature of this concept would be a progressive movement from mutual interests through mutual benefits to mutual confidence. The most fundamental mutual interest is in survival. For this purpose relations need not be "good" but they do need to be well managed. This means, as a minimum objective, avoiding confrontation, and if possible anticipating trouble spots, defusing potential conflicts and reducing tensions. It also means the creation of crisis management machinery and procedures, as well as measures to reduce the risk of accidental war in times of crisis. More broadly, it means that each side should take the other's security concerns into account in setting its own security requirements. Ideally, security requirements should as far as possible be determined by negotiation rather than unilaterally, and should be accompanied by arms control considerations.

Beyond survival the aim should be to generate mutual benefits through renewed efforts to expand East-West cooperation in a wide variety of functional fields. Trade, industrial cooperation (including joint ventures and joint production), environmental cooperation, scientific and cultural exchanges are only some of the areas where more intensive cooperation is becoming possible as barriers come down to the free movement of people, ideas and capital. Similarly we should encourage greater involvement of the Soviet Union and its allies in the international trade and monetary system. The Soviet Union has already indicated an interest in joining the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and we should study seriously the practical problems to be resolved in that connection. At the same time the West should insist on the principle of reciprocity, and should not allow the East to gain any one-sided advantage in credits, technology or goods with military application.

Beyond serving mutual interests and generating mutual benefits we should continue to build mutual confidence through measures designed to create an environment favourable to further far-reaching and durable arms control and reduction agreements (such as those currently under negotiation in Vienna and Geneva). There is scope for further confidence and security building measures (CSBM's) for enhancing mutual information about military doctrine and activities, guaranteeing a longer warning period and guarding against surprise attack. And efforts should be made to negotiate agreements to deal cooperatively with the implications of new technologies and to prevent either side from seeking or allowing one-sided advantage.

The continued existence of nuclear weapons would not be inconsistent with this concept, nor would the maintenance of the deterrent. But it would be a crucial function of the proposed regime of mutual security to see that deterrence is indeed mutual, that it is maintained at the lowest possible level of forces and that those forces remain invulnerable on both sides. Such mutuality would of course preclude unilateral moves by either side to obtain strategic dominance, but it would by the same token ensure the credibility of both sides' deterrent.

Thanks to the openings provided by Gorbachev's reforms, the West has an unexcelled opportunity to shift the East-West relationship onto a more constructive footing, to bring the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe more fully into the international system, and in the process to heal the division of Europe. If we can move in this direction with all due urgency, then perhaps we can keep up with events, can give the North Atlantic Alliance a new lease on life and can look forward to developing a new basis for East-West cooperation to deal with the emerging global problems of population, poverty, pollution and weapons proliferation. This may appear visionary, but in these turbulent times we need a vision of where we want to go, for without that we will be victims rather than managers of change.

* * * * *

Despite its problems and shortcomings, NATO has over the years served Canada's security interests well. It is true that Canadians have been unhappy about a disposition they have sometimes perceived in NATO to emphasize defence and deterrence at the cost of dialogue and arms control, have been uncomfortable with NATO's nuclear strategy, and have been disturbed by a tendency on both sides of the Atlantic to foster the "two pillar" concept of NATO as an alliance between two mythical entities, "Europe" and "America." All this has tended to make Canada "odd man out," North American but not American, a country whose military contribution, divided between Europe and North America, has never been enough to make much of a difference.

Nevertheless Canada has gained much more from the Alliance than it has had to contribute. The maintenance of Canadian forces in Europe, as part of a collective effort to prevent war, has been far less costly than returning to

Europe to fight, as we did on two previous occasions. And Canada has in the process obtained access to the most important forums for information sharing and consultations in the Western world. An overwhelming majority of Canadians seems to understand that the only sensible defence policy for Canada, given its geopolitical situation, its vast territory and its sparse population, is to do its part in cooperation with like-minded friends and allies to help ensure a benign international environment. Less clear is whether Canadians appreciate what the implications of this should be in terms of commitments undertaken and resources allocated to the collective defence effort.

And what should Canada's part be in the new scheme of things which is emerging? We are in fact well placed to continue playing a modest but constructive role. We are participants in both NATO and the CSCE, two of the three instruments around which the new European order seems likely to be built. And we have an important stake in the maintenance of strong transatlantic ties – they enhance international security and stability, and they contribute to a healthy diversification of our external relations. To judge from its words, the Canadian Government shares these views. It has been active in the CSCE process and has offered small amounts of aid to Poland and Hungary. It has recently reconfirmed its NATO commitments and has contributed substantially to the arms control process, particularly with respect to verification. But it remains to be seen whether Canada will be a spectator or a participant in the period ahead, for the latter will require a willingness to commit resources to both security and cooperation in Europe on a scale greater than the Government has yet shown.

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